

METHODIST REVIEW

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ART. I.—JESUS OR CHRIST?

IN 1865 Strauss published a work entitled *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History*. The book was a criticism of Schleiermacher's *Life of Jesus*, and Strauss's aim was to emphasize the doctrine of his own *Life of Jesus*, that the Christ of faith is a production of the church, while the Jesus of history is something very different. The antithesis expressed in the title of his later work has become quite the order of the day in recent times. The *Hibbert Journal* recently published a symposium on the subject, and a book bearing the title *Jesus or Christ?* has lately appeared. Those who maintain the negative view in this matter are generally quite acute in objection, but not always strong and comprehensive in their discussion of the subject. Every student knows how easy it is to raise objections, and how often many a writer who in attack is very able proves to be weak enough when put on the defensive. Of course in logic a theory is justified not merely or mainly by the objections it can raise to other views, but also, and more especially, by its own positive adequacy to the facts. It often happens that a view which, considered by itself, has many difficulties is, nevertheless, the line of least resistance, so that when the subject is comprehensively considered, the view is found to be one in which the mind most easily rests. And this seems to us to be the case with this discussion of *Jesus or Christ?* The orthodox view, while undoubtedly having its mysteries and difficulties, after all turns out to be the one of least resistance. To show this, and thus indirectly to support the ortho-

dox view, I purpose first of all to examine a little book recently published which is essentially devoted to this problem. If we find that it makes more difficulties than it removes, and requires more faith than the view it rejects, we shall find ourselves correspondingly confirmed in the historic faith of Christianity. The book is entitled *What We Know about Jesus*. The author, a liberal clergyman of advanced type, says: "Our study requires us to separate two words which have grown together, namely, 'Jesus' and 'Christ.' They represent different ideas." For him, then, the word "Jesus" is the name of the real man, the prophet of Galilee; "Christ" is the name for the dogmatic creation of the church, historically baseless and infected with all manner of dogmatic and theological suggestions. It will be seen from this that the author's thought is essentially that of Strauss. Of course the similarity is in the title only. There is no suggestion in this brochure of the massive scholarship of Strauss, but still the general thought is that the Jesus of history must be very sharply distinguished from the Christ of faith. What, then, do we know about Jesus? What we may believe about Christ is another thing. That is a matter of dogma and tradition, but what we know about Jesus is a question of history, and is to be determined by historical methods. As the result of much reflection the author concludes that we do not know very much about Jesus and not all that we seem to know is entirely to his credit. He says:

From any point of view the problem must be extremely difficult. It is no slight task, indeed, to obtain a really clear and lifelike, not to say accurate, description of a man of our own stock and language, and as near our own time as Channing and Washington, only a hundred years ago or less. But in Jesus's case we have to make our way back nearly twenty centuries. We peer dimly through hundreds of years where books or, rather, manuscripts were extremely rare, and careful scholarship as we know the term was rarer still. . . . We come at last upon a few bits of writing which constitute almost the sole authority of our knowledge for the beginnings of Christianity. I mean the New Testament books, the Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles. Outside of these writings we know nothing authentic about Jesus. Moreover, most of the New Testament does not profess to give us any information about him. Paul obviously had only the slightest acquaintance with his teachings, which he hardly more than quotes once, or of his historic life, which he seems to slight in favor of a somewhat mystical theory of his personality (p. 2).

Obviously, then, we cannot get much first-hand knowledge. A few pages at most, the amount of a simple pamphlet, are the sum of our material: "A considerable part of the material consists in wonder stories or miracles."

Only a few personal incidents here and there, a glimpse as of one passing in the street, serve to reveal the real man. How we strain our eyes to see what he looks like, to catch the tone of his voice, to get for one long moment the clear impress of his personality. Who can honestly say that he ever feels acquainted with Jesus? (p. 7). How many clearly authentic utterances have we from Jesus? What can we rest upon? What exactly did he do? What did he say of himself and his mission? What commandments did he lay down, or what ordinances did he establish? What new ideas, if any, did he contribute? The answers to all these questions must be found, if at all, in the study of a few pages of the synoptic Gospels. No one is sure or can possibly be sure of these answers. The light is too dim in the remote corner of the Roman empire of the first century where we are at work deciphering, as it were, a series of palimpsests (p. 9).

Our knowledge of Jesus, then, seems to be in a bad way, and when we turn to the pamphlets we find no single account of a consistent character, but many scattered characters which leave us in great uncertainty.

The general portraiture of Jesus in the fourth Gospel hardly impresses us as winning or lovable. We are constantly disturbed by the language of egotism and self-assertion put into Jesus's mouth, in accordance with the author's evident conception of a mystical and Messianic personage, not a veritable man. The constant use of the word "I" almost spoils the Gospel for profitable reading to a modern congregation. Moreover, John's Jesus repeatedly assails, provokes, and castigates the leaders of his people. All this portraiture, judged by our highest standards of conduct, is unworthy of the best type of man, not to say a good God (p. 15).

The author is unpleasantly impressed with this egotism of Jesus and recurs to it more than once. He thinks it "not in line with the whole trend of the democratic thought of our age. To most men even yet Jesus is the center and head of a monarchical scheme of religion. . . . The democratic ideal, on the other hand, conceives of a host of men all of one common nature, all associated together as members of one family, all needing both to help and to be helped, to give and to take of each other, to teach and to

be taught, to inspire and to be inspired by every fresh act and word of friendliness and devotion. There is here no one master or leader or Saviour—like a king cell in the human body. There is reciprocity, there is mutuality. . . . This alone is spiritual democracy" (p. 86). The synoptic Gospels are better in this respect, but here, too, the wonder stories make up so large a part of the narrative as to tend to obscure the portrait of the real Jesus. Some things related are fine, but the story of the temptation "reads like a series of dreams; it belongs to no real world." His habitual attitude toward the Pharisees is not to his credit: "He never seems to show them any sympathy. He upbraids and denounces them and calls them by harsh names, as hypocrites, as a generation of vipers, and, if one could believe the fourth Gospel, as 'children of the wicked one.' 'Ye are of your father, the devil.' Few realize how many such passages there are." In smaller matters Jesus seems to have spoken in an unfilial way to his mother, and in his cleansing of the temple and denunciation of the churchmen of his time he appears to have given way to unpardonable temper. "This story matches, indeed, with the theory of a supernatural and terrible Messiah. But as the story of an actual man it is nothing less than an act of anarchy, like lynch law" (p. 23). His egotism, already referred to, further appears in putting forward his own personality as central to his work and message. This, too, displeases the author, for "the world is going to learn the use of a greater word than the 'I' of a Messiah. The noblest of leaders may not safely dwell on the centrality of his own person. The more modest words 'we' and 'ours' alone keep men safe and in orderly place in the ranks of the common humanity. No one may assume a sole authority over his fellows. . . . There blends, therefore, with the touches of the common and genial humanity an almost repellent impression of aloofness as of one already the inhabitant of another and mystic realm. On this side Jesus is well-nigh unapproachable. Normal humanity is apart from this realm. It is the region of fanaticism and of religious extravagance" (p. 65).

Thus we see that Jesus as portrayed in the Gospels does not make a good impression on the author. There are, indeed, many

remarkable and wonderful passages of love and many gleams of deep insight, but along with these there are many other things unpleasant and forbidding. There are, for example, suggestions of eternal damnation. The devil is not altogether ruled out. Then, too, there is the unpleasant refrain, "Where the worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched." The picture of Dives in hell is terrific, and such parables as "the wedding feast, the wise and foolish virgins, and the talents are morally more or less vitiated for our use by the inhuman ending of each of them" (p. 47). Thus the matter gets worse and worse. Jesus himself seems also to have adopted the Messianic idea, as "it is not easy at all otherwise to explain so numerous a number of passages ascribed to him. The origin and growth of the resurrection stories seem also more likely to have come with Jesus's help by way of preparation for them than without any such help. They also came, I surmise, with a wave of interest and belief in occult and psychic phenomena, of which we get hints in the Gospels, as, for example, in the story of Herod's theory of the reincarnation of John the Baptist in the person of Jesus, in the story of Jesus walking on the sea, in the legend of the transfiguration, as well as in the ghostly appearances in Jerusalem after Jesus's death" (p. 53). Thus we see that Jesus seems to have regarded himself as appointed by God for a peculiar mission, and as being so understood by the people of his time, for "Why did the authorities put Jesus to death if he claimed nothing beyond the gift of ordinary prophecy? No one can easily explain his very frequent assumption of some species of unique and authoritative character, except by the quite natural belief that he took himself to be—I will not urge more than a man, but a man appointed by God for a peculiar mission. You certainly have to do violence to his language in order to dissociate the centrality of his own person from numerous passages. The more than prophetic 'I' and 'mine,' while not so exaggerated as in the fourth Gospel, yet run all through the synoptic Gospels. The very words, 'Come unto me, all ye that labor,' emphasize this centrality of thought" (p. 54). There is here a clear recognition of the fact that Jesus made very high claims for himself, and was so understood by the people, both friends and enemies. Of course

in all this he was mistaken, and would seem to have suffered from megalomania in an aggravated form.

This leads us to consider Jesus as the founder of Christianity. Here the author says:

In the first place, there seems to be no ground to believe that Jesus even in the role of Messiah ever intended to found a new religion. . . . The truth is that the early Christianity obviously owed its success very largely to the indefatigable labors of Paul, whose genius picked it out of the lines of a Jewish sect and gave it a quasi-universal character. As Jesus founded no new religion, so he wrote no books and professed to bring no new doctrines. There is no certainty that he appointed apostles, least of all twelve in number (p. 73).

Jesus as thus described is so unpromising a character that the author is strongly inclined to find the source of Christianity elsewhere than in him. Thus in speaking of the parable of the sheep and the goats and others, he says:

It was no feeble hand that composed the tremendous chapters to which we refer and these grand and awful parables. This is the hand of a prophet. It would look now, contrary to the ordinary impression, but in line with all the analogies of history, as if we had not merely the figure of one man, Jesus, all alone, but a group of remarkable personalities—Paul, the anonymous author of the Johannine writings, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, besides those who put the synoptic Gospels into shape. It may be true, as Matthew Arnold has suggested, that Jesus was above the head of his disciples, but it begins now to look more as if the new religion must have owed its existence to a succession of great individualities, all of them worthy to be compared with the earlier prophets (p. 49).

But this suggestion of unknown powerful writers "who may have supplemented Jesus's teaching with more or less fresh material leaves the figure of Jesus himself even more obscure and fragmentary. Where does the authentic teaching of Jesus leave off and these others begin? No one knows or ever can know. How far was Jesus responsible for the more extreme and terrific doctrine which was evidently in the air while he lived and which he seems to have done nothing to controvert?" (p. 50). In this suggestion the author finds great relief. He says there has been "a profound ethical difficulty in the theory of Jesus's uniqueness from which we are now relieved. The fact is that our highest spiritual ideal will not permit us to believe that the sanguinary words put

into Jesus's mouth could proceed from a man wholly possessed with the spirit of God" (p. 51). The author seems to have great faith in the existence of these unknown individualities, but appears to have overlooked the fact that, like Paul, they put Jesus at the front rather than themselves. Whoever wrote the stories, they all make Jesus the hero of the play. Paul is busy with the preëxistent Christ, who was rich, and for our sakes became poor, that we through his poverty might be made rich. "God forbid that I should glory," he says, "save in the cross of the Lord Jesus Christ." Christ Jesus had come into the world to save sinners, and he refuses to know anything but Jesus Christ and him crucified. We can hardly imagine a more extraordinary vagary than this, which founds Jesus on Paul, instead of Paul on his faith in Jesus. And the other seems to be in the same condition. As said, Jesus is the hero of the drama, whoever the writer may be. We may not know very much about Jesus, but we know nothing whatever about these other people, and they seem to be largely products of the author's imagination. But with all this outfit we still seem to have no great promise of success for a new religion. The author says:

Suppose that he [Jesus] had merely emphasized the Fatherhood of God, and the brotherhood of man, though in the clearest manner, does anyone imagine that a real religion could have been established and made to endure on this simple basis in the age of Nero and in the face of Gothic invasions? (P. 73.)

We should reply, Certainly not; for establishing a real religion in the world of real men is a somewhat difficult task. And we do not think the case very much helped by referring to Paul and those other remarkable personalities. And the author himself seems to find some other foundation necessary; and here it is:

The primitive Christianity was involved with certain very natural and fascinating ideas lying close to the border land of error, which, like alloy mixed with the gold, gave it common currency. One of these ideas, akin to the ideas of modern spiritualists, was the bodily or physical resurrection of Jesus. This appealed tremendously, as such a notion always does appeal, to the popular imagination. This was the burden of Paul's teaching, though he seems for himself not to have credited a physical resurrection so much as the repeated appearance of Jesus in his "spiritual body." The early church also seems to have looked for the miraculous

coming of their Lord from heaven to judge the world. This was an idea to conjure with and to make converts. The grand expectation in the early church that spiritual events were about to spring forth made such a book as the Apocalypse possible. Again, the early Christianity, just like Christian Science to-day, was a vigorous health cult, all the more persuasive from the common delusion that devils were the cause of disease. The Christian healer, at the magic name of Jesus, could cast out the devils and cure the sick. Imagine this idea removed from the early Christianity and try to think what would have been the collapse of faith. These three ideas, like so many strands, helped mightily to hold Christians together until the new religion came to be fortified with the priestcraft, the pomp, and power of imperial Rome. Then it largely ceased to be Jesus's religion at all (p. 73).

Here, then, is the author's account of the origin of Christianity and the Christian Church. We have first a megalomaniac, whose mania went beyond anything known in the annals of insane asylums. He contrived, however, to obsess a number of remarkable personalities with the belief of his own greatness; and these worked together, though they kept mostly out of sight, in such a way as to produce the Christian doctrine and the Christian Church. Most of the things assigned to Jesus really do not belong to him, although he plainly had some Messianic expectations and unpleasant aloofnesses. But all these things together are insufficient without the belief in the physical resurrection and second advent of Jesus, the casting out of devils, and the cure of diseases. "These great ideas like so many strands helped mightily to hold Christians together." How the belief in the resurrection could have sprung up so suddenly and done its work of inspiration so mightily without any corresponding fact is not considered. These were ideas "to conjure with," and that is enough. The church made the Jesus of history into the Christ of faith, and when we ask how the church came to exist, we have some suggestions about religious evolution in which, however, these mistaken notions play a prominent part, they being the great "strands" without which, apparently, in the author's thought, Christianity could not have endured. Of course these great strands were all errors, and we are left with the somewhat difficult problem as to how error could play so beneficent a part in the real world while the truth would have gone under without its support. It would really seem that

if error could work so well in the beginning, there is no *a priori* reason why it might not be as beneficial even in later ages. We might still find a place for a belief in the resurrection and the headship of Christ, and even in his divinity, in order to hold the faith together. Since error played so great a part and still continues to do so, with the exception of a very few enlightened spirits, there appears to be no reason why it should not continue its useful role. It may still be too early for truth to be received. Truth may be so ethereal, so ideal, as to be safe only in the upper air, being altogether too weak for the rough-and-tumble of real life. The waning fortunes of the author's own religious body, and its complete ineffectiveness in all missionary work, would seem to suggest that there is still a place for error in the form of the old gospel of Christ. And if we should adopt the orthodox conception that the Father sent the Son to manifest God to men and to be their Guide and Saviour, this one "strand" might possibly suffice without any others. It certainly must be a matter for much heart-searching on the author's part to see error up to date so far in advance of what he conceives to be the truth, and to see the truth, as he conceives it, sensibly on the wane.

The Jesus of history and the Christ of faith cannot be separated in time. Whenever we find anything in the history of the early church we find the Christ of faith. As we have already pointed out, Paul and "those other remarkable personalities" who are mentioned as the great founders of the faith make Christ himself the Founder. Certainly Paul, who calls himself a slave of Jesus Christ, was very far from looking upon Christ as a secondary Person. His thought was full of the preëxistence of Jesus. Similarly with the other remarkable personalities. They seem to be preaching the gospel of the Lord Jesus. The distinction between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith is fictitious, for the Christ of faith is what we really find when we find anything. Paul, writing within thirty years of the crucifixion, assumes the orthodox faith to be the faith of the church, as in the passage quoted. "For ye know the grace of the Lord Jesus, that he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might be made rich." Paul did not know Jesus after the flesh, nor

very much, so far as we can learn, of the Jesus of history. But he knew the Christ of faith from the start, and in his letters he assumed that the church also knew this Christ of faith. The Gospels equally assume the Christ of faith.

Now, in order to explain this Christ of faith there must have been a corresponding Jesus of history. It required more than a simple egotist, somewhat fanatical and unpleasantly aloof, to move men in the way in which they were moved in the early Christian years, and to start a new current in religious development such as that which has come from him. Christ himself left nothing in the way of writing, and we have not many documents from that early time of any sort. But he left a company of disciples, and the story runs that he promised that the Holy Spirit should be with them to guide them into the truth, so as to make plain in the coming years what it all meant and what the divine purpose had been in the incarnation of the Divine Son. And this leads us to inquire as to what kind of a revelation we should expect in the case. Possibly a person of modern scientific tendencies would have liked to have a series of careful experiments made with appropriate affidavits and with a code of legislation drawn up so as to ward off Sadducean objection. We certainly have no revelation of that kind, and we may well doubt whether it would have been desirable. The one thing that was important was to make an impression of a character which should shine through that history and subsequent history and remain a permanent inspiration and illumination for the religious life of the race. And that seems to be, at least in orthodox thought, what we actually have, just such a revelation of infinite goodness and condescension and righteousness, which, while leaving most of the mystery untouched, nevertheless makes a revelation of God such that we can love him and trust him even where and when we do not understand. It would not seem to have been God's purpose to satisfy professional Sadducees but to make a revelation of himself to plain men and women. And such a revelation these men and women have found in the gospel story. But the author does not seem to think we have such a revelation. He finds the Jesus of the gospel, as we have said, an uncertain character, with many contradictions, unpleasant

aloofnesses, and egotisms. This, however, is a question which has to be decided by the religious worth that the picture of Jesus given in the Gospels has had for the religious life of humanity. We may dwell on the barren fig tree, or the fish with the coin in its mouth, and many another thing of that kind, and thus conceal from ourselves entirely the majestic figure of Christ which men generally have beheld through the gospel narratives. The same thing affects different people differently. One person reading Paul's words, "If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink, for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head," declared it was the most infernal thing he had ever heard. In such cases there can be no argument. Men reveal themselves in their judgments. In like manner we can look upon the life of Christ and fix upon the contradictions of details or the things which may offend our taste, and may finally decide that he was a quite inferior person and very far from ideal for us. And here, too, there can be no argument. We can only appeal to the judgment of humanity in the case. It is not a question of objective historical evidence alone, but of the interpretation of the gospel story or of the impression it makes upon us. To the Jews it was a stumbling-block and to the Greeks foolishness, but to them that believe it was and still is the power of God unto salvation. The judgment of the Christian world has most certainly not agreed with our author's estimate of the gospel narratives. As the result of their study Christians have generally set Jesus on high as the Lord of Glory, the Desire of Nations, the Hope of Humanity, the Judge of the World, and they do it still with as good right as ever. Historical study has discovered nothing that forbids this interpretation. Debate is idle. At the last the personal equation decides, and the survival of the fittest revises the decision. It is significant in this regard that the views within the Christian Church that have departed from this orthodox faith have had only a parasitic and precarious existence, and, left to themselves, have shown marked tendencies to decay. A minimum of faith has no attraction. When it comes to believing we want to believe something worth while.

The author is fully convinced of the goodness of God, and

speaks impressively of the Infinite Good Will. In this we agree with him, but it is somewhat surprising that he should fail to see that his style of criticism could be equally used to throw doubt upon the first article of the Creed, the belief in God, the Father Almighty. We have only to pick and choose, to fix our thought upon the obscure and unintelligible things, to make out a pretty strong case for pessimism and despair. To one man the heavens declare the glory of God, to another they are only a mechanical function. To one man the earth is full of the goodness of the Lord, to another the whole creation is an ache and an unrelieved horror. It is known to everyone that we have just come through a pessimistic period, and we have emerged from it not because we have any clearer insight into the works of God, but because humanity has reacted against the style of criticism that led to this unfaith. The author, too, is almost alone among thoughtful people in his estimate of the character of Christ. He finds that he is no ideal for us, and here, again, he proceeds with such bald literalness as to raise the question what he would regard as an ideal. In fact, an ideal is a rather dangerous possession unless one knows how to use it. One man hears that he must imitate Jesus, and buys a pair of sandals, or a sweater "without seam woven from the top throughout," and parts his hair in the middle, and eats unleavened bread. And another man of the same sort thinks that this will never do, and because it will not do decides that Jesus is no ideal for us. Jesus lived in Judæa; he was not married; never went to college, and knew nothing of modern democracy. How could he be an ideal for us? Of course the author does not fall into such depths as this, but much of his objection to Jesus as an ideal smacks a little of this kind of thing. Looking at nature as the work of God, we might say, on superficial study, that God himself is no ideal for us and is the last being in the universe for man to imitate. How far the author is from the ordinary judgment, not merely of Christians but of thoughtful men in general respecting the character of Christ, may appear from the following quotation from John Stuart Mill, who certainly was not excessively prone to orthodoxy:

Above all the most valuable part of the effect on the character which

Christianity has produced by holding up in a Divine Person a standard of excellence and a model for imitation is valuable even to the absolute unbeliever and can never more be lost to humanity. For it is Christ, rather than God, whom Christianity has held up to believers as the pattern of perfection for humanity. It is the God incarnate more than the God of the Jews or of nature, who, being idealized, has taken so great and salutary a hold on the modern man. And whatever else may be taken away from us by rational criticism, Christ is still left, a unique figure, not more unlike all his precursors than all his followers, even those who had the direct benefit of his personal teaching. It is of no use to say that Christ as exhibited in the Gospels is not historical, and that we know not how much of what is admirable has been superadded by the tradition of his followers. The tradition of followers suffices to insert any number of marvels, and may have inserted all the miracles which he is reputed to have wrought. But who among his disciples or among their proselytes was capable of inventing the sayings ascribed to Jesus, or of imagining the life and character revealed in the Gospels? Certainly not the fisherman of Galilee; as certainly not Saint Paul, whose character and idiosyncrasies were of a totally different sort; still less the early Christian writers, in whom nothing is more evident than that the good that was in them was all derived, as they always professed that it was derived, from the higher source. . . . About the life and sayings of Jesus there is a stamp of personal originality combined with profundity of insight, which, if we abandon the idle expectation of finding scientific precision where something very different was aimed at, must place the prophet of Nazareth, even in the estimation of those who have no belief in his inspiration, in the very first rank of the men of sublime genius of whom our species can boast. When this preëminent genius is combined with the qualities of probably the greatest moral reformer, and martyr to that mission, who ever existed upon earth, religion cannot be said to have made a bad choice in pitching upon this man as the ideal representative and guide of humanity; nor even now would it be easy, even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete than to endeavor so to live that Christ would approve our life. (*Three Essays on Religion*, p. 253.)

Mr. Mill did not think very highly of the God of nature, and he found relief from his difficulties in nature in thinking of Jesus; and he seems to have regarded Jesus as a worthy ideal. The author is right in thinking that the New Testament documents by themselves and apart from all connection with the Christian history do not give us much connected information. They seem to be a set of memoirs, largely limited to a brief period in the life of Jesus, which were gathered together in their present form at a much later date. There seem even to be indications that the writers did not always understand Jesus, and may not always

have correctly reported his words. But it is perfectly clear that they give no connected and extended biography. It is equally clear that they do not answer a great many of the questions which the author seems to think important. They, rather, reveal a Person somewhat shrouded in mystery and yet to most men infinitely winning and impressive. They are impressionist writings, but they have made a mighty impression. They are an impressionist picture, but out of it looks the face of One whom the church has agreed to call divine. As we have already hinted, little was said by him and nothing was written. Not much seems to have been done in the way of rules and institutions; but he left a group of disciples and, it is said, promised that his Spirit should be among men to guide them into the truth. Apparently he recognized that the truth would have to be revealed through history, and it is in that way the great revelation was to come. The kingdom of heaven was a grain of mustard seed which was to grow and be discerned and understood in its growth. This is a kind of revelation which cannot be expressed in formulas nor appreciated by unsympathetic spirits; but when we take the documents and the history and the present religious life together, the faith of the church certainly has in it less of difficulty than any of the substitutes offered for it. The aloofnesses the author refers to are there, the self-assertion, the tone of authority, the air of mystery, and they are rightly there on the Christian theory. The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us. The preëxistent Son of God humbled himself and became obedient unto death, that he might reveal God and redeem men. Given this conception, we should expect just the contradictions the author finds in the life of Christ. We should have statements in which the Divine appeared and statements in which the human appeared. We should have statements to be understood from the side of his divinity and statements to be understood from the side of his humanity. And we should expect in such a Being also something of the contradictory aspects that we find in the revelation of the God of nature. Life and law, inexorable sternness and unspeakable tenderness—both aspects are in life, and both have to be taken into account in any complete view of things. This moves on a different plane altogether from

the author's conception. He finds all severity, all assertion of the harshness of life, all recognition of the tragedy of existence too harsh and unlovely for his tenderness of feeling. But there are others who find it otherwise, who believe that great interests are at stake, that life is tragic in its possibilities, who believe also that God is no far-off Unknown, whose gifts have never cost him anything, but that he has entered into the fellowship of our suffering and our sin in an act of infinite compassion and cost to recover men to himself. And we are persuaded that this view will always command, as it always has commanded, the faith of men. If this faith should disappear, we are perfectly sure that the author's religious notions would not long command attention. When the sun has set there may be twilight for a time, but before long the twilight vanishes also. One of the most grotesque things one sometimes hears in this connection is that this view of Jesus puts him so far away from us that we can have no real sympathy with him. It is alleged to make an impassable gulf between us. Nothing further from the real religious life of men could be imagined than this. For our Saviour we do indeed need one who understands us and who can sympathize with us, but we do not need any ordinary man like ourselves. We need something mightier by far than this. What could such a man do for us? If Jesus is simply the dead son of a dead carpenter, what can he do for us or we for him? What does he know about us? Even less, perhaps, than we know about him. We really want some one who knows us altogether as our eternal companion and helper, capable of infinite sympathy and infinite aid. This has always been the faith of the church, with the scantiest exception, and we have no doubt it always will remain the faith of the church.

It is distinctly an error in scholarship to suppose that historical study is making this faith any more difficult. Indeed, the middle of the last century was a period of far greater storm and stress. The mythical theory of Strauss and the writings of the Tübingen school gave Christian scholars something to think about for a time. It can hardly be pretended by anyone acquainted with the literature that current negative writings have anything like the solid and original scholarship of those men. And in spite of a

subjective criticism that would not be tolerated in any other field of inquiry, the historical date of the leading New Testament writings has been pushed so far back as to establish the Christ of faith as the Christ of the primitive church. This is all that historical criticism can do in any case, and all that is really necessary. Whether to accept or reject this Christ of faith each must decide for himself; but nothing could well be more naïve than the fancy that the way of unfaith is easy or is becoming more so. We may add in closing that views of the sort we have been criticising have commonly failed to keep up with the progress of philosophic thought. They are generally based on a conception of the old naturalism which eliminated God from the world altogether. It was hardly willing to allow God to exist at all, but if he did exist, his sole function was to set things going and then to retire from all further connection with the world. In that view God and nature were opposed to each other and everything that had a natural explanation, as it was called, was thereby rescued from any dependence on God. When, then, an event was called natural, it had no meaning or significance. Naturalism of this sort is completely out of date in intelligent circles, and in its place we have the conception of a Divine Immanence in the world and life and history. In crude thought this immanence takes the form of a species of a deterministic pantheism which is altogether impossible, but in more enlightened thought it becomes idealistic theism, or the immanence taught by Saint Paul when he declares that in God we live and move and have our being, and that it is God who worketh in us both to will and to work of his good pleasure.

This view is fast changing the old debate over miracles and the supernatural. It is now permitted to find God in history and in the natural order as well as in signs and wonders or strange and anomalous things. But an event is no longer undivine because it is also natural. We may seek to trace the order of life in the ongoing of life and history as we trace the same order in the ongoing of the physical world; but this order in no way removes God or puts him farther away from us. The divine revelation in the largest sense now becomes an interpretation of history itself, and from this point of view it is permitted to find in the history

of the Christian Church and in the great trend of the Christian movement an exegesis of what the earlier revelation through the prophets and through the Divine Son meant. As creation is still going on in nature, being but the continuous procession of the divine will, so revelation is still going on in the minds of men; God is revealing himself more and more through his Spirit and through the life which he inspires. In some sense the older revelation continues, and in some sense it is ever being outgrown. It continues through its growth, as all organic growth continues, not in a changeless sameness but in endless self-revealing of its spirit and in new adaptations to new conditions. It is outgrown in the sense of the larger conceptions which are always arising through the increasing depth and richness of the spiritual life in its historical unfolding. And this we believe is the view to which the church will eventually come. We shall no longer be unduly concerned about signs and wonders, and we shall no longer hold that God has been banished from the world by the order he has established and maintains in it. With this conception Christianity can remain true to type and at the same time progress along the line of the orthodox faith, the faith in God, the Father Almighty, and in his Son our Lord, and in the Holy Spirit, and in the forgiveness of sins, and in the life everlasting. The antithesis of Jesus or Christ we set aside, and we rather say Jesus the Christ, the Anointed and Sent of God. This faith will never be outgrown, not even by "the religion of the future." It is too deeply rooted in history and the needs of the human soul.

Borden Parker Bowne

ART. II.—THEOLOGY AND THE HISTORICAL METHOD

IT is not this paper's purpose to enter into a defense of the historical method or its place in theology. The question of its value and its full right in the Christian Church is a settled problem. It is linked with the surest progress of our intellectual life. It has the respect for facts which marks the scientific spirit, the age of realism, as against the age of speculation. It brings out the modern sense of individualism. It gives expression to the idea of development, which in some form is inseparable from our thought to-day. It has magnified the personal and spiritual as against the mechanical and external. It has enforced upon systematic theology a respect for the actual and has made it more biblical. It has aided the appreciation of the real meaning of Christianity by lifting above the dull level of the letter the mountain peaks of prophetism in the Old Testament and of gospel in the New, and it has rendered its greatest service, I believe, at the very place where it awakened the greatest fear. Men feared that with the authority of the infallible letter all authority was gone. We are learning to know better what the nature of religious authority is, and that we may have an authority which is objective without being external, which is historical and yet personal and vital. Our question is not as to the right or value of the method, but as to its final meaning for theology. The question is not merely speculative. It is a present problem that we are facing. There is a vigorous school of historical study which declares that the real effect of the historical method is to rule out all other theology. There is to be only one theological science, the historical. The historical method is to stand not only superior but sole, like the method of observation and experiment in natural science. Nothing else in theology is to bear the name of science. And now, in the name of this supreme science, the supernatural is ruled out, not as a conclusion, but as a premise, and the whole movement makes for an interpretation of Christianity as a philosophical idealism, against its conception as a positive historical revelation and a

divine redemption. Here is our issue: Have we adopted a new conception of Christianity by taking the historical method?

In order to make a difficult task simpler and more concrete it will be well to link this discussion with a particular group, the so-called religio-historical school, which includes some of the ablest critical scholars. While quite independent in their conclusions, they represent the same method and point of view. Of this fundamental agreement they are conscious. They realize, too, that they stand not only for the method but for the new interpretation of Christianity. They not only believe in this new conception, but they feel that it will win back the people alienated by the old doctrines, and so they have begun a vigorous propaganda by means of popular books and pamphlets. The movement is represented in a measure both in England and America, and its influence will be more fully felt in the future. The more thorough and clear expression among the German thinkers, however, justifies their being made the basis of our study. The religio-historical school may be considered an outgrowth of the Ritschlian movement, though this is true of but part of its adherents. In Ritschl's theology there was a double element. Its positive element was his emphasis on history and revelation. Its rationalistic element lay in his abstract conception of religion. These two elements have been apparent in the subsequent movement. Men like Kaftan, Reischle, Haering, emphasized the idea of revelation centering in Christ, and set forth in varying manner the positive content of Christianity and evangelical truth as given in this revelation. The left wing started with the general idea of religion. We must study not a dogmatic revelation but religion, and religion wherever it is found. Christianity cannot be separated from all other history. As historical, it is part of the greater whole of human happening. As religion, it is simply the flower and consummation of the movement of religion which is as broad as human life. By this road they came to a confluence with the stream of influence which still flows from Hegel. In this new group, which cannot now be called Ritschlian, we find men like Gunkel, Bousset, Troeltsch, Heitmueller, Wernle, Weinle, and Wrede. Anticipating them in part was Pfeleiderer, Hegelianistic in his theology and

vigorous opponent of Ritschl. The leader of this school is Troeltsch, of Heidelberg, one of the most brilliant of German theologians to-day. Because Troeltsch as *Dogmatiker* has discussed these questions systematically we shall refer particularly to his work. Troeltsch declares truly that our general theological situation to-day is not a matter of single problems but that of the historical method and its meaning. There are two methods in theology, he holds. The old method is the dogmatic. It is really the method of Catholicism. It attempts to find an absolute authority for faith. Protestantism formerly found this in the letter of the Scripture. Now it seeks it in a supernatural history, which is different from all other history. This history is conceived as an absolute revelation, and this revelation is set up as authority. The whole is regarded under the idea of a redemption which is worked from without. This position, says Troeltsch, is impossible for anyone who accepts the historical method. History must criticise, it can never give you absolute certainty. History sees everything in relations. You cannot pick out some fact or fraction of history and give it absolute value. Every such part belongs to a larger whole, is dependent upon it, inseparable from it. The dogmatic method is an impossible attempt to rise above the limitations of history, out of the one great stream of history to separate some single current and give it a supernatural source and an absolute value. Instead of this, as historians we must study religion as we find it everywhere among men, and Christianity as part of the larger whole, that we may find at last, as the fruit of this universal movement of the human spirit, the ideals and values in which we are to believe. Thus far Troeltsch. Here, then, is the position. It appears that the exclusion of the supernatural, the opposition to the idea of a positive revelation and of Christianity as a divine redemption, the hostility to a Pauline Christianity, is not a matter of detailed results of historical study, as so often announced. It is involved essentially for this school in the very principles of the historical method. It is assumed as a starting point. Our task is set for us by this position. It is not enough for us to fight critical problems one at a time. We must ask these deeper questions: What are the true principles of the

historical method? Do they involve these conclusions? Is the historical method to be sole and final? Professor Troeltsch declares that the three principles of the historical method are those of criticism, analogy, and correlation. Let us consider these three principles.

The principle of criticism means that it is the business of the historian to test every source and every authority. We can understand the significance of this and admit its right. It is true of every historical document, as Professor Gardner has put it, that "In place of external fact of history, we have in the last resort psychological fact as to what was believed to have taken place. To pass from the psychologic to the external fact is precisely the task which modern historians find set before them." Protestantism has no absolute external authority which it tries to remove from such criticism. It will not accept the authority of Pope, or council, or church, nor does it set up the Scriptures in this sense as a fixed, external standard. That would involve not only external and mechanical inspiration, but would demand authority for interpretation (the church) and a supernaturally fixed canon. The report of the late Papal Commission on Genesis indicates what such a position involves. The Scriptures are historical writings. We believe they contain the record of God's revelation, but we must scrutinize and compare and criticize, and the more earnestly and honestly because of what is at stake for us. But the principle of criticism means something more for this school. It means that no fact of the past can be absolutely established, and that therefore the historical can never be the basis of Christian certainty or yield an authority for Christian faith. To this larger question of the relation of faith and history we must turn later. So much can be said here: What is really involved is not the divorce of history and faith, but the limits of historical science, which can no more ground our faith than can any other science. More and more clearly we see that, though Jesus of Nazareth is the great Personage of history, the New Testament writers are not primarily historians. The Gospels are proclamations of faith, like the rest of the New Testament; it is the preaching of the early church. That preaching does not

come with historical proof or scientific certainty, but it can do for men to-day what it did then. The living God still speaks to us through these words, and as in the first generation, with the living word spoken by the first disciples, it can still convince the open heart that in that history the Eternal came among men. The second principle which Troeltsch suggests is that of analogy. We understand the past because that which happened there is analogous to that which was happening elsewhere and which happens now. It is the task of the historian, realizing this, to understand the past from within, sympathetically to appreciate and live it over. Nor do we exclude Scriptural history from this principle. Is it not the heart of our faith that the final revelation of God was in One who came "in the likeness of sinful flesh"? It is because he is Son of man that the sons of men can understand him; he can speak to them. Here is Paul, with his unique personality and his marvelous experience. His judges thought him mad, and he once called himself a fool. But we have learned Christ ourselves and we know the rich meaning and the deep reasonableness of that life. The analogy of our own experience, though it may not measure with his, gives the key for its understanding. It is in this sense, that of the appreciation from within, that the historian must make psychology fundamental for his work. But the principle of analogy as used by this school means something very different. Troeltsch speaks of the "omnipotence of analogy" which "involves the similarity in principle of all historical occurrence." What we have here is not the analogy which helps us to understand the past, but the analogy which determines what the past could have been. It is not a key but a norm, a law. It is evidently the idea of the uniformity of nature that comes into play here. The religious nature of man is everywhere and always the same, and will always manifest itself in the same manner. These laws of the religious life, or analogies, the historian must trace out, and this will determine his interpretation of other religions. The writings of this school are full of this use of analogy. It is applied with a wealth of learning and the greatest industry. Its purpose is generally the same: to bring down the higher to the level of the lower, to use the primitive in order to

determine what the advanced must be. It is applied in two directions, which may be considered separately. The first has regard to those forms and ideas in which religion expresses itself. It is refreshing to hear these men protest against superrefined literary criticism and the overemphasized study of the doctrinal or intellectual side. The first business of the theologian, they declare, is the study of religion. Unfortunately, their conception of religion neutralizes this advantage. Religion appears as a sort of native force with which men are endowed, and which has its own natural laws of development by which it comes to expression everywhere in the same forms of cultus, the same myths and ideas. Nominally, they admit the supernatural element. Indeed, they reproach us with narrowness in limiting this to one religion. In reality, however, religion is not God disclosing himself to man and lifting man into the fellowship of holiness, but the evolution of a native force working out according to its own necessary laws. We can understand now how the principle of analogy is applied. We know how it has been used where men juggled with the phrase of evolution. The highest religions are explained by the primitive in which they find their source, and the primitive forms, in turn, give us the rule for interpreting the higher. Thus Troeltsch declares that "the primitive religions give the foundation and the means of explanation for all the more complex forms, forming the fruitful womb for all new religious forms and the substratum which persists under all higher religions." Heitmueller's monograph on the phrase "In Jesus's Name" is a typical illustration. From every source of primitive faith and superstitious practice he brings together the illustrations of the belief in the magical power of the name and its use in incantation and prayer. The heaping up of these analogies is to prove that we have in the Christian phrase such a magical survival. In the same way this writer takes up the question of Paul's view of the sacraments. Primitive religion is full of its sacrificial meals. Christianity has the same in the Lord's Supper. The lower must again explain the higher, and the principle of analogy must serve to prove identity. And so Heitmueller proves that for Paul the sacraments have a magical efficacy which lies in the form or act itself.

Gunkel's work on the Religio-Historical Interpretation of the New Testament gives illustration for the great events of the life of Christ. He searches out the analogies in other religions for the stories of infancy, for baptism and temptation, transfiguration and resurrection, as well as for many other ideas in the New Testament. There may not be a single instance in which he has a case strong enough to stand alone, but the heaping up of these analogies is meant to convey the same general idea: the primitive is the source of the later, and the lower must be used to teach us what the higher means.

With all the show of learning there is something very superficial in this study of phrases and forms. The mere language of religion, whether in phrase or form of cultus, shows a marvelous persistence, but the heart of religion is in the new spirit, which may speak the speech of other days, but which fills these words with new meaning. Cremer's great work on New Testament Greek still justifies its main purpose by showing how the new faith transformed the old speech which became its chief organ. Love can never again mean what it did before Christ lifted that word from sensuality and passion, or from mere natural inclination, and made it the symbol of the greatest moral power on earth and the revelation of the heart of God. We interpret Paul not by looking back to pagan customs, but by looking at that new faith and spirit to which he gave classical expression. And Paul stands not merely for the doctrine of grace, but for the great truth that the Spirit of God in man means a new moral and spiritual life. Fellowship with God is moral, and a moral fellowship cannot come from a magical rite. The same issue appears when it comes to the application of this principle of analogy to the study of great personalities. History must be psychological, we are told, in order to be scientific. But what does that mean? Does it mean the sympathetic attempt to enter into the inner life of great men in order to appreciate them? Then it is true, but it is not new. Does this refer to modern psychology, naturalistic, studying the inner life only so far as it illustrates general laws which are everywhere the same? Then it is useless or misleading. How shall we do justice to Paul if we insist that his experiences must conform

to the common modes of man's life? And what shall we say of Jesus? But this is exactly what is attempted. This is assumed as a principle of scientific history. I know that you can pick out the declarations here and there with these writers concerning the ultimate mystery of every personality. But in actual historical treatment this mystery does not enter in. If there is any place where the mystery appears in the life of Paul it is in his vision and conversion. But scientific history demands that Paul's experience here must be in analogy with the common experience of men, and so the great event is finally reduced to an epileptic seizure and hallucination. Most of the so-called lives of Jesus are examples in point. The New Testament gives us a Person, not a history, least of all any basis for working out a psychological development of Jesus's inner life. A striking illustration of this position is seen in the critical treatment of the great passage of Matt. 11. 27: "No one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him." Pfleiderer declares that Jesus did not speak these words, that he could not have spoken them. Certainly, if the principle of analogy means that the experience of Jesus could not transcend that of common man, Pfleiderer's position holds, for we know of no other human consciousness which could have given expression to that thought. All this is simply the effort at a naturalistic scheme of things, which can conceive no history without its general laws of happening, to which all things must be leveled down. Is not all this a misconception of what history means and of what historical studies should be? The rationality of natural science rests upon the power to reduce events to general laws. If you do that with history there is nothing left. Science has no place for the individual, history lives upon it. The scientist must leave the individual aside. The plant interests him, not as an individual plant, but as one of the species. Even a chance peculiarity would concern him only as it illustrated a general law. The historian considers not what is the same, but what is different, not that which simply repeats, but that which happens once. It is the individual with which he deals, the individual in the realm of personality. He may be a determinist, but as a historian he

must work on the principle that men make history. The modern historical school under the influence of the ideas of natural science is misusing the principle of analogy in the search for general laws. It is failing in its first task, the study of the individual and the appreciation of those personalities who make history and who are more than illustrations of general laws. It has so overemphasized the idea of continuity in history as to change it to the principle of identity. It has failed to see that the meaning of human history is in the forward look and the forward step, and not the ceaseless round in which nature repeats itself.

We turn now to the third principle, that of correlation. It is inseparable from our modern idea of what history implies. The interest of history is in the individual, but the individual is never alone. You can draw no lines in history to separate one part from the rest. The man is linked to his age, the age is joined to what has gone before, the single nation is part of a larger whole. Nor can we isolate one section of history and call it sacred and study it simply by itself. Israel had its environment in the stream of history, and that environment was religious as well as social and political. The humanity of Jesus means something more than an abstract doctrine of two natures. He was a Child of a given race, instructed in its religion and speaking its language, and he lived in a given age. How much that special age, with its social, political, and religious influences, meant for the beginnings of Christianity we have not yet measured. Christianity is historical, and things historical are things which are in specific relations and must be studied in those relations. In all this there is nothing new, nor is there anything here to conflict with the Christian idea of revelation or redemption. That idea does not exclude God from other than Christian history, or imply that he was not speaking to other men or nations. We do believe that God was working out special purposes for all men through this special line of history, and we hold that he found here a special organ for his self-disclosure, and that in the fullness of time the work was wrought and the full disclosure made in Jesus Christ. I know how many minds there are who are fearful that God is absent because man is present. But we have learned

that the human and the divine do not exclude each other, that we do not need to say impossible things about the Scriptures to save them as the Word of God. If once we have seen that clearly, we shall not be concerned about the relations of Babel and Bible. We need not be troubled by old cosmogonies in Genesis or current apocalyptic ideas in Revelation, nor when the religious influences of the age come closer to the heart of the New Testament. The revelation in Christianity is historical, and historical revelation means a revelation conditioned not only by the human factor in its immediate agents but by its whole environment. Our question lies deeper. Is God really present in this history—acting, directing, self-revealing? Is he not only *in* this history but more than this history? Or is the divine here simply the sum of human forces, everywhere the same and everywhere pressing on in the same blind fashion? It is the question of the real personality of God and of his transcendence.

It is this truth which does not come to its own in this modern historical school. Like the principle of analogy, the principle of correlation seems to be conceived on the naturalistic order. It corresponds to the principle of the conservation of energy and correlation of forces. Troeltsch speaks of the "mutual interaction of all phenomena of the historical-spiritual life, so that no change can occur at any point without preceding and succeeding change at some other, so that all occurrence . . . must form one stream in which all and each belong together." What this means is made more clear by Troeltsch's protest against what he calls the dogmatic method. What is the sin of the dogmatic position? It holds to the supernatural as a real and determining factor in history. It makes the historical method impossible. Now, there is only one history which the dogmatic method can make impossible. It is a history where all things are joined together in a strict causal connection, and where all development proceeds from a self-sufficient unity of immanent forces. The principle has been very clearly expressed by the historian Von Sybel: "The certainty of knowledge stands or falls with this presupposition, that there is an absolute development according to law, the common unity of existing things. If it were not for this, or if this could be inter-

rupted in any way, then all certainty of conclusion and all connection of events would be surrendered, and all calculations as to human beings would be given up to chance. The two sources of historical knowledge would be overwhelmed." I do not mean to say that this historical school stands for naturalism, for a merely causal explanation in history. I wish simply to make plain that their protest against the supernatural is consistent only from this standpoint. The historian, as such, has no right to protest against the supernatural. It is one thing to study events in their relations. That is his task. It is another to declare that they are causally determined by those relations. That is not history but dogmatism, the popular philosophy of a naturalistic or pantheistic evolution. It is not implied in the historical method. No mastery of method, no perfection of historical knowledge, could ever have enabled the student to put his finger on the point where the tides of influence converged and say, "Here a Paul," "Here a Jesus of Nazareth." The causal explanation of history implies the possibility of such prediction, and such prediction is an absurdity. "History depends upon the men who will make it." Correlation, then, does not mean causal dependency. It is true that naturalistic science, as such, cannot consider the miracle. But historical science has no right to suppress either the significance of human personality or that direct play of divine personality which we call the supernatural.

In the actual work of criticism we constantly meet illustrations of the position which has been opposed above. History seems to be a sort of a rearrangement of ultimate elements which themselves remain constant. In the introduction, sometimes, or the appendix of these works we have an appreciation of personality, its mystery, its originality. In actual operation the business of history seems to be to point out that cause equals effect; the age, the institution, the man, is the sum of that which surrounds or goes before. The suppression of the significance of human personality goes hand in hand with the elimination of the supernatural, of the direct movement of the divine personality. In many ways the great dividing question in theology to-day is the question of the relation of Jesus and Paul. The weakness of this method,

which looks at external causes rather than personal forces, at the old that remains rather than at the new and its meaning, is well illustrated in the treatment of these problems. Here is the question of the Person of Christ, the early church's faith in his resurrection, his work as a Saviour of men, his divine Sonship. What shall explain this? Is it not Jesus himself, and what he wrought for those disciples? No. The men who were sounding the praises of Jesus a moment ago are now searching Judaism or Oriental religions for analogies to explain the church's Christology. Listen to Gunkel explaining the faith in the resurrection: We know, from the comparative study of religions, of divine beings who died and rose again. It is true, we cannot find any such idea in official Judaism, "but there is nothing to oppose the assumption that this existed in certain secret circles." The idea must have come to the disciples indirectly from paganism through Judaism. That the resurrection occurred on Easter Sunday at the rising of the sun points to the Oriental celebration of the day, the turning from winter to summer in the Babylonian religion. Or turn to the crux of the problem, Paul's Christology. Paul does not, indeed, stand alone in his estimate of the Person of Christ. We have no sources to indicate that the early church had any different conception, and we know that, with all of Paul's conflicts, on this point he was never accused of being an innovator. But Paul's Christology has given expression to the faith of nineteen centuries. The modern historical school must find its sources. What were they? "Paul's Christology," says Wernle, "does not come from the impression of Jesus himself, or the working out of what he did and said. It is the transfer of a bold speculation to the historical person of Jesus." Gunkel finds the secret of New Testament Christology in various ideas which had been attached to the Judaistic conception of the Messiah and which were transferred to that of Jesus. It is true, as Gunkel admits, we know nothing of this Judaistic Christology, but, he calmly adds, "We must assume it in order to understand the New Testament." And elsewhere Wernle uses this astounding word: "Jesus came to the Greeks in the form of a dramatic myth. Again they had the story of a god, and from the most recent time. This conquered the world."

Let me point out two marvelous things in these expressions. In the first place, it is a most remarkable feat of putting the pyramid on its apex. Wrede insists that Paul is the second founder of Christianity, that the great leaders of the church, from the author of the fourth Gospel through Athanasius and Augustine down to Luther and Calvin, all had their inspiration from him. And yet he suggests that the decisive event to which this man traces back his career was an hallucination joined to an epileptic seizure. These writers agree that the heart of that conception of Christianity which has dominated these ages lies in Paul's Christology. Wernle calls it the "myth that conquered the world." But the origin of this Christology is not that matchless personality which dominated those disciples. Gunkel says distinctly: "The Christology was not so much formed to sound the mystery of his person, as though Jesus were primus and the Christology second; rather, the souls which longed for the nearness of God, which had need of a Son of God appearing from heaven, transferred to him these ideals of their hearts." And for these ideals, for the forms of this faith, Gunkel must invent a supposed source in current Judaism which was fed, in turn, by pagan myths. On such a precarious apex the whole massive pyramid of Christianity is balanced, that Christianity which not only conquered the old world but which was never more aggressive than to-day, or more dominant over the thoughts of men: a longing set for a faith, a myth turned into a creed, an hallucination founding a theology, and the greatest Person of history misunderstood and displaced by this creation of his disciples. All this suggests the second marvel in this position, the failure to find the real forces that make history. The one factor that Christian faith sets first has been pushed aside—the living presence of that God who can come into personal fellowship with men. When you suppress that source you cannot rightly evaluate those great personalities, like Paul, who found here the spring of their being and power and who became in turn the creative factors for new movements of history. Too few of these historians do justice to Paul's own declaration, "For me to live is Christ."

Some results may now be summed up in answer to the ques-

tion, "What does the historical method imply for theology? The principles of historical study do not rule out the supernatural. Only a naturalistic scheme of mechanical causation could imply that, with a pantheistic idea of a kind of spiritual conservation of energy and correlation of forces. The world of history is the personal world. Even human personality will break through such a scheme. The law of the personal world is not quantitative equivalence, not cause equals effect. Its mark is not sameness, but difference. To recognize this leaves play for human personality, but equally so for the divine. There is no more rationality in the exclusive immanence of pantheistic evolution than in Christian theism. The rationality of natural science depends upon the tracing out of general laws of cause and effect. The rationality of history lies in the great ideal achievements which mark the goal of history's movements, and in tracing these back to adequate origins. And those origins are never apart from creative personalities who are themselves inexplicable. These actual forces of history mark its great tasks and its limits. To these the new history must do better justice than it yet has done. One point we left for consideration—the relation of history and faith. By its principle of criticism this school denies that faith can find a ground for certainty in anything historical. By its principle of relativism it refuses to see anywhere in history the absolute as authority for faith. Each fact is but part of a larger stream and flows out of it. Nowhere can you say, in absolute sense, This is the finger of God. And yet these men have their faith, and an aggressive faith too. What do they put in place of the old certainty of God's direct and final revelation in Christian history? Briefly stated, it is an evolutionary idealism of a pantheistic trend. Troeltsch has outlined it. Instead of any special revelation, we have a "Reason ruling in history and progressively revealing itself." Revelation becomes practically equivalent to man's religious intuitions. History shows us a revelation of the divine depths of the human spirit, and of the development of faith "out of its own consistent character, and that means out of the impelling power of God." History is thus the "unfolding of the divine Reason." It is an "ordered succession, in which the central depth

and truth of the spiritual life of man mounts upward out of the transcendent Ground of the Spirit, in the midst of struggle and error of every kind, but yet with the logical necessity of a normally begun development." This is simply a modified Hegelianism, a development through immanent forces according to rational necessity. You may say the necessity is grounded in the World-Spirit, and these forces are God. Then you have a religion. But there is no God except these immanent forces. To criticise this position is not a part of our subject. But we may note three points: 1. This position has nothing to do with historical science. It is not a scientific conclusion at all. It is a leap of faith. The historian here runs into the dogmatic camp which he has been fighting. It does not change the situation one whit to speak of this as the modern world view, or as required by the conclusions of modern science. This is Hegelianistic philosophy. It is simply a question of one faith against another. 2. The hard facts of history will not sustain the easy optimism of this Hegelian evolution. Who can look upon this tangle of human history, upon its darkness and superstition, upon its age-long failures, upon the wide sweep of paganism to-day in distant lands, and even in our own, and then stake his faith upon a philosophy which sees the inherent rationality of it all, "the logical necessity of a normally begun development"? 3. This position has illegitimately influenced the historical method of many scholars. It has minimized the meaning of personality, agreeing here with naturalism. It has ruled out the supernatural, that is, the divine Personality, for it leaves no God but the sum of those immanent forces which may be called God or man as you will.

We come back, then, to our question of history and faith. How is faith to find certainty if we still tie up Christianity with a given history? We answer that certainty cannot rest either upon philosophy or upon historical science. Kant made plain the first. Historical study, on the other side, shows us that there may be no absolute historical certainty on which faith can rest. But that does not mean that we are to give up the historical Christ. We have to-day what the first generation had to which the disciples preached. We have the confession of faith of the early church.

These men did not labor primarily to tell the words of Jesus or to give his biography. Their subject was not a history, but a gospel. That gospel in history we have to-day. Mark every point in which Matthew differs from Luke, or Paul and John stand over against the synoptics. In one point they all agree, that Jesus is Son of God and Saviour of men. And the effort scientifically to go back of this gospel, and set up Jesus himself against this estimate of the faith of his first disciples, has signally failed. It cannot scientifically be done. In other words, historical criticism does not rule out this Christ and his gospel for faith. So far this means simply that the door is not blocked against us. What do we find when we enter? If we look with open and willing hearts, we find that which the first disciples and their hearers found, that in this Man's life and love and death the living God moved, and that in him the living God speaks and comes to us now. Higher than historical certainty, higher than human philosophy, above any letter of sacred page, is this Spirit of the living God. And he must speak before faith and certainty can be. The gospel lives to-day and grounds our faith because he speaks through it still as of old. Historical criticism has taken away our confidence in the letter, it has not shut the door for faith.

There has been much written of late of the religion of to-morrow. With the note of the social and the humanitarian, no one need contend. They belong in the gospel. But Dr. Eliot's religion, like that we have been considering, is deficient in two elements that belonged to the religion of yesterday and that will be present in the final religion. The first is the full Christian idea of personality, the personality of God first of all. That means more than a scientific conception of universal energy, or an omnipotent good nature raised to the throne of the universe by a sentimental religion. Over against naturalism and pantheism we need to hold this truth in all its meaning. It means a living God, with power and purpose and holiness. It means the supernatural, not primarily as the miraculous, but as implied in the Christian faith in the living God. Immanent in history as in nature, he is yet more than the sum of the forces resident and active in these. In that history he makes himself increasingly known, until men see

at last "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." That is revelation. Through that history he works out his eternal purposes for men, purposes whose meaning and power center in Jesus Christ, though only the ages shall consummate them. That is redemption. Into that history he enters as a personal presence to lead men into personal fellowship with himself. That is religion—religion in its final sense, not simply as a social ideal or an ethical task, but as a personal relation. And here the real meaning of human personality comes in, which can be held only on the foundation of a strong doctrine of the personality of God. With our socialized religion, and our humanized religion, there are other facts to be taken into account; they spring from the depths of man's personality and his relation to this personal God: human freedom and responsibility, human sin and guilt, and man's need of God's mercy. This double meaning of the personal has been endangered by the wrong use of the historical method. It must be present in the religion of to-morrow. And the historical will be present in the religion of to-morrow. It will not put Jesus of Nazareth and his meaning for men into a five-line postscript. Our systems come and go, the wisest and the best. We shall have others still. And we shall need them—the theologies in which we try to interpret for the church of our age the meaning of God's revelation. But greater than all these is the revelation itself; the fact that the eternal God has been made manifest to men, that in Jesus Christ his will of mercy and his presence to save have come into the history of human kind. The historical is not a problem for our faith, but a foundation without which it were not faith enough for the storms of life. Religion is more than an inspiration, an ideal, a program, an evolution. It is more than man reaching up to God. It is God coming to men. In the faith that God has so come in our history the human heart will find its rest and strength, as it ever has. And in that truth, that has won the ages past, we shall find our conquering evangel for the days to come.

W. Frank Rall

ART. III.—A FRIEND OF LAMB'S: WILLIAM HAZLITT

IN America there are probably ten readers of the *Essays of Elia* to one who has thumbed the pages of *Winterslow*. Hazlitt has made his way but slowly in this country. And yet every lover of Lamb is almost sure to love that friend whom he called "one of the wisest and finest spirits breathing." For Hazlitt, like the immortal *Elia*, possessed to the full that rare and fine thing, the literary temperament—something quite other and better than the modern "artistic temperament." He enjoyed good literature—how he did enjoy it!—and he was able to communicate this enjoyment to any sympathetic reader. And he did not enjoy mediocre or bad literature. Herein lies his great value as an impressionistic critic. But he was not merely a critic; he was a master of the familiar essay, and, again like Lamb, revels in autobiography without ever being egotistical. As I turn once more the pages of *Table Talk*, *Sketches and Essays*, or *English Poets*, I feel with renewed confidence that that person of literary taste who has not yet read Hazlitt may experience, if he will, the joy of a discoverer. Why, then, is Hazlitt so long in coming into his own? Largely, I suspect, on account of his personal qualities. Upon first acquaintance he is to many good people a strange paradox. His qualities as a man and as a writer seem scarcely reconcilable: in the former character he was awkward, shy, captious, morbidly suspicious, and with his too abundant store of sentiment prone to play the fool; in the latter character he was easy, brilliant, often bold beyond measure, frank without egotism, and always admirably effective. His genius, wayward, yet to a certain degree self-justifying, refuses to linger within the pale of the small critic's rules. Never was there a man who called for more breadth and generosity of estimate. He declines to be ranked either as optimist or pessimist; he was one, or both, or neither, all in the space of a single essay. Essentially, then, he was a person of moods. Variety was to him not only the spice of life but, one suspects, a large part of food as well. He had an inordinate craving for sympathy, but,

apparently not always a proportionate quantity to bestow. In short, despite Proctor's assertion that "no man was competent to write upon Hazlitt who did not know him personally," one is not unlikely to feel, when particularly exasperated by some of Hazlitt's displays of the varieties of iniquity which in orthodox days were believed to derive from Adam, that one wishes to know him thus chiefly in order to forget him in the writer.

Here his fame and title, so long denied him even in his own country, are now secure. The dull-witted sneers of the Quarterly and the ruffian abuse of Blackwood's no longer annoy him. William Gifford and John Wilson are fast receding into forgetfulness, while Hazlitt, despite their attacks, as petty as they were dastardly, has risen to his place of pride. The complete edition of his works published but a very few years since is one of his rewards from posterity. This abuse he owed to the fact that he was a political Dissenter, a Radical deep-rooted. His, moreover, was not the diffidence of dissent, but its dissidence. He prided himself upon being no government tool. In many beliefs he ranked under a party which had but one member—William Hazlitt. He was nothing if not independent. Naturally, this drew upon him the malignity—for it was no less—of the King's men. By a libelous review of his *Characters of Shakespeare's Plays*, they killed at once the further sale of the book, which had for several months been popular. Then, to make assurance doubly sure, they maintained a fire upon him during the remainder of his life, retarding his just recognition and blighting his career. They dubbed him "pimpled Hazlitt"—not because it was true but because it would serve as well with Tory readers. They called him a "poor, cankered creature." In fact, they endeavored to make him an object to point the finger at. After a Blackwood's, he was fearing descents from his creditors or landlord for the next week, and scarce dared look a passer-by in the face. Through it all, it is true, he kept his principles: he was not a man to be bullied; yet he felt, despite his sturdy rejoinders, that he had the worst of this unequal contest, and the knowledge embittered him. After that stormy setting of Napoleon's power at Waterloo there were few hours of Hazlitt's life which could be reckoned by a sun-dial. Thenceforth

he took refuge in the memories of his early days. His spirit of dissent was, perhaps, due in part to his undeniable love of combat; but it is hardly just to accept De Quincey's cavalier assertion that Hazlitt's motto was, "Whatever is, is wrong." Both his pugnaciousness and his dissent he imbibed from his father, a Dissenting clergyman of Irish blood, who designed that his son should also follow this profession. But William had little enough of the endowment of a clergyman. The blood which ran warm in his veins very early protested against the paternal wishes; indeed, one soon finds him a freethinker—independent in this as in all other respects.

Meanwhile the first great experience of his life had come upon him—his meeting with Coleridge, in 1798, Hazlitt being then in his twentieth year. Here, certainly, from his enthusiastic account in that memorable essay, "My First Acquaintance with Poets,"¹ a new planet swam into his ken. Coleridge was to him an inspired bard, an oracle of truth, speaking withal in a voice whose tones were a spell unto his listeners, rising, his worshiper tells us, "like a steam of rich, distilled perfumes." Hazlitt was then at his father's home, in Wem, Shropshire. The ten muddy miles to Shrewsbury, where Coleridge was to preach, he covered with eager expectation—an expectation exceeded, however, by the reality, which only his own words can properly relate. He soon afterward met the poet at Wem, and listened in silence to accents which were for him those of a new existence. "The past was a sleep, and his life began." An invitation to Nether Stowey, where Coleridge then resided, filled his cup of happiness. This man exercised more influence on Hazlitt's life than anyone else. In spite of Coleridge's later apostasy from the principles of the French Revolution, which Hazlitt never forgave, he was always an idol, "the only person I ever knew," declares his disciple, "who answered to the idea of a man of genius." But, hero-worshiper though he was, Hazlitt had few friends and retained fewer. His irritable temperament and love of solitude—one of his most delightful essays² dilates on the joys of going on a journey alone—did not recommend him to the give-and-take of comradeship. One cynically

¹ In Winterslow.² "On Going a Journey" (Table Talk).

suspects that he got more comfort out of his hatreds than out of his friendships; he declared himself "the king of good haters." Here only was he methodical. He may be said to have kept his personal hatreds in a kind of mental ledger, and was never satisfied unless the accounts balanced. A list of his dislikes would be amusing: it would certainly include kings, pedants, blue-stockings, country people, tyranny, Methodism, long friendships, the Society for the Suppression of Vice, the Royal Academy, the conversation of lords, the House of Commons, and the sound of the ocean! Besides these, moreover, he had a large assortment of "imperfect sympathies."

Yet it were ill justice to omit to record that his likes were as many and as intense as his dislikes. His favorite books he loved beyond measure. He delights in telling us the time and circumstances in which he perused them; how he sat up all night at a country inn to finish Paul and Virginia. His early years, however, form the only period in which he accomplished much reading; for, as he himself says, he ceased to read when he began to write—which was not, it is true, until he was past thirty. His literary criticism seems to have begun with a paper in the Edinburgh Review in 1815, though for a few years earlier he had been contributing short articles to Leigh Hunt's Examiner. His powers were therefore matured before he made any important estimate. And into literature he carried a serenity quite foreign to what would be expected of him as a man. He was another Hazlitt, and a better. That was an acute and sympathetic remark of Thackeray's concerning him: "It was always good to know what were the impressions made by books, or men, or pictures on such a mind." Although he was an impressionist, he was almost invariably safe. On most literary works and problems he was fitted to speak *ex cathedra*; his sensuous and poetic nature enabled him to place himself *en rapport* with nearly any theme, to exercise both a sympathetic receptiveness and a disinterested judgment. He always saw deep into his men and their works; his essays are never barren, never commonplace. He has, moreover, that final power of a critic, the knack of getting at the heart of a thing. His are the *bon mots* of criticism. He writes a phrase where your small critic

covers a page. When he has finished his discussion of Spenser or Crabbe, one feels a sense of satisfaction which does not always accompany a perusal of some modern "literary" essays which illustrate the scientific method and reveal the scientific temperament. In Hazlitt the whole is so good reading that you forget it is mere criticism. He is kin with those on whom he pronounces; the author is tried by his peer. One stops here to ask, Of how many critics since Hazlitt can this be said? And, as Mr. Saintsbury has well suggested, he never praised a defect.

Concerning his powers of estimate a few reservations must naturally be made. He is occasionally prone to use a superlative where it is scarcely warranted. His enthusiastic assertion that Mrs. Inchbald's stories are as if written by Venus herself is perhaps harmless enough, since Venus never wrote anything; but it is, shall we say, fancy rather than judgment. More reprehensible are his few but violent prejudices. Sir Philip Sidney's sonnets, for example, he finds unendurable; and no less hearty is his contempt for Shelley's work. But such critical aberrations are rare in his volumes. If we add that he failed to recognize Byron's power as a satirist, we have mentioned most of the important ones. Nor ought we to find much with which to quarrel in his general method—or lack of method—of criticism; he is often desultory but seldom either careless or slipshod. Many of his verdicts seem written in a genial, after-dinner mood. All of his critical papers were apparently done rapidly. He went down to Winterslow, to a lonely country house where he loved to work, and spent six weeks with a pile of Elizabethan dramas. When he returned he had not only read them all but had penned his lectures as well. This we may think discreditable haste—until we have read the lectures. The pages on Dekker have, I think, never been surpassed. In much of his work, both in this and other periods, Hazlitt was a pioneer—a pioneer, that is to say, in furnishing correct and well-rounded estimates. Moreover, many of his specific assertions are far in advance of those of his contemporaries—his defense, for example, of the clown scenes in Shakespeare's tragedies. Lamb's remarks on the Elizabethan period are also excellent, but when Swinburne speaks of "the Hazlitts prattling at his

heels" he talks nonsense. If there was anything that Hazlitt did not do it was to prattle at anybody's heels. He was the first to do justice to the fine genius and character of Swift, anticipating similar verdicts from Forster, Mr. Craik, and Churton Collins by more than fifty years. He even forgave Swift for being a Tory. Of *Gulliver's Travels* he says: "I cannot see the harm, the misanthropy, the immoral and degrading tendency of all this. The moral lesson is as fine as the intellectual exhibition is amusing. It is an attempt to tear off the mask of imposture from the world; and nothing but imposture has a right to complain of it." How firmly has posterity placed upon these words the golden seal, "Well said"! Not only in his studies of past literature, moreover, did he display these admirable qualities, but in studies much more difficult—so difficult, indeed, that few modern critics have succeeded in them. His estimates of contemporary literature are remarkably sane and penetrating. With extremely few exceptions he reveals astonishing ability to gain perspective, to detach himself from his time and its associations, and to view its poetry and prose in the clear light of an alien. A crucial test of this ability is his estimate of Wordsworth, favorable and true when almost all other contemporary estimates were unfavorable and untrue. One sees in Hazlitt's pages no such tirade as Jeffrey's over Wordsworth's "childishness," "perverseness," "silly sooth," "babyish absurdity," "trash," "hubbub of strained raptures," "poetical intoxication," and the like, which are but a few examples of the Scotch editor's billingsgate. Hazlitt pronounced Wordsworth the most original poet of the age, averring, furthermore, that he had described nature better than any other poet. His praise of the "Excursion" was tempered with considerable frank and well-deserved censure; but his commendation of the poet's best work is proved unmistakably by his boldly expressed preference of Wordsworth to Byron. It took courage to voice such an opinion at a time when the author of "*Childe Harold*" was at the full blaze of his fame; but Hazlitt was never one who hesitated to speak his mind. To his credit be it said that if he was sometimes a rather querulous dissenter, he was never a shuffler, a feeler of popular sentiment. If he saw that a thing was good, he said so,

whether one or a million were on his side. And all this he said justly; for by his remarkable gift of swift insight he was qualified to do it. Beside so thoroughly unqualified a person as Lord Jeffrey—whose worst critical remarks illustrate Hazlitt's strictures in his paper "On the Conversation of Lords"—he "sticks fiery off indeed." Jeffrey, in the eyes of posterity, forfeits all right to pronounce on Wordsworth by his pitiful inability to distinguish his good qualities and good poems from his bad qualities and bad poems. No such bathos of criticism yawns in Hazlitt's work. If we look forward to Matthew Arnold, we find in his literary verdicts correspondence to those of Hazlitt, not only on Wordsworth but also on our other great poets. No higher tribute than this need be paid to Hazlitt's permanent value. Like Arnold, he possesses the illuminating phrase, the power of brief and telling characterization, the wise emphasis, the salutary severity, the determination to stamp nothing great that is mediocre, which mark the truly inspiring critic. Nothing has been better proved than that the adequate critic of poets must himself be at soul a poet. Herein Jeffrey often failed; herein Gifford miserably failed; and herein many a modern hopelessly flounders. But of Hazlitt it may be repeated that "It was always good to know what were the impressions made by books, or men, or pictures on such a mind."

Of his comment upon painting and the stage I shall make no mention; but in this he showed the same nicety of touch as in his literary criticism. His references to pictures and artists are frequent throughout his works. And despite his desultory methods he had a set of critical principles sufficiently well formulated in his mind. His impressions are not lawless, random, or inconsistent; he did not, like Jeffrey, say one thing to-day and another to-morrow. Moreover, though it has been urged that the range of his reading and, consequently, of his estimate, was not wide, yet he touched upon nearly all of our great names in English letters. It may be admitted that he was not a comprehensive and deep scholar; but what he said of Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra may be applied to himself—his genius has spread over the whole field of his judgments "a richness like the overflowing of the

Nile." Says Mr. Saintsbury,¹ with pardonable enthusiasm: "He is the critic's critic as Spenser is the poet's poet; that is to say, he has, errors excepted and deficiencies allowed, the greatest proportion of the strictly critical excellences—of the qualities which make a critic—that any English writer of his craft has ever possessed."

His miscellaneous familiar essays, of which he wrote a great number, refuse to be ranked so conveniently. Hazlitt's powers are probably even more characteristically revealed in them than in his critical papers. But they are a genus Hazlitt—as unique as Lamb's *Essays of Elia*. His desultory methods were better suited to this form of composition than to any other. We expect no system, or ought to expect none. Shall we ask for a systematic treatise "On a Sun-Dial"? Or on "My First Acquaintance with Poets"? Or "On Living to One's Self"? Obviously what is requisite here is interest; and to secure interest the author must have a brilliant mind, a fund of illustration, abundant imagery, recollections, the fruits of unplanned meditations over uncounted cups of fabulously strong tea—Hazlitt's substitute for pipe and bowl. All these desirable things Hazlitt gives his readers. I am tempted to say that in his choicest personal essays he is the best company in the world. The sources of this charm it is not easy to explain, and even less easy to generalize upon, since each essay has a flavor of its own. But, unquestionably, one main source is the personal spell: on every page the author is telling us in one way or another about himself. He is taking us into his confidence. And, like Lamb, he can do this without leaving a trace of egotism. Or at times he turns the quizzical philosopher on things of everyday life. When he discusses the apparently trite question, "Why Distant Objects Please," we see nothing of the pedant, the dry-as-dust philosopher; it is philosophy popularized, brought to our armchairs. But if anyone thinks it easy to write this kind of philosophical essay, let him point us excellent examples outside of Hazlitt's work; a precious time he will have in the search, for the qualities necessary thus to extract only the interesting are not common. We do not desire threadbare commonplaces or trite

¹ *A History of Nineteenth Century Literature*, p. 187.

comparisons; in a word, we do not wish a philosopher, in an effort to be popular, to talk like poor Poll. But all such pitfalls Hazlitt as if by instinct avoided. In all of his philosophical papers he succeeds in holding us under the spell of his unique methods. These essays are full of rich passages of emotion, of unexpected excursions of thought, of swift sallies, of daring assertions which pique the curiosity and arouse antagonism only to disarm it. Hazlitt was master of these arts of holding the attention. He was a master also of narrative method in the essay. And I suspect that he could have given us an absorbing novel. It would doubtless have been largely made up of autobiographical material, and would never have arrived anywhere; but for my part I should not have cared whether it did. There would have been delights innumerable on the way. All this, of course, is mere fancy; but it serves to illustrate his peculiar gifts. There is almost an atmosphere of Arcady in several of his best personal essays; and in the final analysis they are all personal. This atmosphere seems to be gained somewhat by a tone of romantic regret, the painting, now joyous, now tender, of the days gone by. Hazlitt is always looking backward, is, in fact, a dweller in the past. The impetus which he gave to the Romantic Movement in the early nineteenth century was not inconsiderable. He commends himself particularly to those readers whose days are already in the sere and yellow leaf. He ought to be delightful perusal for old maids; indeed, for the advanced singulars of either sex. One gets a genuine feeling of comfort from many of his essays. Things "long to quiet vowed" start up in our recollections as he proceeds in his endless reminiscences—endless, however, to modify one of his own phrases, only in the sense that as they go on forever you wish them to go on forever. Such are those in the "Farewell to Essay Writing,"¹ which opens with that passage of mournful content:

Food, warmth, sleep, and a book; these are all I at present ask—the *ultima Thule* of my wandering desires. Do you not then wish for

A friend in your retreat,
Whom you may whisper, solitude is sweet?

¹In *Winterslow*.

Expected, well enough—gone, still better. Such attractions are strengthened by distance. Nor a mistress? "Beautiful mask! I know thee!" When I can judge of the heart from the face, of the thoughts from the lips, I may again trust myself. Instead of these give me the robin red-breast, picking the crumbs at the door, or warbling on the leafless spray, the same glancing form that has followed me wherever I have been, and "done its spiriting gently"; or the rich notes of the thrush that startle the ear of winter, and seem to have drunk up the full draught of joy from the very sense of contrast. To these I adhere, and am faithful, for they are true to me.

There is perhaps a certain tone of petulance in this and other essays; a petulance which seems more frequent in the productions of his latest years. His impatience at the world and at himself would sometimes out with almost startling plainness. But more often the mood was one of half-content. And there are many essays that herd under neither definition. Indeed, if there is one thing to be emphasized concerning Hazlitt's miscellaneous papers, it is their astonishing variety both of theme and treatment. At one remove stands that thoroughly enjoyable description—full of gusto—of "The Fight," a masterpiece of vividness and color. It would go far toward reconciling the veriest man of peace to prize-fighting if he possessed literary taste. Tennyson thought it good enough to pilfer from it the phrase, "red ruin," which Hazlitt had applied to the condition of the face of one of the combatants after an especially sturdy blow. At one remove, I say, stands this description; at the other, perhaps, "The Look of a Gentleman." And for satirical power we must go to our greatest satirist, Swift, to find anything better than the "Letter to William Gifford, Esq.," that slashing editor of the Quarterly Review. One fancies that even the crocodile plates of Gifford's brain must have been pierced by it. The language, moreover, is not wantonly abusive but simply adequate to the subject. And this adequacy of expression is just as characteristic of any other article of Hazlitt's. Whether he is writing an essay critical, philosophical, or personal, his style is always clear-cut and brilliant. Its structure is simple and straightforward. His long, rolling periods, which appear in some of his best essays, are never involved; they gather themselves up like a billow, and break at the close into a long cadence which echoes down the entire page. Such is that sublime description of

the joys of life in "The Feeling of Immortality in Youth."¹ Moreover, he frequently shows that nice sense of phrase which is one of the surest marks of a good style. "The idea of what the public will think prevents the public from ever thinking at all." How well that is said! Here was a writer who could mold language to his will. Such powers often imply, as in the case of Carlyle, that their possessor will allow himself, in diction and usage, a liberty, perhaps a license of treatment. On the contrary, no man took fewer liberties than Hazlitt. He did no violence to our English tongue. He was no highwayman of literary art, forcing words and phrases to his bidding. His is a manner well suited to the most frequent demands; it satisfies both the artist and the utilitarian. It is flexible without weakness, formal without stiffness. It is Hazlitt, true to himself, and his splendid powers. If he was sometimes ridiculous as a man, he was always master of the situation as a writer. His self-possession is as complete in the latter character as it was indiscernible in the former. There is no shuffle in his literary gait.

Such a writer has the golden gift of turning everything that he touches into literature. And in his best passages he often shows a poetic power—for Hazlitt's temperament was clearly and richly poetic—which recalls the "glad prose" of Jeremy Taylor. Imagination glows through them with a wealth and softness which give us a new indication of their author's genius; and one seldom detects, as one detects so often in De Quincey, overabundant alliteration, inflated diction, or grandiose sentiment. Hazlitt's influence, as might be suspected, upon the prose of the nineteenth century was easily noticeable. Stevenson, himself one of the best stylists of its later half, said, "We are mighty fine fellows, but we cannot write like William Hazlitt." And there are others who might well have acknowledged thus generously their indebtedness. Ruskin is almost certainly to be reckoned among these. Hazlitt's essay "On a Landscape of Nicholas Poussin" is a pioneer in the field. And the following touch is unmistakably in the manner of Ruskin: "Let the naturalist, if he will, catch the glow-worm, carry it home with him in a box, and find it next morning nothing

¹ In Winterslow.

but a little gray worm; let the poet or the lover of poetry visit it at evening, when beneath the scented hawthorn and the crescent moon it has built itself a palace of emerald light." Truly, the seed of Hazlitt's work was fruitful. Both Macaulay and Arnold drew some suggestions from it. Whether Carlyle did is doubtful; if he had, he would probably never have admitted it. But what a character he would have presented for Hazlitt's critical pen! It is to be regretted that we could not have had a twenty-page picture of this Oracle of Chelsea in *The Spirit of the Age*, a sprightly volume in which Hazlitt drew faithful portraits of some of his prominent contemporaries. It would have been as good, I suspect, as Carlyle's own *Reminiscences*. And perhaps Hazlitt would have repaid that indecent abuse of Lamb which is one of the disfigurements of the *Reminiscences*.

One likes best, however, to think of Hazlitt, not in the recrimination of partisan bitterness but in the lonely peace and genial surroundings of Winterslow. When he once forgot the world—and, one may add, the flesh and the devil—he was, to repeat the already quoted tribute of Lamb, "one of the wisest and finest spirits breathing." He tossed off exquisite papers with an ease which may well have awakened the admiration of his successors. He did

What many dream of all their lives.
Dream? strive to do, and agonize to do,
And fail in doing.

When he breathed the serene air of literary creation he was himself. He never committed a *gaucherie* here. He wrote no labored sentences, no heavy or pompous platitudes. When we turn the last pages of his volumes we forget the blunders of his well-nigh ludicrous life; we remember only the swift flashes of insight, the catholicity which quite overshadows the prejudice, and, above all, the naturalness, the consummate ease, of his writings. Now that Tory rancor and all other hostility is inefficient against his memory, Hazlitt will take the place which he has so long deserved. Though he gave us no body of new doctrine, yet he talked upon subjects so intimate to the average man, in a manner so picturesque and personal, that he fills a niche of his own in our literature. And his

criticism, invaluable in his own period, has endured remarkably the searching test of time; despite the long roll of later critics, Hazlitt is still quoted, and some of his work in this field will probably never be supplanted. In one of his later essays he says, "I should like to leave some sterling work behind me." He has left it. Disappointment and persecution obscure his real self; but abundance appears, none the less, to assure us that here was a seeker of the "fugitive and gracious light" of truth, which does not come

With houses or with gold,
With place, with honor, and a flattering crew.

His splendid talents might have won him wealth and comfort in the service of his political opponents; he rejected the thought. Indifference to injustice would have secured him a more peaceful life; such indifference was impossible. His seemingly contradictory qualities estranged from him all save a few whose insight could understand him, or whose sympathy was willing to accept him. Lamb could do both; and it is with Lamb that I like to think of him, whether in life or in letters.

Harry T. Baker

ART. IV.—DENOMINATIONAL CONTROL OF COLLEGES

THERE are new movements in education which render a far-sighted policy, for denominational institutions, of the greatest importance. Princely gifts from individuals, and the creation of great boards which assume more or less of educational or of administrative direction, while they have not entirely created, have rapidly, and perhaps unduly, intensified a situation regarding denominational colleges which, sooner or later, was sure to involve the entire question of college administration. The genius of Protestantism works toward the survival of institutions on the pure basis of their right to exist as witnessed in the judgment of enlightened men. It will brook no mediæval compulsions, no survivals through appeal to passion and prejudice, but it depends upon the appeal of God's truth to man's spirit and man's instincts. An institution must prove its worth by the contribution it makes to the transformation of men into the image of God and by the ability of that institution to keep pace with advancing conceptions of justice, of morality, of social service, and of religion, as finally shown to be true and tenable by all righteous tests. Any man of prophetic spirit who understands the spirit of Protestantism will see that eventually there must have come a lively discussion of the question of technical denominational control in institutions which lay special stress on the development of religious life and character, and which seek to train a generation in their religious ideals and in devotion to the service of a particular denomination. This is a many-sided question. The last word of the discussion is a long way from having been spoken. Sooner or later all artificial restrictions will be removed. The strong, broad-minded, truly spiritual man, who demonstrates his power to lead by the strength of his ideas, the nobility of his Christian character, and a loyalty evidenced in the sacrifice which makes him serve and give, will be the dominant personality. That was so in the early history of our institutions; it ought always to be so. If Christian ideas are what we hold them to be, there is no question about the ultimate outcome. Rightly

understood, they can and will win in intelligent America, for they are the permanent ideas on which civilization must rest. The failure to recognize denominational institutions in certain quarters seems to have forced the issue rather prematurely, and it is tending to prevent that true spiritual development in which certain phases of formal ecclesiastical control would have passed away because it became the sober judgment of the denominations themselves that it had survived its usefulness. The fading out of denominational lines to make way for the world movement of a united Protestant Christianity must certainly have given us very soon a non-denominational yet vitally Christian control of those educational institutions which are really the "Port Arthurs of Christianity," and we can only regard it as regrettable that the question has reached the acute stage a little too early. The issue is none the less upon us, and the necessity for a settlement of it gives denominational educational work some aspects of crisis.

Denominational systems differ. In some the results of change in the governmental system of their colleges are much more serious than in others. All the important Congregational colleges, by reason of their general denominational system, had charters which made it easy for them to meet the conditions demanded by one of the most conspicuous of the great educational foundations. The genius of the Methodist system was different. The Methodists are persuaded that, while their system may seem autocratic and monarchial to outsiders, in reality it is one of the most democratic, just as the limited monarchy of Great Britain gives that empire a quite genuine form of democratic government. If England is having trouble with its House of Lords, we in America must speak softly in view of the radically different sentiment often manifested in the House of Representatives and in the Senate of our own Congress. The introduction of laymen into the governing body of Methodism, the vote permitting women to sit in that body, recent changes in certain phases of the district superintendency, all indicate that, while Methodism is conservative, the body is progressive, has not lost its power to read the signs of the times or to adapt itself to changing conditions in a conservatively progressive spirit. It is duly responsive to public

sentiment. Many of the strongest leaders, however, look with suspicion upon movements for the modification of charters which have even the appearance of being forced by financial considerations. Moved by the high motive of loyalty to truth, they strenuously oppose, on ethical grounds, what under different circumstances they might have received with favor. It is not surprising that the Methodist denomination, which raised ten million dollars for its colleges in two or three years during the Twentieth Century Movement, whose Sunday schools have created an educational fund of over a million dollars, whose colleges have an honorable educational history, and now have about sixty thousand students on their rolls, a denomination which has trained in its colleges some of the most noted men in our national history, should hesitate before wrenching from their proper place in a denominational system institutions which have been so vitally related to the success and progress of the church, and which, more than any other single factor, have been the source of Methodism's universally recognized contribution to our general national life and to our present world-wide national influence. The Methodists, therefore, view with uneasiness, and, in some instances, with irritation, a situation in which an institution like Oberlin is admitted to certain benefits, while institutions like their own Northwestern or Wesleyan are left off. These latter colleges are quite the educational equals of Oberlin, while the Congregational institution has a religious history as pronounced as either of the others, and points with pride to the fact that it has given over one thousand home and foreign missionaries to the church. This, indeed, indicates that a college can be true to Christian principles under a denominational tie and with a form of control quite different from that in vogue for more than a century among the Methodists. But it is not remarkable that strong leaders in that denomination should resist a demand which seems to them, in essence, to require an immediate change to a congregational or independent basis of administration. They are hardly ready to admit that the general interests of education cannot be served unless institutions with such a notable and honorable scholastic history at one twist wrench themselves from their historical relations and go on an entirely

new basis. That such is not quite intended is certain from the statement, oft repeated, that it is proper to have such colleges continue under "the friendly auspices of the denominations which founded them." Inasmuch as the demand strikes the Methodists more severely, perhaps, than it could any other of the Protestant denominations, it is worthy of note that the leaders of that communion have, as a rule, spoken with great calmness and moderation, and are meeting the whole matter in a judicial temper. Drake University, the leading institution of the Christian denomination, has made the necessary changes and is on the "accepted list." Bowdoin last year returned the endowment of the Stone Professorship with interest, the total amount being \$56,118.16, that a gift conditioned on the loyalty of the college to the teaching of the orthodox Congregational or Presbyterian Church might not prevent her enlistment, and Bowdoin is now on the "accepted list." Brown University is said to have taken steps looking toward the modification of its charter. The Presbyterians and the Methodist Church, South, are in more or less confusion. Several of their institutions are disposed to meet the requirement imposed by the Foundation, while others severely criticise this disposition; but on the whole, particularly beyond Methodist circles, the pronounced tendency is to change charters when necessary, to return, if need be, conditional gifts, and to secure, if possible, the benefits of the Carnegie Foundation.

In the Methodist Church a large percentage of the natural constituency is urging a "stand pat" policy, but that constituency is not accepting, as it should, the responsibility for the support of the colleges. Numerous illustrations can be given where, in the raising of funds amounting to one quarter to one half a million dollars, in recent months, the larger percentage of the money has been from non-Methodists. In some instances, from fifty to seventy-five per cent of the funds secured has been from outside sources. Incidentally, this is a striking evidence of the confidence of the public in these colleges. Ohio Wesleyan University seems to be the institution most conspicuously supported by its Methodist constituency. Those who seek the control of a college ought to stand ready to accept, if need be, full responsibility for

its sustenance. In this condition it is no wonder that some boards of trustees are seriously considering such action as will secure for them the largest financial benefits, whatever the cost in the severance of denominational connections. Already college presidents are experiencing difficulty in inducing desirable and competent men to enter college faculties with a double handicap of small salaries for the present and the deprivation of such privileges as those afforded by retiring allowances at the end. There is danger of an acrimonious contest which may result in some of the larger and stronger colleges becoming almost completely alienated from the church, while a large number of the weaker ones separate themselves from public sympathy, put themselves beyond the hope of aid from some of the large foundations, and leave themselves to financial suicide. There are most serious questions centering around subjection to conditions which seem to be insisted upon by some of these boards. In the first place, Is a purely self-perpetuating body of trustees in any case the desirable form of control? Is there not grave danger of putting great and largely endowed institutions in the hands of men who can dictate their own successors and who may, if thus disposed, bring it to pass in the course of half a generation that an institution should become subversive of everything for which it was founded? It would not be impossible now to find institutions where, in the course of a long administration by a forceful president, the governing board has become, in no small degree, his creature. If authority to control must more and more carry with it the moral obligation of adequate support, the reverse will be true, namely, supporters will control. This indicates the necessity for a large contributing constituency, if colleges are not eventually to become the creatures of those who have great wealth to bestow. State institutions, through the popular election of regents, are responsive to popular will. Ought we to consent to the creation of a series of institutions which may become purely autocratic, or which may, in time, become so indifferent to the real demands of the time that they shall become as deserted as has Andover in recent years? If State institutions incur the danger of the leadership of the demagogue, these private institutions thus governed might be in peril of the rule of the

autocrat. It would seem that this question has not received proper consideration. There are others involved in the conditions or possible conditions of these foundations. How far must institutions submit to their dictation? What degree of institutional liberty will finally be granted? Is there danger of relinquishing ecclesiastical control for a more serious external control—a possible change of masters without diminution of discomfort to the servant? I understand the Carnegie Foundation has made some notable changes at the recent meeting. What will be the final content of their demands? It is not a misfortune that the large foundations have spoken on this subject. Senator Root well said recently: "The essential process of free government is free discussion. Discussion confined to people of the same way of thinking, with the same interests, the same purposes and prejudices, tends only to strengthen their common difference from all others and to increase the divergence between different groups of our people; but discussion, information, sincere and earnest attempts to get at each other's minds and to *learn* as well as to teach, among people of different points of view—this leads to that common public opinion whose expression in the end comes nearest to being the voice of God that man has ever attained." We can only profit by such full and free discussion. It is of equal importance to all the denominations. The future of Protestant Christianity in America and the problem of the retention of a definitely Christian element in education is, perhaps, more seriously involved than many good men realize. It is well, therefore, to call attention to the fact that the present method of ecclesiastical control, differing widely in different denominations, largely through Conference election or approval of trustees in Methodist institutions, gives no adequate or modern supervision. In many cases it is an embarrassment without compensating advantages. It is defective for its intended purpose. It does not even assure a safe and business-like management. The business methods of some of the institutions ought to be a source of poignant grief to us, if not of shame; but some whose methods and standards are most open to criticism have self-perpetuating boards of trustees. Though under the auspices of the church, they are under no Conference control and

have no denominational tests for members of the governing board. Among the trustees of colleges of this type are able men, but they are directors who do not direct. Such cases convince one that ecclesiastical control is, to say the least, not the only defect, and that we need to look more deeply into the subject before we decide on the final and effective system.

Not infrequently men without that adequate educational discipline or that openness to new truth which enables them to judge wisely attack the noblest teachers in a sensational way, to the great injury of the institution. Whoever officially looks into the educational or business management of Methodist colleges must see the possible or actual defects of present methods of control. I speak now of Methodist colleges because it would be ungracious in me to make such statements concerning others, but Methodists are probably not the only sufferers. It ought to be impossible for a college president to plunge an institution seriously into debt without the knowledge of the trustees. There ought to be some responsible and competent body who would select professors with such foresight and care as to guard us against immature or erratic men in professorial chairs, and against that all too large class who, in the name of intellectual freedom, pose as original thinkers and teach conclusions which are not infrequently long-discarded theories utterly subversive of the truth. On the other hand, there should be adequate protection for the tried, sane, safe investigator who can discover new facts, who has the courage to state and defend new truth, and who distinguishes between proved truth and tentative hypothesis. Such a man alone can beget within his pupils the true Protestant spirit of open-mindedness to new truth while he anchors them to unshaken fundamentals. Our present methods of control in many cases assure neither proper liberty to a faculty nor proper protection to the public who intrust their children to these colleges. Take this pathetic picture. Half a dozen boys and girls, as bright and as capable as any the nation affords, are awakened by some pastor or by some effective college agent to the necessity of a better preparation for life. They are turned toward a so-called college. In those unsuspecting years they have little or no conception of what

really constitutes either a college or an education. They wend their way to "Meadow Hill College"; they spend eight years, the only eight they will ever have for this purpose. They develop the youthful sense of loyalty "to the institution"; they learn its yells, join in its contests, and are genuine in their enthusiasm. They have seen nothing better. In due time they receive diplomas. The degrees for which those diplomas stand are conferred amid the plaudits of acclaiming friends and often before a larger concourse than gathers at some of the notable institutions of the country. These young people are made to believe that they are adequately prepared for the world's work in the twentieth century when, in large measure, they have neither the method, the content, nor the spirit of such a training. It is all very well to say that they have received other things which constitute "an equivalent," but the choice should not be between mental discipline, breadth of culture, and these "other things." The Christian college, if true to its mission, stands for the completest education. Its first principle is, or should be, moral honesty and intellectual integrity. With due attention to the matters herein set forth, and with the assertion of bona-fide moral and religious standards, which apply not only to devotional habits but to college equipment, to the content of the college course, and to the actual classification of our institutions for what they really are, the Christian college would be the strongest and most permanent educational influence in the land. The purpose of administration is to secure the ends for which the institution stands. Without reference to the Carnegie Foundation, or any other, we need a discussion and a reformation of our methods in these particulars. If some system of efficient direction through trustee election by the alumni, or through a more efficient and democratic method of election by the denomination, can be devised, or if we can leave the corporation to self-perpetuation after drafting some democratic and educational safeguards, the day is at hand for the scheme. We are all agreed that we do not wish to be narrowly sectarian. On the other hand, are we to concede that a denomination which, by great labor, by a tender solicitude worthy of a mother, by generous and often sacrificial gifts, has created and fostered an institution, must hand it over

to a new system of control, content only to have relations of friendly sympathy with it? Are we persuaded that educational efficiency for the future demands this? or can those denominations which have shown themselves educational leaders in the earlier history of our nation devise a modified system of control suited to our age which will conserve that for which they established these colleges, while securing all that is just in the demands of these educational reformers? Unfortunately, "denominational" and "sectarian" are terms almost hopelessly confounded in the public mind. It is possible to devise a scheme which will eliminate both terms while assuring vital Christian control and adequate support. We want no mercenary or servile spirit, but it is a time for all denominations to coöperate. What is good for one is likely to be good for all. The Laymen's Missionary Movement is showing how denominations can coöperate. Why not a united Christian movement for efficient and modern control of Christian colleges—a method of control which will leave faculties unhampered in modern statements of truth and in free investigation, while at the same time insuring us against the subversion of fundamental Christian principles, which will be a guarantee for sound and progressive educational policies and standards, and which will appeal, as the present system does not appeal, to men of means, men of sterling business methods, and men of broad Christian ideals. These Christian institutions, moreover, are the expression of the conviction of a very large percentage of our American citizenship that education is not and cannot be complete without the religious element. Any movement which tends toward purely secular education, or which promises, designedly or undesignedly, however gradually, to eliminate the distinctively Christian factor in education, must and will be resisted at any cost. Weighing everything the great foundations have said, estimating our own difficulties, let us accept their conditions, if we can, after devising a way to safeguard that for which we exist. If we cannot, let us go to our own people with a well-thought-out scheme and say to them, "If you believe in this, and want it perpetuated, you must finance it." Would that we might move with such expedition as to have each wait until all could move together. Meantime, if

any given institution feels that its pressing interests demand immediate modification of charter, our spirit should be so irenic as to prevent alienation and to insure coöperation later. Will not well-to-do men of the churches take this matter as seriously as it deserves? This is a time when the best Christian brain of the country should give consideration to the subject and back up its conviction with its gifts. No more important question can engage the attention of Christian men in this generation.

The College Presidents' Association of the Methodist Episcopal Church has a committee, consisting of Dr. John F. Goucher, President Abram W. Harris, President Herbert Welch, and the corresponding secretary of the Board of Education, giving careful attention to the problem, and it was the subject of earnest consideration at the last annual meeting of the Board of Education. Thoughtful and well-considered opinion of any sort bearing on a subject of such moment will be welcomed by the committee.

Thomas Nicholson

ART. V.—THE CASE OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH

THE "Methodist Federation Farce" is the descriptive title given by the Pacific Christian Advocate of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, to the present laudable effort of the two Methodist Episcopal Churches to adjust their differences and heal the wounds of fifty years. The occasion for this denunciation of federation is that a Southern Methodist church near Los Angeles, California, of some three hundred members, went over in a body to the Methodist Episcopal Church. It is needless to say they were not induced to come, nor was their determination seriously considered until they had affirmed that if they were not received they would form themselves into an independent Methodist Church. Possibly, if the Pacific Advocate had known of federation in Missouri, through the application of which several Methodist Episcopal churches had gone over to the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and one here and there of that church had transferred to the Methodist Episcopal Church, and all this on the approval of Southern Methodist bishops, he would have practiced a little more rigid economy of invective and a larger expenditure of judicial fairness. Certainly, that which is indorsed by bishops and ministers of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, in Missouri, where members of the Methodist Episcopal Church change to the Church South cannot be complained of when members of that church in California come over in a body to the Methodist Episcopal Church. If the principles of federation apply at all, they apply equally to both churches.

The editor of the Nashville Christian Advocate has also pronounced federation, as we understand it, a farce, and "will have none of it," for the reason, it seems, that federation does not signify annihilation of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the white Conferences of the South. Criticising some utterance of Dr. James M. Buckley in a Missionary Committee, he says:

Dr. Buckley intimates that the acceptance by the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, of the provisions of the recent Plan of Federation is an

admission by that church of the right of the Methodist Episcopal Church to be in the South. If he really thinks so—which we doubt—he is much mistaken. That plan was devised to allay friction along the border between the two churches, and in the West where there is no dividing line. The territory recognized in 1844 as that of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, is still ours.

Now, the question naturally arises, Why this attack on federation and this harking back on all occasions to 1844? Since that epochal date the world has wandered far, and to thousands of Methodists in both churches the events of those days are almost as legendary as the fair deeds of King Arthur's knights, and not nearly so interesting as tales of "moving accidents by flood and field" told in Desdemona's ear.

In the interests of peace and good will such attacks have been ignored as editorial expressions of individual opinion, and as in no sense the judgment of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, or of its Commissions on Federation, for a more surprising misapprehension of fact could not well be conceived than this interpretation of the purpose of federation by the Nashville Christian Advocate. It may be not improper to state that for twelve years the writer was secretary of the Commission on Federation appointed by the Methodist Episcopal Church and also at the same time one of the secretaries of the Joint Commission of the two churches. Due regard to possible future complications and misunderstandings which may arise from this interpretation compels the affirmation that the statement of the Nashville Advocate is not in harmony with the facts. Had such been the understanding, it is quite likely that the Joint Commission would not have convened again after its first meeting. If the commissioners of the Church South had any such views, they never expressed them. Border lines only had nothing to do with our purposes or discussions or conclusions, for the very simple and sufficient reason that they do not exist. No such limitation, with its corollaries, of federation was ever expressed by either church. It does not appear in the resolutions of either General Conference providing for the commission. It does not appear in any report emanating from that commission. It is, as Max Nordau says of Nietzsche's originality, simply "an inversion of a rational train of thought." The resolution of the

General Conference of the Church South providing for the Commission refutes it. That resolution reads:

Resolved, That this commission shall have power to enter into negotiations with said commission from the Methodist Episcopal Church, if one shall be appointed, and with similar commissions from other Methodist bodies, with a view to abating hurtful competition and waste of men and money in home and foreign fields.

There is no reference to "border" here respecting the church, as there is not for "other Methodist bodies." The scope is general. It embraces home and foreign fields. The Methodist Episcopal Church is everywhere in the South—from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, from the Ohio River to Tampa Bay—and has been for well-nigh forty years. The acts of the Joint Commission also refute such an interpretation, if further refutation were needed. The fundamental agreement of that commission, and adopted by both churches, reads:

Resolved, That we recommend to the respective General Conferences to enact provisions to the effect that where either church is doing the work expected of Methodism, the other church shall not organize a society or erect a church building until the bishops of the two churches in charge of that field have been consulted.

But such erroneous views, and the groundless accusations which the church has become accustomed to and has patiently borne for decades, might even yet be ignored were it not that unchallenged perversions of history long continued become in time accepted fact. There is also another reason. For many years ceaseless complaint has been made against the Methodist Episcopal Church for maintaining her work in the South, and this, with her respectful but firm refusal to accept the interpretation of the Church South of the events of 1844, seems now to have become the agreed-upon method by which partisan editors hope to achieve their ends, the reversal of history, grant of further concessions on the ground of concessions already obtained, and the withdrawal of the Methodist Episcopal Church from the white Conferences in the South. The Methodist Episcopal Church in the South, however, in no wise detracts from either the usefulness or the dignity of the Church South, which we honor for its Christian heroism and fidelity to the gospel, nor would our withdrawal to-morrow enrich it or

strengthen it, or remove by an inch the obstacles to organic union.

Now, in turning aside for a moment from more congenial themes—since the issue is forced upon us—to interpret the facts of history and describe the situation as it exists, we may inquire what are the basal facts beneath all this contention? Representative journalists of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, demand that the Methodist Episcopal Church shall withdraw her jurisdiction from the South, leaving, if she desires, only the colored Conferences. That is, the church must surrender 200,000 native-born members, thousands of Sunday schools, nearly \$9,000,000 in schools and church property, or dispose of it in some way—which would involve endless litigation, stultify her entire history, the solemn affirmations of her bishops and officials and pastors, and all her Annual and General Conference acts and declarations for the space of more than sixty years. All this must be done, it is affirmed, before genuine and lasting fraternity can be assured, because it is insisted:

I. That the General Conference of 1844 divided the church. That in thus dividing the church it was agreed that all the territory occupied by the Southern Conferences, and the membership and property of the same, were to be under the sole jurisdiction of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, as was afterward decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.

II. That the Methodist Episcopal Church has violated this agreement of the Plan of Separation to this day through her bishops and pastors and General Conference action, by invading the South and establishing churches and Annual Conferences therein.

III. That the Methodist Episcopal Church, in contempt of the Supreme Court of the United States, still claims to be the original Methodist Episcopal Church, thereby denying the division and making the Church South a secession from that body, by continuous dating of her General Conference and other official documents from the founding of the church in 1784 instead of from 1845; and that notwithstanding repeated protestations of fraternity and appointment of Commissions on Federation she has not yet withdrawn from the territory of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South.

Such are the issues and such are the demands kept alive and insisted upon by representatives of the Church South. It is needless to say, perhaps, that such ancient controversies are not

issues at all at the present day with the Methodist Episcopal Church, they having been long since determined and settled finally by her in various General Conference and other official action. Nevertheless, it appeals to the highest reason, that if the Methodist Episcopal Church has done wrong, she should submit to the dictates of reason. We are not responsible for the wrongs of the past, but for perpetuating those wrongs, thus making them our own. But if the church has not done wrong, nor is doing wrong now, any attempt under any guise or plea to reverse the facts of history and surrender to such demands is for the church to institute a new and more tremendous wrong, a wrong outwringing all other wrongs, for then she would be not only breaking faith with 200,000 of her people but would be also confessing to evil doings which she did not commit and cannot condone. The Methodist Episcopal Church cannot thus write her own condemnation, and thereby invite that penalty which sooner or later comes to all who betray the truth, whether that truth be religious, scientific, or historical. The General Conference of 1844 faced grave questions. Slavery in the episcopacy was the issue. On that issue the Conference divided into two antagonistic, irreconcilable forces. It was an irrepressible conflict. The ages had been leading up to it. Neither side could yield. They may have made mistakes. But the *dramatis personæ* in that combination of events were Christian men, and they did the best they could with the light or the half-lights before them. Back of them were the monumenta of many yesterdays—Eli Whitney's cotton gin, which in a truer sense than Victor Hugo said, of Waterloo, was a change of front of the universe; the consequent tidal rise in values in lands and slaves, the readjustment of conscience, the struggle for power, and—the Missouri Compromise. But great as may have been their blunders, it is a yet greater blunder to force upon us at this day an acceptance of those blunders; to attempt to force us to recognize that as a virtue which the fathers condemned, to pay a note the fathers never signed.

I. Now, that the General Conference, by formal act, did, as far as it was able, divide the *funds* of the church is an indisputable fact; that it had the constitutional authority to do, and it was

right that it should do so. But that the General Conference of 1844 *divided the church* is not an indisputable fact. It is one thing for the prodigal son to come to his father and say, "Father, give me the portion of goods that falleth to me," and then leave his father's house on his own responsibility, and quite another and different thing for the father to enter into a compact with him to withdraw from the parental home. The division of the family was the act of the son, not of the father, though the father provided for the son, should he assume that responsibility. The division of the family was the act of one, the division of the property the act of both. The father had no right to expel the son from his home; he did possess the right to provide for him if he went. This is what the General Conference of 1844 did. That it divided the church is, as it appears to us from historical data, just what it did not do. It did not assemble for that purpose. It had neither delegated nor inherent power to divide it. It was forbidden by the Constitution to divide it, for to circumscribe the church, and thus limit the jurisdiction of its ministry and itinerant general episcopacy, was to destroy that episcopacy, which the Constitution declared "they shall not do away nor destroy." The General Conference itself acknowledged it had no power to divide the church. Dr. Capers had introduced a resolution to divide the church into North and South under two General Conferences, but the General Conference when thus brought face to face with division took no steps to encourage the committee and the resolution came to nought. When the Committee of Nine reported on the resolution signed by the fifty-two delegates from the thirteen Conferences in the slave-holding States that they could not remain under the jurisdiction of the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and presented for adoption by the General Conference the so-called "Plan of Separation," Dr. Bangs, one of the committee, declared in open Conference that the report did not speak of division—the word had been carefully avoided through the whole document; it only said, "in the event of a separation taking place," throwing the responsibility from off the shoulders of the General Conference and upon those who should say that such a separation was necessary. Mr. Griffith declared no one had the right to divide

the church. Mr. Fillmore said: "These resolutions do not say that the South must go, shall go, will go, or that anybody wants them to go; it only makes provision for such a contingency." Dr. Lucky considered that the resolutions were provisional and preliminary, settling nothing at present. "Mr. Finley could see in the report no proposition to divide the church." "Mr. Hamline said that the committee had carefully avoided presenting any resolution which would embrace the idea of a separation or division." Dr. Winans, of the South, said, "The only proposition was that they might have liberty, if necessary, to organize a separate Conference." Dr. Smith, of the South, said, "This General Conference, I am aware, has no authority directly to effect this separation." Dr. Paine declared that he did not know for certain that the separation would take place. He ardently hoped that it would not. "The separation would not be affected by the passage of these resolutions through the General Conference. They must pass the Annual Conferences," (Debates in General Conference Journal, 1844, p. 221.)

Thus Southern delegates themselves, in General Conference and *after*, acknowledged that the Conference had no power to divide the church. It was not until some time much later, when the smoke had cleared away and the legal consequences involved had become apparent, that the doctrines of the authority of the General Conference to divide the church became the doctrine of the South. The evidence on this is that on July 12, 1844, one month or so after the adjournment of the Conference, Dr. Paine, one of the foremost leaders of the South, wrote:

Is the Methodist Episcopal Church divided? No. The General Conference had no power to divide it. Ours was a delegated power, to be exercised under constitutional limitation, and for specific purpose—as individual delegates we organized and acted on this principle.

On August 23, 1844, Dr. J. B. McFerrin, another of the great leaders of the South, in that Conference, and whom the writer had the honor to meet in his last days, wrote:

To be sure we did not divide the church; to do this we had no authority, but we adopted measures to lay the matter before our people.

In a letter dated December 27, 1844, he again writes: "The General Conference, however, did not divide the church. It only made

provision for an amicable separation in case the Southern Conferences found it necessary to form distinct organizations." In the Methodist Quarterly Review (South) for January, 1910, however, Dr. Gross Alexander, book editor of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and editor of that Review, in a very temperate article on the General Conference of 1844 says that the Committee of Nine to whom was referred the "Declaration" of the Southern delegates above referred to "*was instructed*" by the Conference "to devise, if possible, a constitutional plan for a mutual and friendly division of the church, provided they cannot in their judgment devise a plan for an amicable adjustment of the difficulty now existing in the church on the subject of slavery." After three days of deliberation the committee presented their report which is known as the historic "Plan of Separation."

Conclusive arguments demolishing our contention are built upon this resolution, and it must be admitted that if its solidity is anything more than that of castles and fortresses one sees towering high in summer clouds, it is a conclusive argument for the Church South as far as it goes. But while this statement of Dr. Gross Alexander has the support of the official journal, it is both inaccurate and misleading. It makes the General Conference contradict itself; it makes Dr. Hamline, one of the Committee of Nine, contradict all that he had said and to antagonize his well-known position. It makes it appear that the committee reported according to *instructions* to devise a constitutional division of the church, whereas the committee makes no reference whatever in its report to this resolution offered by Dr. McFerrin to devise such a plan. It disclaims all intention to divide the church, but specifically mentions that its report is on the "declaration" of the Southern delegates.

The select Committee of Nine to consider and report on the *declaration* of the delegates from the Conferences of the slave-holding States beg leave to present the following report:

Whereas, A declaration has been presented to this General Conference, etc. (Journal, 1844, p. 217.)

The resolution by Dr. McFerrin, however, to devise, if possible, a constitutional plan for the division of the church, was presented.

But Dr. Hamline arose and said: "I will not go out with the committee under such instructions." Dr. Peck said: "Let the General Conference beware. This is a proposition to commit this Conference to a division of the church. We are sent here to conserve the church, not to divide it." The resolution was finally amended so as to provide for a constitutional division of the funds. By mistake, not accounted for, the resolution appeared in the Journal in its original, not its amended form. Dr. Hamline, in the absence of the secretary, called Dr. Bangs's attention to the error. Bangs was reluctant to interfere. Hamline pointed out the legal possibilities of the error, but, being a young member of the Conference, he refrained from further expostulation, and the error remained in the Journal to be employed later in the courts. (Biography Bishop Hamline, Ridgaway, p. 13-19. See also Bishop Peck's statement in *Methodist Quarterly Review*, 1870.)

Now, an intelligent study of the relation of the General Conference to the church will show that even if the General Conference had intentionally adopted a report dividing the church, that would not have made the act binding on the church. If the next General Conference voted to divide the church East and West, would that be binding on the church? If the next General Conference of the Church South should adopt a report to forget the past and unite with the Methodist Episcopal Church or dissolve, would that bind the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and would its ministry and laity admit the authority of their General Conference to adopt such a resolution? As Chief Justice Marshall declared, it is something "to know the difference between a government of law and a government of men." Dr. Paine, of the South, and other Southern leaders, as we have seen, acknowledged the General Conference was a delegated body acting under constitutional limitations to transcend which, they well knew, would be usurpation and revolution. They knew that they had neither legal nor moral right to usurp an authority beyond that which was given them. If the power to divide the church is not specifically mentioned and expressly denied in the "Restrictive Rules," it is because no government ever provides for its own destruction; and because it never entered the hearts of the framers of the Constitu-

tion that such an extraordinary usurping power would ever be assumed by a delegated body. Is it possible to assume that the Constitution says: "You shall not change a single Article of Religion, but you may destroy the whole gospel? You shall not alter a restrictive rule, but you may destroy the church"?

In the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 1870, the Constitution of which at that time was the same as that of the Methodist Episcopal Church, unchanged since 1844, Dr. Leroy M. Lee, nephew of Jesse Lee of famous memory, delivered a most convincing speech on the powers of the General Conference. In that speech he declared, "The General Conference is a dependent and responsible body, dependent for its authority and being upon the original body of elders and responsible to them for its fidelity in the use of its powers delegated to it." In the absence of this accountability, "its responsibility ceases, and it can revoke, alter, change, or destroy even the Constitution itself at its own will and by its own act. Such power was not given to it, nor intended to be given," etc. This speech led the Church South to adopt a resolution providing for episcopal veto. But the church did not then perceive, or else it ignored, the Trojan horse in the accepted reasons underlying the resolution adopted—that, in admitting Dr. Lee's contention, which was the sole reason for episcopal veto, they completely reversed their position on the powers of the General Conference of 1844. For in adopting the principles underlying this act of 1870 the Church South acknowledged that the General Conference is a dependent and responsible body, that it does not possess all power; that all power is not delegated to it by the ministry. Upon this principle the Church South established the veto power of its episcopacy. But the disintegrating question is, If the General Conference of 1870 did not possess all this power, how could such power be possessed and lawfully exercised by the General Conference of 1844—the power, not simply to change, alter, or destroy a restrictive rule, but the far greater power to change, alter, or destroy the church? Furthermore, in the interests of justice it should be stated that the "Plan of Separation" was never completed, and could not, therefore, become legally effective in the church. Our Southern Methodist

friends should conscientiously ponder these historic facts. Before the vote was completed the Southern Conferences had left the church and organized a distinct ecclesiastical connection of their own, thus preventing completion of the vote, for many Conferences refused to vote, lest their act should be construed as an indorsement of separation. On the first of May, 1845, delegates from the thirteen Annual Conferences in the slave-holding States met in Louisville, Kentucky, in what is known as the Louisville Convention, and there by their own act, and not by any specific act of the General Conference, they assumed the responsibility of dividing the church, and did organize the Methodist Episcopal Church, South.

In connection with this it is asserted by Southern Methodist writers, that, in accordance with a well-established principle of law, which is that every person *intends* the natural, and necessary, and even probable consequences of his act, the General Conference of 1844 was a party to the Louisville Convention, since that Convention was a consequence of the General Conference's act. Now, we shall not dispute a common-sense principle recognized by eminent jurists in England and America, but for obvious reasons we must deny its application to the case before us. Every act coming within the compass of law or morals must be a rational act. A lunatic is not responsible for his acts. It must be an intentional act. Accidents are not crimes. Hence, to say that the General Conference by a certain act intended to divide the church, is to assume the very thing in dispute, to beg the whole question, to assert the very thing we deny, and which we have clearly shown by the testimony of delegates of that Conference, both North and South, the General Conference did not do. This legal principle, therefore, does not apply to this case, and the General Conference which was not represented in the Louisville Convention cannot be held as a party to the acts of that Convention. The declaration, however, is triumphantly made that no matter what is said of the intentions and powers and acts of the General Conference, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that the General Conference of 1844 had the power and did divide the Methodist Episcopal Church. This is supposed to be final. But we do not

think it is final. History is not subject to courts. Caesar did live. Napoleon did cross the Alps. Even the brilliant effort of Froude in several volumes to reconstruct the character of Henry VIII, to make Queen Elizabeth a saint and her victim, Queen Mary, something else, cannot change the facts. What is done is done, and no power can make it other than it was. No Anglican sentiment, however worthy, can change Macaulay's portrait of Archbishop Laud. The Supreme Court, it is admitted, did declare as above. But the case in equity before that court, however, was on the division of the *funds* of the Book Concern and not on the division of the church. That decision of the court was readily accepted and the money paid to the Church South. But the *obiter dicta*, *propia dicta*, or *gratis dicta* of the court concerning the division of the church, its extrajudicial declarations, reasonings, and inferences concerning the powers of the General Conference have never been accepted by the Methodist Episcopal Church, nor does it appear they ever can be. She renders and must "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." But there is no union of church and state in this country. Outside a legal decision on a disputed case submitted to that exalted tribunal, its *obiter dicta* or *gratis dicta* have no legal force as an interpretation of the history and doctrines and constitution of the Methodist Episcopal Church; otherwise the church would be a creature of the courts or of the State, deriving her existence from the power of the State rather than from the authority of God. Hence the Methodist Episcopal Church, while obeying the legal decision of the Supreme Court in the case in equity before it, has never accepted the doctrine that her existence began in 1844. On the basis of this decision it was declared in the General Conference of the Church South at Birmingham, Alabama, May, 1906, by the secretary of that body, who was afterward elected bishop at that Conference, that the Methodist Episcopal Church is in contempt of the Supreme Court because she does not redate her official Journals in harmony with the opinions of the Supreme Court. And many in the Church South hold this view. But the Methodist Episcopal Church knows her own identity as an individual knows his; she knows she is the

Methodist Episcopal Church, which was organized in Baltimore in 1784, and not at Louisville in 1845. *No obiter dicta* of any court can change that. Her unbroken succession of bishops and pastors, of Annual and General Conferences, her records and Journals, title deeds, the monuments on the graves of her honored dead, the acknowledgment of the Church South itself at its organization in 1845 at Louisville, when the delegates present declared themselves to be at that moment members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, twelve months after its supposed division in 1844, the declaration of the "Plan of Separation" itself that ministers and members on the border "may remain" with the Methodist Episcopal Church, are facts from which there can be no appeal to the assumptions of that august body, to whose legal decisions as good Christians and law-abiding citizens we yield instant obedience, but to whose unhistorical statements we cannot yield assent. This was not the only separation from the church. Before this withdrawal of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, there had been several others in the course of her history: the "O'Kelleyites," the "Reform Methodist," the "Methodist Protestant," the Church in Canada, the "Stilwellite Methodists," the "Wesleyan Methodists," but these separations in no wise affected her identity. She remained the same identical Methodist Episcopal Church as from the beginning. Nor in this refusal does it appear that the Methodist Episcopal Church is in contempt of the Supreme Court. That court has itself declared in *Carroll vs. Carroll's Lessee*, 16 Howard, 287,

If the construction put by the Court of a State upon one of its statutes was not a matter in judgment, if it might be decided either way without affecting any right brought into the question, then, according to the principles of common law, an opinion in such a question is not a decision. To make it so there must have been an application of the judicial mind to the precise question necessary to be determined, to fix the right of the parties and decide to whom the property in contention belongs.

Now, the "*precise question*" before the court was not the power of the General Conference to divide the church, but a "bill filed to recover share of a fund called the Book Concern," etc. That this question "might be decided either way" without deciding on the power of the General Conference to divide the church is admitted by the court itself when it says that even if the General

Conference did not have the power to divide the church, "Even if this were admitted, we do not perceive that it would change the relative position and rights of the traveling preachers within the divisions, North and South, from that which we have just endeavored to explain." The church, therefore, does not know herself to be in contempt of the highest tribunal when she refuses to accept as history the unnecessary dictum of that tribunal in a case not before it for adjudication. It is no discourtesy to say that men in that Conference were as thoroughly competent to interpret the constitutional powers of the General Conference as any member of that Supreme Court, and the whole General Conference, the ablest Southern delegates included, as we have seen, had declared or admitted that the General Conference possessed no delegated or inherent power to divide the church. They never dreamed that the Conference possessed the inherent power to divide the church and erect two distinct ecclesiastical connections in the place of the old one, as the court assumed, any more than they did that because the Revolutionary Congress of 1776 had the power to adopt some other form of government than the form they did adopt, therefore every United States Congress has the inherent power to divide the United States government and erect two distinct governments in the place of the original government. They never dreamed that because the Christmas Conference of 1784, which organized the church, had the power to reject the plans and purposes of Wesley, and not to establish the church at all, therefore every General Conference had inherent right to destroy the church. Back of the General Conference of 1844 was the Constitution, and the preamble to that Constitution by virtue of which the Conference itself existed, declared:

Whereas, It is of the greatest importance that the doctrine, form of government, and general rules of the United Societies in America be preserved sacred and inviolable; and,

Whereas, Every prudent measure should be taken to preserve, strengthen, and perpetuate the union of the connection;

therefore, both bodies, General Conference and United States Congress, are delegated bodies, acting under a written Constitution, any violation of which renders their respective act null and void, and in no sense binding on the church or the nation.

II. But it is constantly affirmed as a standing grievance that the Methodist Episcopal Church violated the "Plan of Separation" by sending her ministers into the territory of the Church South assigned to it by the Plan and organizing churches and Conferences therein. No true fraternity, it is sharply insisted, can be hoped for until this wrong is righted. This, we regret to see, is the burden of that unfraternal editorial in the Nashville Christian Advocate, to which reference has been made, and is the ever-recurring note in the rippling music or plaintive wail of all addresses on federation. Punic faith is a grievous charge and should not be lightly made. What are the facts? The General Conference of 1844 adopted a Plan of Adjustment, called a Plan of Separation, for thirteen protesting Southern Conferences whose delegates declared they could not remain under the jurisdiction of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The line of division between these Conferences and the church was not a Mason's and Dixon's geographical line, as many have supposed, nor the lines of slave-holding States. Conference boundaries are not determined by State lines. The Conference fixed the line upon the northern boundary of these thirteen Conferences in the slave-holding States: Virginia, Holston, Kentucky, Missouri, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, Tennessee, and Memphis. The border Conferences were Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri. This is clear and beyond doubt. The Plan is explicit. It reads:

Resolved, 1. That should the delegates from the Conferences in the slave-holding States find it necessary to unite in a distinct ecclesiastical connection, the following rule shall be observed with regard to the northern boundary of such connection

—that is, of these thirteen Conferences as then constituted, and about to form themselves in a new church. What was the northern boundary of these thirteen Conferences then constituted? The boundary of the Virginia Conference was the Rappahannock on the north and the Blue Ridge Mountains on the west. In all the region north of that line and in the State of Virginia were portions of Northern Conferences, the Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Pittsburgh Conferences. The Ohio River from the mouth of the Big

Sandy was the line separating the Kentucky Conference from the Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois Conferences. The Mississippi and the State line separated the Missouri Conference from the Iowa Conferences. Beyond these Conference lines neither church was permitted to go. Beyond that line the Methodist Episcopal Church did not go. She violated no rule of the Plan of Separation, and it remains to this day for those who persistently accuse her of this breach of faith to furnish the proof. But on the contrary, the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, violated the Plan of Separation from the beginning. At its organization at Louisville it invited Conferences not represented in that Convention to send delegates to the General Conference at Petersburg. It interpreted the fixed line as a *movable* line. Just as soon as the societies on the line voted to join the Church South the boundary line was then placed north of those societies, until, if not resisted, there would be no line at all. On the basis of this interpretation the Church South invaded the Baltimore, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, and Illinois Conferences. It organized churches in the city of Baltimore itself, crossed the river and obtained a footing in Cincinnati; established churches wherever it could, and then accused the Methodist Episcopal Church of violating the Plan of Separation because she would not accept this peculiar interpretation and refused to be expelled from the Southern States. But, after all, of what practical or concrete value now can this perpetual galvanizing of dead issues be to the kingdom of God; issues dead at least to the Methodist Episcopal Church, occupied as it is with world-wide problems and living questions of to-day? The Plan of Separation has been long since dead, repealed, abrogated, and repudiated by both churches.

In 1848 the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church formally repudiated the Plan of Separation. At that Conference the Committee on the State of the Church, after thorough consideration of the facts, reported that the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, had everywhere violated that Plan, giving times and places and methods employed. As a part of their report the committee incorporated a statement to the same effect signed by Bishops Hedding, Waugh, Morris, Hamline, and Janes, of what

they had personally known or had learned on reliable information in their administration of the Conferences. The General Conference then adopted the report:

Having thus found upon clear and incontestable evidence that the three fundamental conditions of said proposed plan have severally failed, and the failure of either of these being sufficient to render it null and void, and having found the practical working of said plan incompatible with certain great constitutional principles elsewhere asserted, we have found and declared the whole and every part of said provisional Plan to be null and void. (Journal, 1848, p. 164.)

In 1866 the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, repudiated the Plan. The General Conference of that Church in that year, held in New Orleans, made the following declaration:

Resolved, That as the geographical line defining the territorial limits of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, established by the General Conference of 1844, has been officially and practically repudiated and disregarded by the Methodist Episcopal Church, therefore we are bound neither legally nor morally by it; and that we feel ourselves at liberty to extend our ministrations and ecclesiastical jurisdiction to all beyond that line who may desire us so to do.

Having thus repudiated the Plan of Separation, the Conference resolved to go beyond any previous aggression by adopting another resolution by the same committee for the extension of their work in northern territory, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, namely:

Your Committee have also had before them the resolutions of the delegates of the Kentucky, Louisville, and Saint Louis Conferences, asking authority to annex territory in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, to their respective Conferences, and recommend the following resolutions for adoption:

Resolved, That such churches or societies as are now or may hereafter be organized in sections of the country not now under our ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and which wish to be united with us in church fellowship, may be connected with the Conference most convenient to them; and that the bishops be authorized and requested to form such churches into separate Annual Conferences whenever in their judgment the interests of the work demand such action.

Thus did the Church South abrogate the Plan of 1844. In the face, then, of these undeniable facts, what becomes of the affirmation, and why is it still insisted on by the Nashville Christian Advocate and other papers that "the territory recognized in 1844 as that of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, is still ours"

and nobody else's? These facts are seldom or never mentioned in discussion on federation in Southern Methodist journals, which sit in permanent judgment on the policy of the Methodist Episcopal Church, but are sedulously kept in the background, so that neither the membership in general of the Church South, nor of the Methodist Episcopal Church, nor that larger public outside, are fully or correctly informed as to the significance of the extraordinary demands now made by the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. For it may justly excite amazement in every reasonable mind that representatives of the Church South should ignore all these facts and yet demand that the Methodist Episcopal Church should obey the provisions of that very Plan which the Church South itself has violated and officially repudiated by General Conference action. Such a demand is without a parallel in ecclesiastical history, and in future times may be regarded rather as the egregious blunder of the historian than as the act of a church proclaiming the principles of Christian equity.

In 1865 the Methodist Episcopal Church resumed her work in the South. She did not intrude herself there. She was invited. Nor was the invitation suggested by her. It was the spontaneous movement of thousands of Methodists whose fathers and grandfathers had been members of the old church before the "division" and from which they themselves and their children had been cut off against their unavailing protest by the Plan of Separation. Had it not been for the Methodist Episcopal Church these sheep without a fold or shepherd would have been scattered elsewhere and with their children become lost to Methodism forever. To answer such a call was therefore both a patriotic and a religious duty. From that time the growth of the church in the South has been steady and gratifying. In the Central South Conferences we have now 1,113 ministers, 223,206 members, 211,541 Sunday school scholars, 2,943 churches valued at 6,200,560, and 728 parsonages valued at \$1,425,118, and in addition valuable school property in nearly all the Conferences.

III. It now remains to consider the charge that, notwithstanding repeated protestations of fraternity and appointment of Commissions on Federation, the Methodist Episcopal Church has

not withdrawn from the territory of the Church South. Federation does not involve such withdrawal. In view of the foregoing historical facts based on the official Journals, the question naturally arises, Why should she? What legal or moral right has the Church South itself, in the South, that the Methodist Episcopal Church or any other Methodist Church does not possess? But, waiving this, consider:

1. It is an historical fact that the Church South officially accepted the offer of fraternity in 1872 from the Methodist Episcopal Church. Now, that offer was based on the distinct understanding, which is also kept in the background, that the existence of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the South was not to be disputed or her withdrawal therefrom considered. That was not an open question, it was a closed question. The preamble to the resolution which provides for sending fraternal delegates to the Church South adopted by the General Conference of 1872 reads:

Within the parts of the country in which the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, has nearly all its membership and institutions (to wit: all the States formerly known as the slave States, except Maryland and Delaware) over three hundred thousand of our members reside, with their houses of worship, institutions of learning, and other church arrangements. Our church is as really settled in that region as in any part of the land, and every consideration of good faith to our own people and of regard to the integrity of our church, and especially of the unmistakable evidence of the favor of God toward effort there, forbids the thought of relaxing our labors in any part of the country in perpetuity; and we have need to strengthen and reinforce our work in it as God shall give us the means and opportunities. (General Conference Journal, 1872.)

On the basis of this resolution containing this open declaration of our right to be in the South and avowed determination to remain there, the General Conference of 1874 of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, received Drs. Hunt and Fowler and General C. B. Fisk as fraternal delegates from the Methodist Episcopal Church. The result of this action was that the General Conference of the Church South appointed commissioners to meet with commissioners from the Methodist Episcopal Church to settle all questions between the two churches relating to *property*. No commission was appointed by either church to discuss the right of the Methodist

Episcopal Church to be in the South, or of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, to be in the North. The preamble above quoted prohibited any such discussion. Nor was such a question before the commission. The commission, known as the Cape May Commission, met at Cape May, New Jersey, in August, 1876. The only reference to the Plan of Separation by the Southern commissioners in the preliminary negotiations was that the Methodist Episcopal Church should recognize the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, as a legitimate organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church into a second General Conference jurisdiction, as provided for in 1844 by the last Ecumenical General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. If this could not be done, it is asked that this be "conceded as the status" of the Church South. The result was the *status quo* of both churches was conceded. The interpretation that has since been put upon the purpose and work of that commission is an injustice both to the commission and to the sincerity of the two churches. The sole question, as stated, before that body, and the only one ever mentioned in the reports of the commissions to their respective General Conferences, and adopted by those Conferences, was the settlement of cases in dispute in which both churches claimed to have property rights. To such cases of this kind only were their deliberations directed. There was no question concerning churches of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the South which were not in such controversy. The commission could not advise, as they did, that Methodist Episcopal churches and property be turned over to local Southern Methodist churches, nor for Methodist Episcopal Church, South, churches and other property to be turned over to the Methodist Episcopal Church, if the rightful existence of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the South was not fundamentally acknowledged, or if that church was to withdraw from the South. They could not advise in Rule II, as they did, that,

In communities where there are two societies, one belonging to the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the other to the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, which have adversely claimed the church property, that without delay they amicably compose their differences irrespective of the strict legal title and settle the same according to Christian principles,

if the Methodist Episcopal Church was to withdraw from the South, if the *status quo* of the Methodist Episcopal Church in all the territory of the South was not a conceded and acknowledged right without any relation whatever to the doubly repudiated Plan of Separation.

2. The same clear, outstanding fact appears again in the appointment of the present Joint Commission on Federation. No question of the right of the Methodist Episcopal Church to be in the South, or of its withdrawal therefrom, was before the commission which met for the first time in Washington, January, 1898. Nor was the subject ever discussed or even mentioned. The question before this commission was how to avoid competition between the two churches in the same territory. This question was met by the adoption of the following resolution, which was also adopted by the General Conferences of both churches, and thus made equally binding on both churches everywhere, North and South, East and West, and in foreign lands:

Resolved, That we recommend the respective General Conferences to enact provisions to the effect that where either church is doing the work expected of Methodism, the other church shall not organize a society or erect a church building until the bishops of the two churches having in charge that field have been consulted.

Thus again, both by fraternal commission and General Conference action, the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, recognized the rightful existence of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the South; and whatever limitations were placed upon her by this resolution, such limitations were equally in force against the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. Wherever the Methodist Episcopal Church is established in the South, or elsewhere, the Church South shall not, from the adoption of the above resolution by its General Conference, organize a society or erect a church building until the bishops of both churches having charge there, have been consulted. And wherever the Church South is established the Methodist Episcopal Church shall observe the same rule.

In view, then, of all these facts, and of all the history incontrovertible we have summarized in briefest manner, there does not seem to be any rational ground for constant agitation or exploita-

tion of these subjects by Southern Methodist editors, who insist that we must again reopen the graves of the dead past and reenact the Plan of Separation as the only basis for genuine fraternity. Nor is there any convincing ground for denouncing Methodist federation as a farce, and that the Church South "will have none of it"—a decision, however, which is for the Church South to determine. One sure thing is clear: the Church South could not now repudiate 1866 and the Cape May Commission and go back to 1844 if it had never repudiated the Plan of Separation or recognized the *status quo* of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the South. Nevertheless, in the face of all this the Methodist Episcopal Church, because of her work in the South, is still made a subject of criticism and object of attack. She is charged with failure to carry out agreements entered into and adopted by her General Conferences. Orders are issued by the Church South to its commissioners on federation to enforce (!) compliance with these agreements, as if the Methodist Episcopal Church were again the offender. "Your committee suggests that the commissioners of our church be instructed to continue the effort to secure the enforcement of the agreements already enacted by the General Conferences of the two churches" (Journal General Conference M. E. Church, South, 1906, p. 260). What agreements the Methodist Episcopal Church has not kept is not pointed out. On the other hand, wherever the Church South has desired to organize a society or to erect a church building in the South, there she has entered without regard to the resolution adopted by both churches.

In this same report on federation adopted by the General Conference of the Church South at Birmingham, 1906, the usual charge of waste of men and money is again brought to the front. It is declared that "an effort ought to be made to save the great expenditure of missionary money in these parts of the South where our church is meeting the needs of the people"; that "much good now unattempted could be done were the means now spent in the support of individual churches and Conferences in the South devoted to heathen people." No one, in all these Southern Conferences, I am sure, desires or defends "wasteful" expenditure of men or money. But "it is strange, and passing strange," though we

make no criticism on it whatever, that while the General Conference of the Church South was thus addressing itself to this subject and the needs of the heathen, it should forget its own apparent useless expenditure of men and money in the bounds of Northern Conferences of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the West and Northwest. The Methodist Episcopal Church spends little money in the South that she does not get back. In 1906, when the General Conference of the Church South called attention to our "wasteful expenditure," the membership of our Southern Conferences was 143,290. The missionary appropriation to these Conferences was \$44,300. The contribution to missions from these Conferences was \$40,250. That is, our Southern Conferences paid back, less \$4,050, the whole amount that had been appropriated to them.

We now submit a statement of the work of the Northern Conferences of the Church South, except that for these Northern Conferences of the Southern Church the column of missionary contributions embraces the amounts paid for both home and foreign missions: Members, 15,095; missionary appropriation, \$15,800; amount contributed, \$4,252. That is to say, at the very time the General Conference of the Church South was criticising the Methodist Episcopal Church for useless expenditure of men and money in the South the Church South was spending nearly \$16,000 on 15,000 members in the Northwest—more than a dollar for each member—and getting only \$4,253 in return for both home and foreign missions. From these facts also there is no appeal except to that charity which covereth a multitude of—mistakes.

And yet, in spite of all this, in spite of all differences and all difficulties, we do not despair. No good cause ever does. Methodist federation is not a farce. It has produced a common Catechism, a common Hymnal and order of worship, unified publishing interests in foreign fields, and demonstrated what may be done if belligerent editors will expend their superfluous energy in building up rather than tearing down. Both churches are in earnest. The love of God and of Methodists North and South with a common heritage will yet prove stronger than all estrangements. Only let us be patient and forbearing, "laying aside all malice and evil

speaking," hasty judgments and unsanctified ambitions sustained by worldly principles and methods of selfish diplomacy. In God's own good time, which we may hasten by courtesy and love and coöperation, the mistakes and follies of men who did the best they could with the light before them will be forgotten, and only their piety and devotion and fruitful labors in building the kingdom of God will be remembered. And then, upon that Methodism, the united Methodism of the future, made wise by history and experience, shall come the promise of God to Israel—"Thy sun shall no more go down, nor thy moon withdraw her rising, for the Lord God shall be thy everlasting light, and the days of thy mourning shall be ended."

R. J. Cooke

ART. VI.—THE SPIRITUAL BEAUTY OF THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION

THE fascination of such a title lies in its subtle and true assumption that an underlying harmony really does exist between two realms often set in contrast—the realm of spiritual loveliness and the realm of natural law. What shall be the order of our inquiry? Let it be simple. First, let us remind ourselves in a word what evolution is, and what it is at in the world. Then, secondly, we may inquire as to its invariable accompaniment of beauty, a beauty rising without a break, as the plane of evolution itself rises, into the loftiest forms of spiritual loveliness.

I. What is evolution? "Progress by antagonism, with the survival of the fittest," answers Herbert Spencer from the honored and dusty shelf to which he has now been relegated by a later and more vital philosophy; a good, rough definition for the lower ranges of evolutionary law. What is evolution? "Progressive differentiation of species as the result of adjustment to environment," answers Charles Darwin—a subtler and finer definition for levels of life half way up. What is evolution? "The development of maternity—the creation of human motherhood," answer John Fiske and Henry Drummond, speaking for what they find to be the final outcome of evolutionary processes on the high human levels. Ah, then, something very different here from "progress by antagonism" and "adjustment to environment." It seems that the same evolutionary law, carried higher, reverses its own earlier aspect of selfishness and helps a man to be unselfish and to conquer his environment. Selfish and even brutal, apparently, on the low animal level, the very same evolution develops heroism and develops altruism on the High Alps of humanity, and Drummond's immortal chapter on the "Evolution of a Mother" is justified. And, if this be so, then what? This: that the essence of this law of evolution, accordingly, must be discriminated from the rough or fierce quarries and jungles where it tarries for a night (or for a thousand years) on its way up. In other words, only the large and lofty view of evolution, that view of its field

of operation which takes in man and mind, can be the true view or lead to the true conclusion as to the real errand of evolution itself.

The early mistake of Christian thinkers in so hastily taking up arms against the doctrine of evolution lay in accepting without challenge a low, materialistic definition of the scope of that doctrine. It is only as evolution is admitted to the human altitudes that its noble meaning all the way up becomes apparent, because we judge the nature and essence of a force or a law by its final product, not by its half-way camping grounds; and this is both science and common sense. The key to the meaning of evolution is to be found in man's mental scenery; not down among the mollusks, but at the summit of the evolutionary process in man and man's mind. Evolution is not a tigress, although the "fearful symmetry" "burning bright," to use Blake's curdling phrase, of the tiger's body, is its temporary camping place and playground. Evolution tames tigers—give it time. A few thousand years more and all tigers will be—well—aldermen, let us say! I intend no disrespect to either class. What I am getting at is that it is not in the tigerness of the tiger that we discover what evolution really is and is aiming at in the world. It is in that mother force within the tigress which, gradually working itself clear from the tissues of tigerdom, and incarnating itself, after a thousand approximations, in a human mother's clasp of her child, that we find the soul of the evolutionary energy, the essential meaning, the supreme errand, the spiritual content of its law.

II. We are prepared, then, for the second step in the argument. It is this: that from the beginning, all the way up, the law of evolution works with the accompaniment of the principle of beauty, attaining at last to the highest forms of spiritual beauty. The evidence of this fact along lower ranges, the strange inseparableness of beauty from evolution in the physical world, is so familiar, and the fact itself so universally recognized, that we shall be glad to be spared any recital of that evidence so varied and splendid, though, perhaps, we have been dull to its wonderful higher significance. But the thing to be noted is that, as the

force and law of evolution rise in their field of action, so this invariable manifestation of beauty rises also. Evolution evinces no disposition, upon the higher ranges, to swing clear of its accompaniment of beauty, but insists upon it, still more and more, embodying upon every ascending terrace of life the beauty appropriate to that terrace. There must be the beauty of curve and color and motion and order, wave-form and bird-flight, wherever evolution has had its way, but not less as evolution enters the brain and heart of man; its product is a beauty still higher—the fire-opal of imagination and the far flight of thought; and, higher yet, the moral loveliness is evolved. Bravery, and constancy, aye, and the glorious archery of honor and the altar fire of self-sacrifice—all these appear when evolution has its final way upon the summits of human character.

Let us employ a familiar illustration. Evolution is an architect. Here is a great building going up. Now, suppose at the end of the first week we define the architect, and say the architect is a mud-digger. What he is for is to plant broken stone and cement down in yonder mire. All the beauty he cares for is the evenness of solid concrete. Some weeks later we think better of it, and say the architect is a scaffold rigger. What he is for is to spike boards together for a scaffold. Still a little later we further revise our definition, and say an architect is a boss hod-carrier. What he is for is to pack men on a ladder. The beauty he cares for is the equal rhythm of two moving lines of mortar hods up and down. All this would be stupid judgment, just about as stupid as have been our customary and current thoughts about evolution. Only as the finished cathedral at last appears, complete, with its soaring lines of beauty unbroken from foundation to finial, all one great poem of interlacing beam and stone, “a mountain of rock-work set to music,” to recall a shining phrase of Dr. Storrs, only from the view-point of the finished and immortal loveliness of some Salisbury or Cologne, can we define the architect or tell what beauty he is really seeking in the world. So of God’s master-builder whom we name Evolution. We have stopped in the mortar beds to define him. We have perched on the rough scaffolding to define him. Only from the finished

finals of man's life, personal and social, can we define him; and these finished finals include spiritual beauty. And this theoretic conclusion is justified when we look at the facts and observe how the lower kind of beauty is developed into the higher. Nearly two hundred years ago, for example, a fine but common type of patience was exhibited by a humble Swedish pastor trotting about his obscure rural parish and making his little boy, who trotted at his side, name all the plants by the roadway. But that same patience reappears in higher beauty in the scholarly tirelessness of that same boy grown older, for he was Linnæus, the great botanist. Linnæus himself thus speaks of his debt to his father. Take another instance. One hundred years later, and nearly one hundred years ago, another humble parish pastor was moving about in his little parish of Motiers, near Neuchatel, in Switzerland, and in his daily round stopped often to lift up his heart in wonder at the glory of the great Alps of the Jura around him, and the still greater Bernese Oberland in the southeast distance, and by him also trotted and waited his little son. But it was this humble reverence of the parish pastor that was reproduced in the splendid lamp of adoring homage to the Infinite which that same little boy hung later in the halls of science upon both continents, for his name was Louis Agassiz. Never accepting for himself the theory of evolution, he yet was himself its product. So in all the higher life of man. Mark how the rude sturdiness of Ellery Channing's ancestry comes to its finished blossom in the spiritual gallantry of Channing himself. Think of the softened reverberation of the soldier father's valor in the equal but more delicate bravery of his daughter—the constancy of some Monica of Carthage, the devotion of some Teresa of Spain. Think of the evolutionary relation between the hoarse old Viking war-scream, twelve centuries ago, and the white knightliness whose chivalry on land and sea to-day defends the flag we love. Norseman, Norman, Anglo-Norman, Old England, New England, then Lexington's shot, heard and honored in the heavens as well as "round the world"—these indicate the successive terraces along which, with whatsoever other coöperating factors, evolution also clearly climbs, with its inalienable, inseparable accompaniment of higher and higher

forms of intellectual and moral beauty. Evolution is a battle song that ends in a lullaby—yes, in the Te Deum of sacrificial redemption.

I am far from asserting that this spiritual wealth of man's inner experience is *entirely* due to evolution. I do not think it is. The mystery of free will steals in. The mystery of God's free grace swings down. But I do assert that a part of this scenery of mind and soul is the result of evolution. Evolution has its legitimate field and its mighty way here also, and, so far as evolution enters this domain of man's spirit, its products here, as everywhere else, are characterized by beauty. The truth is that the path of natural logic upon this subject has been blocked and confused by our early unfortunate assumption—due to that *mêlée* of controversy, between ignorant theologians on the one side and arrogant scientists on the other, in the midst of which the modern theory of evolution had such a hard time to get itself introduced to the world—the assumption that evolution is essentially a low, materialistic process. Nothing is farther from the truth. The doctrine of evolution is the most athletic ally of the true church and aid to its true faith which exists at the present hour. Evolution accredits the old germ as much as it does the new form, and shows that the Christian religion survives because it is fittest to survive. We are hardly yet awake to the higher significance of the new investigations in psychology, in sociology, in ethics, even in the development of religious doctrine, as related to the universal presence of the evolutionary principle. It is evolution that is carrying up the ark of God to-day.

There are two implications of our argument which should be briefly stated as we close. The first has to do with our faith in God, the second with our faith in immortality. This final result of spiritual loveliness, crowning the processes of evolution, flashes its radiance back upon the original source of the evolutionary energy. We admit that the Infinite must always be in some real sense unknown by us. "Lo, these are but parts of his ways, but the thunder of his power who can understand?" Yet, in another sense, it is no less true that from what is at last developed at the summit of the world we can reason back to the nature of the

original Force that produced it. Water does not rise higher than its source. As John Fiske used to say in his later and more Christian thinking, "We must state the Source of the universe in the terms of the final product of the universe." Let us take another familiar illustration. From some rock-cistern in the hills you lead a line of piping down through thicket and mire, underground, till it curves up beneath the cellar of your home, and then, ascending, passes through every story till the current of water it carries is released to play as a fountain in your roof garden. A nosing investigator informs you that he has made an astonishing scientific discovery, namely, that the prismatic play of your roof fountain is evolved from the shelter of the sleeping rooms beneath, and this is evolved from the stuffiness of the parlor floor, and this is evolved from the sordidness of the kitchen, and this from the squalor of the cellar, and this from the very slag and slime itself beneath your house. "I have traced that pipe," he explains, "all the way down, and this is what it comes to, and that is what I find. This is evolution." What will you say to that man? If you say what you think, which is not always the politest way, you will say, "My friend, you are almost, if not quite, several kinds of an idiot. Trace up as well as trace down. Don't you know that the water has to *come down first* in order to rise *as it does*. The 'prismatic play,' as you call it, of the fountain at the summit offers the true standpoint where I can adequately judge how high in the hills my rock reservoir is and what is the quality of the water." So of the light which the evolutionary energy at the summit of its process casts back upon the "hollow of God's hand." If a mollusk in a million years will develop into Plato, then that wonderful Platonic tendency in the mollusk argues something back of the mollusk as high as Plato, for water does not rise above the level of its source. The evolutionary process culminates, as we have seen, in spiritual beauty, and we argue that the infinite prototype of this beauty dwelt and dwells forever in the Eternal, and it is the strong giant Evolution itself that cries to us, "Hats off," when Jesus says, "Abba, Father." Then, last of all, and in the opposite direction, the great torch and headlight of our theme, from the point to which we have now carried it, streams steadily forward,

illuminating the path of faith concerning the hereafter, and lending its mighty presumption in favor of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. I do not hesitate to maintain this! The final fruitage of the science of evolutionary biology is faith in a future life. If, as we have argued, and as the facts of evolution show, the genius of evolution reveals itself as ever a lover of the beautiful, and if the noblest form of beauty, even the beauty of the mind, is precisely what all the long process of development from the ascidian upward really aims at, incessantly reaches after, and ultimately attains, then is it reasonable to suppose that this age-long current of tendency is doomed to abrupt and ignominious arrest and defeat at the crevice of the grave? It cannot be. Evolution has, from the beginning, been bent on the spiritual as its final goal. Patient, tireless, determined, like its God, it has sought, through ten thousand ages, the finished glory of the spirit. We cannot believe, we will not believe, that having at last achieved this, realized this, evolution will then, in an instant, surrender all it has won, throw it aside, toss it to the void, and tamely consent to its eternal dissolution at the bidding of some common ruffian growl. Not since the intuition of Socrates and the revelation of Jesus has so clear a note sounded for immortality as that whose bell rope is in the hands of the modern science of evolution. Science also enters yonder old Athenian prison cell and joins with philosophy to declare, "Aye, Socrates, thou reasonest well in asserting the presence within a noble human spirit of that which is too divine to die." A "misgiving," to use Plato's beautiful word, of some higher world steals over us; and it is evolution itself that has developed this anticipatory gleam. The authority of scientific law, then, is behind that foregleam of the hereafter, which it has been the function of the law itself to evolve within my mind, and science indorses love's defiance to death by its proclamation of the survival of the fit, the perpetuity of the fine.

In this great and holy "aftershine" of evolution, then, we may leave the subject. Bathed in immortal beauty, the law of evolution appears head master in the processional of time, sent forth from God, and swinging through the world, and through the eons, ever intent upon its one sublime errand, which is to

carry the lowest to the highest, and from the nameless gulfs of amorphous and inchoate materials to evolve at last a soul so shining in its strength that it can step across, on the level, into the heavens and live with God.

At last I heard a voice upon the slope
Cry to the summit, "Is there any hope?"
To which an answer pealed from that high land,
But in a tongue no man could understand.
And on the glimmering limit far withdrawn
God made himself an awful rose of dawn.

So sang our Tennyson sixty years ago. But within this half century it is our study of the law and the prophecy of human evolution which, beyond anything else, has added a clearer meaning to that voice, a sweeter assurance to that rose.

Albert J. Lyman

ART. VII.—THE HOLY CATHOLIC CHURCH

DOGMATIC Methodism is based upon the so-called "Apostles' Creed." It is as ancient as that symbol and as comprehensive. Differentiated from other systematic, it is identified with all branches of Christianity by its acceptance of a venerable statement of faith which was originally formulated to discriminate between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. After eighteen centuries the Anglo-Catholic, the Roman Catholic, the Wesleyan, the Presbyterian, the Congregationalist, the Lutheran, the Methodist Episcopalian, the Protestant Episcopalian unite in affirming their religious belief, despite internal antagonisms which render organic union impossible. Perhaps each sectarian (with due apology for the use of a term which seems historically necessary) deems himself a member of the "holy Catholic-catholic church," without denying the rights of all other Christians to membership in that august body, or perhaps, he thinks of "one holy catholic, apostolic church," as an ideal, a sort of mirage, floating in the iridescent spaces of the heavens, remote from the coarse actualities of life in Sardis, Smyrna, Philadelphia, New York or Crabbes Corners. Seldom, indeed, does he set himself the task of settling accounts with his own attitudes, and is content to leave creeds and symbols to the theological specialist. However, every Methodist—however, whenever, or wherever converted—is required to profess belief in the holy catholic church as a prerequisite to baptism and admission into that household of faith, outside of which, technically, there is no salvation, only "uncovenanted mercies," and the justice of a Father whose sunshine falls on the unthankful as on the good. His spiritual advisers may assure him that he merely expresses belief in the "holy general church," and has no concealed sympathies with the church of Pope Pius X, but it is to be doubted if they ever seriously teach him what "*sanctam ecclesiam*" is—or what is implied in a solemn profession of faith in such an institution as a church, or "congregation of faithful men," which is both "holy" and "catholic," and, by implication, "one" and "apostolic." And, after more than forty years' knowledge of the

Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States of North America, I have yet to hear of one Methodist preacher who ever explained to his charge what was meant by the baptismal avowal of belief in the church as "holy" and as "catholic." And I have yet to learn of a layman sincere enough to demand of his minister an exposition of that article of his creed which requires faith in an institution which, in fact, is neither "general" nor "holy."

There is, in the obscure background, I am convinced, an impression that it is not necessary to think clearly on the subject at all, that the essence of religion does not inhere in the formulas of the old Roman symbol, and that even if acceptance of it is a *sine qua non* of church membership, one may hold it in suspense or abeyance, or, indeed, entirely repudiate the claims made by the framers of the symbol, that the church is a holy institution, not because its members are holy, but because it has the so-called "means of grace," and so of promoting the holiness of those who receive the "means," and, ultimately, of "saving" them. How much is actually involved in the repetition of the creed does not appear, and yet nothing is more evident to one who looks critically at the church service than that the creed should not be repeated at all, or that the ministry should devote itself with apostolic fervor to efforts for the realization of all the ethical and organic ideals expressed or implied in the term "church." This will preserve intact the enthusiasms of the ministry and vitalize a pulpit whose temptation is evasion of martyrdom. The Methodist preacher *par excellence* is morally bound to conduct every service so as to aid in the advancement of holiness. His "gospel" is the gospel of "holiness," and the goal of his ministry, so far as he himself is concerned and so far as his "people" are concerned, is to realize the ideals of sainthood. The "church" is not an abstract, intangible, remote dream, but an actual society, and its members are oath-bound to live according to the laws that inhere in the life of God. It is not too much to say that they are obligated to live without sin, or that they recognize the obligations which are latent in the relations that exist between man and man, and between man and the God in whom he lives and moves and has his being. This being true, nothing ought to be done in the name of the church which

does not directly contribute to the conservation of the holiest impulses. From the opening words of a church service to the last words of the benediction, every feature of it is designed to develop the spirit of holiness. By this the church stands or falls. Not only so, but the church is bound to recognize its mission to every human being on the face of the globe. "The church was universal," says McGiffert, "not simply because it was spread everywhere, but because it was for everyone, and so belonged to and had a meaning for the whole world." To emphasize this Paul wrote his letter to the church at Rome. The church is not for the elect; it is for all men everywhere, and its mission is organized to appeal to the universal moral instincts. When it becomes exclusive it ceases to be a church as surely as it ceases to be a church when it ceases to be holy. There is nothing which has more swiftly blighted church life than the culture of caste—the spirit which excludes the non-élite of society. Hundreds of Methodist churches, especially in cities, are dying because it is universally known that they are class churches, and that their representative men are ruthless administrators of capital and exploiters of labor. They are as far from the spirit of John Wesley as from the Spirit of Jesus of Nazareth, and as completely fail to reproduce the spirit of the primitive church as the plutocracy of the United States fails to embody the dreams of the men of '76.

Hierarchic organization of itself tends to destroy the essential elements of holiness and catholicity, and its animus descends from the successful aspirants to place and power to the obscurest member of a circuit church among the mountains of Kentucky. Only the spirit of a fellowship comports with the notes of sanctity and catholicity, a fellowship whose notes are liberty, equality, and fraternity. Where these are there is the true church, because where these are there is the Spirit of that Man who perfectly obeyed the law of God in the impulses of a supreme unselfishness.

G. M. Hammell

ART. VIII.—A NEW ESSAYIST

THERE is a masterful and strenuous gentleman who is now, or was recently, hunting lions in Africa. Like death, this gentleman claims all men and times and seasons for his own. For present purposes we may adopt his own modest characterization of himself: "An elderly gentleman, with a somewhat varied past and a tendency to rheumatism." This gentleman, who is a man of literature as well as of men, took with him into the wilds of Africa a collection of books which he named, from the substance of their binding, "The Pigskin Library." In the nearly two score authors there is but one living essayist, and it is of his works that I wish to speak. I have called him "A New Essayist," and I think the adjective is fairly accurate even in a land and age where the new so quickly becomes the old, for it is only six years since his first volume of essays was published. Those who have not read him have a delightful experience in store, and those who are familiar with his writings will be glad to be reminded of the fresh and spicy flavor which must have charmed their literary taste. It was the freshness, spontaneity and pungent flavor of his work that first drew me to our "pigskin" essayist. Samuel McChord Crothers was born in Illinois fifty-two years ago. He is a graduate of Princeton and of Union Theological Seminary. His early pastorates were in Nevada and California. In view of the tempering that was to come afterward, it was a great thing for him to have spent his early years in the "wild and woolly West." He knows the wheat fields of the Dakotas and the alkali plains. He is familiar with the swaggering cowpunchers and the sulphurous-tongued promoters who shot up the street of Canyon City and salted the mines in Dead Man's Gulch. This is why he writes, "It is only as they turn westward that Americans discover America. The West is a feeling, an irresistible impulse. It is associated with the verb 'to go.'" The symbol of the West is a plank sidewalk leading out from a brand-new prairie town and pointing to a thriving suburb which as yet exists only in the mind of its projector. There is something pathetic in that sidewalk on which the foot of man has

never trod. Our essayist says that when one has been touched with this Western fever he never completely recovers; though he may change his environment, he is always subject to intermittent attacks, and by way of illustration remarks that on his first evening in Oxford, England, he was introduced to one of the Dons in academic garb.

When he learned that I was an American, there was a sudden thaw in his manner. "Have you ever been in Dodge City, Kansas?" he inquired, eagerly. I modestly replied that I had only passed through on the railway, but being familiar with other Kansas towns, and reasoning through analogy, could tell about what sort of a place it was. This was enough. I had experienced the West and was one of the initiated. I could enter into that state of mind represented by the realm of Dodge City. It appeared that in the golden age, when he and Dodge City were both young, he had sought his fortune for some months in Kansas. He discoursed of the mighty men of those days, when every man did what was right in his own eyes and good-humoredly allowed his neighbor to do likewise. As we parted he said, with a mournful acquiescence in his present estate, "Oxford does very well, you know, but it isn't Dodge City."

Now upon the plant so rooted and grounded was grafted the culture of the East. In 1894 our essayist came to live under the shadows of Harvard University and was installed as pastor of the First Parish Church, Unitarian, at Cambridge. It is small wonder that, walking along the paths where Lowell and Longfellow and Oliver Wendell Holmes had preceded him, breathing the literary atmosphere which they had created, and passing every day the door of the Atlantic Monthly, our Westerner should in a decade become as polished an essayist as though he had the blood of Dorothy Q. in his veins. Madame de Staël said to Sir John McIntosh across a dinner table, "Napoleon is not a man, he is a system." And one equally brilliant, and possessed of the same discriminating spirit, has said, "Boston is not so much a place as a state of mind." The Bostonian enjoys his state of mind none the less because he is aware that outsiders are not always able to enter into it, but here is a man who proves himself, whatever his parentage, to be "to the manner born." You will remember that Dr. John Brown tells a pleasant story of a countryman who, being asked to account for the gravity of his dog, said: "Oh, sir, life is full of seriousness to him. He just niver gets 'nuff o' fechtin'."

Burrell adds that something of the spirit of this dog seems lately to have entered into the very people who ought to have been freest from it—our men of letters. "They are all very serious and very quarrelsome. Authors ought not to be above being reminded that it is their first duty to write agreeably. Literature exists to please, to lighten the burden of men's lives, to make them for a short while forget their sorrows and sins, their silent hearths, their disappointed hopes and grim futures, and those men of letters are best loved who have best performed literature's truest office." Measured by this standard, I think our essayist is entitled to at least a modest niche in the temple of literary fame. In some points he resembles Lowell, but in more proves himself to have in his veins the literary blood of Oliver Wendell Holmes. One cannot read his little book on Holmes without feeling that he has not only written *con amore*, but that his own life is pitched to the same literary key and that he can sing the cheery song which Holmes sang before his voice felt the quiver of age. In his essay on "The Autocrat and His Fellow Boarders," published recently in the Atlantic Monthly, he has some general reflections on essays and essayists which are very interesting because very true. You will remember the title of Holmes's book, *The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table*, or *Every Man His Own Boswell*. Crothers reminds us that no man can be his own Boswell except he be an egotist. Ordinarily, it is not considered good form for a man to talk much about himself, but with the essayist the first person singular is his stock in trade. He is interested in the human mind and likes to chronicle its queer goings on. He is curious about its inner working.

Now it happens that the only mind of which he is able to get a view is his own, and so he makes the most of it. He follows his mind about, taking notes of all its haps and mishaps. He is aware that it may not be the best intellect in the world, but it is all he has, and he cannot help becoming attached to it. A man's mind grows on acquaintance. For a person to be his own Boswell implies that he is also his own Dr. Johnson. Dr. Johnson must have enough opinions, obstinacies, and insights to make the Boswellizing worth while. The natural history of a mental vacuum cannot be made interesting to the general reader. . . . The Autocrat was singularly fortunate in making his deliverances in a Boston boarding house, where he had a nervous landlady to please, an opinionated old man

ready to be displeased, a theological student who wanted to know, an angular female in black bombazine, and a young fellow named John who cares for none of these things. Matthew Arnold speaks of "the fever of some differing soul." In America to know "the fever of some differing soul" is part of the fun. We do not think of ourselves as in an intellectual realm where every man's house is his castle. We are all boarders together. There are no gradations of rank. Nobody sits below the salt. . . . The first sentence of the Autocrat strikes the keynote: "I was just going to say when I was interrupted." Here we have the American philosopher at his best. He is inured to interruptions. He is graciously permitted to discourse to his fellow citizens on the good, the true, and the beautiful; but he must be mighty quick about it. He must know how to get in his words edgewise. "Will you allow me to pursue this subject a little further?" asked the Autocrat. Then he adds, dismally, "They didn't allow me." The lady in bombazine remarks, acidly, "I don't think people who talk over their victuals are likely to say anything great."

And then there was the other boarder whom Holmes describes as the model of all the virtues. She was the natural product of a chilly climate and high culture.

There was no handle of weakness to hold her by. She was as unsizable, except in her entirety, as a billiard ball. On the broad table where she had been knocked about, like all of us, by the cue of fortune, she glances on one attack and caroms on another, and rebounds with exact and angular movements.

Concerning literature in general, and the transcendental school in particular, our essayist interjects the remark:

In the first part of the nineteenth century a great wave of didactic literature swept over the English and American reading public. A large number of conscientious ladies and gentlemen simultaneously discovered that they could write improving books, and at once proceeded to do so. Their aim was to make the path of duty so absolutely plain that the "wayfaring man, though a fool, could not err therein." The wayfaring man who was more generously endowed had a hard time of it by reason of the advice which was thrust upon him. The Laborer's Guide, The Parent's Assistant, The Afflicted Man's Companion, were highly esteemed by persons who liked to have a book to tell them to go in when it rained.

That our essayist is up to date in illustrations cannot be denied. He says the Autocrat of the Breakfast Table was not easy to write. No good book is. The writer who is unusually fluent should take warning from the instructions which accompany his fountain pen: "When this pen flows too freely it is a sign that it is nearly empty and should be refilled." For myself,

Crothers is unusually suggestive. Laurence Sterne gives the secret of his own method of writing. "In course," said Yorick, "in a tone two parts jest and one part earnest." Though you must be shaken out of your indifference and dullness by the jest, you are impressed, in Crothers's essays, that there are at least two parts of motive and conviction to one part of jest. He is prodigal of thought. What Dr Holmes said about himself would, much of it, apply to Crothers. "I talk half the time to find out my own thoughts, as a schoolboy turns his pockets inside out to see what is in them."

Crothers's first book of essays is the one in the "Pigskin Library" entitled *The Gentle Reader*. Following that came *The Pardoner's Wallet*, in 1905, and *By the Christmas Fire* in 1908. The frontispiece of his last book, *By the Christmas Fire*, represents an old man sitting in an armchair and stirring the fire in the fireplace with a poker, and the first essay is on "The Bayonet Poker." "As I sit by my Christmas fire I now and then give it a poke with my bayonet. It is an old-fashioned British bayonet which has seen worse days. I picked it up in a little shop in Birmingham for two shillings. I was attracted to it, as I am to all reformed characters. The hardened old sinner, having had enough of war, was a candidate for a peaceful position, and I was glad to have a hand in his reformation. To transform a sword into a plowshare is a matter for a skilled smith, but to change a bayonet into a poker is within the capacity of a less skilled mechanic. All that is needed is to forsake the murderous rifle barrel and cleave to it a short wooden handle. Henceforth its mission is not to thrust itself into the vitals of men, but to encourage combustion on winter nights." And then he falls to philosophizing as to how the bayonet poker fits into the Christmas idea. One does not wonder that Roosevelt was pleased to take with him *The Gentle Reader*. It would be just the kind of a book for a man to read when he had unbuckled his belt, unwound his buckskins, gotten all the comfort he could out of a rubber bathtub, and was seated under a baobab tree, with his feet on the carcass of a lion, at peace with himself and all the world. In more civilized lands the book would make a fine background with the foreground filled

by a fireplace, with a foot-stove and a warming-pan in the corner, and apples, nuts and popcorn within easy reach. What a pity that such a delightful setting is almost impossible to find in our day! Somebody has said that "even the names which reminded us of happy days are passed away." Even periodicals are changed to suit the times, and instead of *The Christian Fireside*, we have *The Christian Register*. Here is literature for literature's sake. There is no terrible moral to make your heart beat fast or stare you out of conceit with yourself, no reminder that you are wasting your time if you undertake anything less than the Higher Criticism or Hegelian Cosmology. "The Gentle Reader"! how familiar that sounds. As if you had just taken down a cloth-covered book, black, of course, printed in 1820 or earlier, and, blowing off the dust, had opened at the Preface.

What has become of the Gentle Reader? One does not like to think that he has passed away, with the stagecoach and the Weekly News Letter, and that henceforth we are to be confronted only by the stony glare of the Intelligent Reading Public. They used to dedicate books to him generations ago, and stop in the very middle of a story to address a word of apology or explanation to the Gentle Reader. . . . Nobody but the Gentle Reader could take up a dull book and enjoy it in the spirit in which it was written. The generation that delighted in Fielding and Richardson had some staying power. A book was something to tie to. No one would say jauntily, "I have read Sir Charles Grandison," but only, "I am reading it." The characters of fiction were not treated as transient guests, but as life-long companions, destined to be a solace in old age. The short story, on the other hand, is invented for people who want a literary quick lunch. "Tell me a story," cries the greedy devourer of modern literature. "Serve it hot, and be mighty quick about it." . . .

Of all the devices for promoting a good understanding with the Gentle Reader the old-fashioned preface was the most excellent. In these days the preface is reduced to the smallest possible space. It is like the platform of an electric car, which affords the passenger a precarious foothold while he strives to obey the stern demand of the conductor that he move forward. But time was when the preface was the wide, hospitable porch on which the author and the reader sat for an hour or so and talked over the subject that was before them. Sometimes they talked so long that they almost forgot their ostensible subject.

There is one chapter on "The Mission of Humor," and one on "The Gentle Reader's Friends Among the Clergy." In the first essay the author says:

An artistic sensibility finds its satisfaction only in the perfect. Humor is the frank enjoyment of the imperfect. Its objects are not so high, but there are more of them. Evolution is a cosmic game of "Pussy wants a corner." Each creature has its eye on some snug corner where it would rest in peace. The corner is occupied by some other creature that is not altogether satisfied, and he is on the lookout for some larger sphere. There is much beckoning between those who are desirous of making a change. Now and then some bold spirit gives up his position and scrambles for something better. The chances are that the adventurer finds it harder to attain the coveted place than he had thought. For the fact is that there are not enough corners to go around. If there were enough corners, and everyone were content to stay in the one where he found himself at the beginning, then the game would be impossible. It is well that this never happens. Nature looks after that. When things are too homogeneous she breaks them up into new and amazing kinds of heterogeneity. It is a good game, and one learns to like it after he enters into the spirit of it.

Humor is impossible to a man of one idea. There must be at least two ideas moving in opposite directions so that there will be a collision. Such does not happen in a mind under economic management that only runs one train of thought a day.

And then our author brings us samples of humor from the days of the great Samuel Johnson down to the good-humored Charles Lamb.

"There has been such a falling off in clerical character," says the Gentle Reader.

In the old books it was a pleasure to meet a parson. He was so simple at heart that you feel at home with him at once. You know just where you will find him, and he always takes himself and his profession for granted. He may be a trifle narrow, but you make allowances for that, and as for his charity, it has no limits. You expect him to give away everything he lays his hands on. As for his creed, it is always the same as the church to which he belongs, which is a great relief and saves no end of trouble. But the clergyman I meet with in novels nowadays is in a chronic state of fidgetiness. Nothing is as it seems or ought to be. He is as full of problems as an egg is full of meat. When the busy man is not fretting against all evildoers he begins to fret because of the well-doers, who do well in the old-fashioned way without any proper knowledge of the higher criticism or sanitary drainage. He is one of those trying characters of whom some one has said that "we can hear their souls scrape." I prefer the old-time parsons. They were much more comfortable and in more rugged health. I like the phrase "Bishops and other clergy." Bishops are great personages, whose lives are written, and, like the lives of the Lord Chancellors, they are not always very readable. But my heart goes out to the "other clergy," the good, sensible men, who were not great

scholars, reformers nor martyrs, and therefore do not get into the church histories, but who keep things going. It would be interesting to discover the origin of the idea that sermons are long. A sermon is seldom as long as it seems. But it is always with trepidation that the listener observes in a discourse a constitutional tendency to longevity. In his opinion, the good die young.

The Gentle Reader discourses most beautifully about the Canterbury Tales, and reminds us that they end with the Canterbury Sermon. He says there was one ministerial weakness from which Chaucer's parson was free, the love of alliteration. He recalls that bit of history distressing to every Republican, how a worthy clergyman was addicted to this habit and instead of the "three R's" enumerated rum, Romanism, and rebellion. The chances are that he meant no offense to his Roman Catholic fellow citizens, but, once on the toboggan slide of alliteration, he could not stop. If instead of rum he had begun with whisky, his homiletic instinct would have led him to say that the three perils of the republic are "whisky, war, and woman suffrage." Out of Shakespeare the Gentle Reader culls an interesting fellowship for the parson.

When Mr. Slender declares his resolution, "After this I'll ne'er be drunk while I live again, but in honest, civil, godly company. If I be drunk, I'll be drunk with those who fear God," the convivial curate responds, "So God judge me, that shows a virtuous mind." So late as the eighteenth century a traveler in Wales remarks that the ale house was usually kept by the parson. One wonders, then, whether the Welsh ministers' meetings were given over to lugubrious essays on "Why We Don't Reach the Masses."

You will be glad to tramp with the Gentle Reader down the literature of the centuries, and stop now and then at the welcome door of a cheery parson.

For mental alertness and keen thrust at human foibles Crothers's best essays are doubtless to be found in *The Pardoner's Wallet*. Our essayist says: "I have no plea to make for this Fourteenth Century pardoner." A few bites out of his chapter on "Prejudices" will serve us to get its flavor. For instance:

It is only during a heated campaign that we think of all the opposing parties as rascals. There is time between elections to make the necessary

exceptions. It is customary to make allowances for a certain amount of partisan bias, just as the college faculty allows a student a certain number of cuts. It is a just recognition of human weakness. Religious prejudice is a combination of religion and several decidedly earthly passions. The combination produces a peculiarly dangerous explosive. The religious element has the same part in it as innocent glycerin has in nitro glycerin. This is a combination produced by a mixture of nitric and sulphuric acid on glycerin at low temperatures. It is observable that in the making of religious prejudice the religion is kept at a very low temperature indeed. To love our friends is the work of nature; to love our enemies is the work of grace. The troublesome thing is to get on with those that are betwixt and between. In such a case we are likely to fall between nature and grace, as between two stools. Almost anyone can be magnanimous in great affairs, but to be magnanimous in trifles is like trying to use a large screwdriver to turn a small screw. It is pleasant to see brethren dwelling together in unity, but it is seldom prolonged to the point of satiety.

Every intellectual investigator who has his logical faculties constantly under strain will find rare delight in his essay, "How to Know the Fallacies." It is evidently modeled on that excellent treatise for the uninitiated, "How to Know the Wild Flowers." This chapter is really the product of his friend, "Scholasticus." Scholasticus, it ought to be said, was in a bad way. He had been educated before the elective system came in and he had a pathetic veneration for the curriculum of his day. It was to him the sacred ark now, alas, carried away into the land of the Philistines. He would say:

"The intellectual world is topsy-turvy. What is to be expected of a generation that learns to write before it learns to read, and learns to read before it learns to spell; or, rather, which never does learn to spell? In his day small children were supposed to be pleased with a rattle and tickled with a straw. But nowadays even babies begin with the esoteric doctrine of their playthings. Having made a false start, he goes farther and farther into the wilderness. He is very observing, but he does not put two and two together. There they stand in his mind, two separate ideas, politely ignoring one another because they have not been properly introduced. How many people do you come across with whom it is a pleasure to hold an argument? Not many. They don't know the rules of the game." . . . In his day folks knew how to deal with knotty problems. "If they survived the school they could not be drowned in a town meeting."

Our essayist labors with him. Every system has its failures. If that of the present day seems to have more than its share it is because its failures are still in evidence while those of your gen-

eration are mostly forgotten. At last it was inferred that Scholasticus was writing a book. It appears in due time with the title which heads our essay. In the preface we are told that arguments as they are found in the state of nature are of two kinds—those that hang together, and those that only seem to hang together. These latter are called “fallacies.”

“The search for fallacies need never take one far afield. The collector may find almost all known varieties in his own inclosure. The trouble with thinking straight is that it is likely to take us too far from home. The first we know we are facing new issues. From this peril we are saved by the habit of going round and round. He who argues and runs away from the real difficulty lives to argue another day, and the best of it is the argument will be just the same.”

In the species *argumentum ad hominem*, he says there are few greater pleasures in life than that of having all our preferences justified by our reason. Such people never do wrong. For the more they think about it the more pleased they are with themselves. “They are like a person who tumbles into the Dead Sea. He cannot go under if he tries.”

There is a fine chapter on the “Cross-fertilization of the Fallacies.” The author shows how two half-principles brought together from two widely separate fields will produce a new and magnificently variegated form of opinion. “The hybrid we produce surpasses either of the specimens of the parent stock in size and showiness. Thus a half truth of popular religion cross-fertilized by a half truth of popular science will produce a hybrid which astonishes both the religious and scientific world. If we follow the analogy of mathematics, we might assume that two half truths would make a whole truth, but when we are dealing with the marvelously productive powers of nature we find that they make much more than that.” And there is a chapter or two on the “Dwarfing of Argument.” “The complaint is sometimes heard that an argument which is otherwise satisfactory proves too much. This may seem a good fault to those whose chief difficulty is in making their arguments prove anything at all. But I assure you it is really very troublesome to find that you have proved more than you intended. You may have no facilities for dealing with the surplus conclusions. For this reason many persons, instead

of cultivating arguments of standard size, which take a good deal of room, prefer the dwarf varieties." In the chapter on the use of "Artificial Fertilizers," Scholasticus dwells particularly upon statistics. He says their importance in the cultivation of valid arguments is universally acknowledged. But in this case success depends upon the extreme care with which they are used.

If solid conclusions that head well are expected, only experts of good character can be trusted to do the work. There is no such difficulty in the use of statistics if the grower is content with arguments of the fallacious order. Statistics are recommended for a mulch. By covering a bed of fallacies with a heavy mulch of statistical matter it is protected from the early frosts and the later drought. The ground of the argument is kept thus in good condition. No particular care is here needed in the application of statistics. Any man who can handle a pitchfork can do all that is required. I have seen astonishing results obtained in this way. No one need be deterred by the consideration of expense. In these days statistics are so cheap that they are within the reach of all. If you do not care to use the material freely distributed by the government, you can easily collect a sufficient amount for yourself.

Our essayist congratulated Scholasticus on his book and said: "You have taught us by a natural method how to reason fallaciously. I wish you would now teach us how to reason correctly." "I wish I could," said Scholasticus.

And now, as we leave our essayist, just a glance under the mask of *Thalia*. Because the author has a reputation as a humorist, let him not be received with an expectant smile. Nothing could be more disconcerting to his sensitive spirit, and besides, how can you know that he has not a very serious message to communicate?

"A penny for your thoughts," we say lightly, knowing that this hidden treasure cannot be bought. The world may be described in a formal fashion, as if it were an unchanging reality; but how the world appears to each inhabitant of it he alone can declare. Now and then is one born with a gift of true self-expression. In his speech we recognize the real person, and not the confused murmur of a multitude. Institutions and traditions do not account for him; his thought is the more fundamental fact. Here is a unique bit of knowledge. There is no other way of getting at it than that of the Gentle Reader—to shut out the rest of the world and listen to the man himself.

C. L. Goodell.

ART. IX.—MUSIC AND WORSHIP

THE place of music in worship is a fundamental one. Music is a natural method of expressing religious thought and emotion, planned by God as a means of communication between God and man. It is the oldest of the arts and common to all nations. In the history of Hebrew worship we can trace it back to Jubal, the grandson of Methusael, who in turn was the great-great-grandson of Cain. His half brother, Tubal-Cain, is revered as the founder of the family of "Smiths," and Jubal is referred to as "the father of all such as handle the harp and pipe."¹ In corroboration of the Genesis history is the persisting fact that the Persian and Arabian name for musician is "Kayne." Music had attained an elaborate development when Jacob fled from the house of his father-in-law, as is revealed by the reproach of Laban when he overtook the fugitive: "Wherefore didst thou flee secretly, and steal away from me, and didst not tell me, that I might have sent thee away with mirth and with songs, with tabret and with harp?"² Job mentions the three possible kinds of instruments—percussion, string, and wind—when he speaks in one sentence of the timbrel, the harp, and the pipe.³ From the most ancient times music has been the handmaid of worship. Miriam led the women of Israel with timbrels and dances as they sang praises unto Jehovah for their deliverance from the Egyptians. With the elaboration of Hebrew worship music was given a constantly more prominent place, until, in the old age of Israel's greatest bard, of the 38,000 Levites 4,000 were musicians, and of this number 288 were accounted skilled musicians.⁴ If direct sanction for Christian song were needed, it could be found in Jesus himself leading the disciples in the singing of a psalm before they went from the upper chamber to the garden of Gethsemane. Paul and James both exhort their readers to sing,⁵ and in song Paul and Silas gained consolation in prison at the midnight hour.⁶ It is to be acknowledged, however, that when we speak of music we mean a very dif-

¹ Gen. 4. 21; James 5. 13.⁴ 1 Chron. 23. 5; 25. 7.² Gen. 31. 27.⁵ Col. 3. 16; Eph. 5. 19.³ Job 21. 12.⁶ Acts 16. 25.

ferent thing from the timbrel-shaking of Miriam and the trumpet-blowing of Joshua and even the harping and singing of David—yes, different from the singing of Christ and the apostles and even the elaborate music of the Middle Ages. For harmony is only three hundred years old, and harmony has made music a new thing. Before that music was all simple melody, just a succession of single tones, sometimes a tune well pronounced, again not even tuneful enough to be attractive and learnable. With the discovery and development of harmony comes the balancing of note over against note to form a chord, a number of notes sounded at the same time, harmoniously and pleasantly. Instead of a succession of single notes music has become a succession of chords with the possibility of a greater variety of effects than the moves upon a chess board. With the understanding of the theory of harmony has come the perfection of musical instruments, chief among which in value have been the organ and piano, which place under the easy and constant control of the operator two full octaves and make possible the reproduction of almost infinite variety of effects. And now, the mere “concord of sweet sounds” may be worshipful. The mind untutored in the intricacies of music is lifted into the heavens by Verdi’s Requiem or the Angel’s Song in Guilmant’s Funeral March.

The vibratory theory of sound and light is accepted as fact. The air vibrates and we hear either a noise or a musical note. If the vibration is very slow, the note is very low in pitch. The faster the vibration the higher the pitch. A wire string vibrates sixteen times a second. The string, striking the air, sets the air vibrating in time with it. The air waves beat upon the inner ear, and there, where is found a harp with *eleven thousand* strings, one string responds to the vibrations of the air and a sensation is carried to the brain, and we hear the lowest note the average ear is capable of distinguishing. The average person can distinguish eleven thousand different tones, or about nine octaves. The highest tone the human ear can distinguish is usually one produced by 20,000 to 22,000 vibrations a second, though some very sensitive ears can receive and distinguish vibrations of 50,000 a second. The extreme limits of the human voice seldom pass below 87 or

above 778 vibrations a second, although Christine Nilsson's high F above high C means 1,365 vibrations a second. Permeating all matter and all space is an attenuated substance known as ether. The ether vibrates, and the vibrations reach the flesh and heat is felt. The vibrations increase, and the retina of the eye is affected, and we see. The lowest vibrations of ether which we can sense are at the rate of 18,000,000 a second, and when these reach us we are conscious of heat. The iron gets hotter and hotter until the vibrations sent forth are 471,982,000,000 a second, and the iron glows, and we have reached the point of luminosity, or red heat. The vibrations still increase and we pass through the spectrum until we reach the limit in the violet colors with 733,000,000,000 vibrations a second. Between the 50,000 vibrations of the highest musical note any ear is capable of hearing and the 18,000,000 vibrations of the first sensations of heat, there is a great blank. Vibrations there certainly are, but we cannot sense them. They make no impression upon the ear, or eye, or nerves of touch. There is reason to believe that there are vibrations faster than the rate of the deep violets, but from the eye of man they are concealed and perform their miracles in what to man is the densest darkness. God has set the universe a-vibrating. He permits man to discover but a part of his secrets. Had we sense acute enough, who knows what pleasures of sense would be ours as great as the warmth of the May sunshine, as inspiring as the glories of the sunset, as satisfying as the stately movement of Von Weber's symphony! And so music is made by God. Man discovers and controls, thinking *some* of God's thoughts after him, but not all. Music is divine. Says Byron:

There's music in the sighing of the reed,
There's music in the gushing of the rill;
There's music in all things, if men had ears,
The earth is but an echo of the spheres.

Beethoven became deaf at thirty and some of his greatest compositions were produced without his being able to hear them save as a very deaf person hears. But his soul vibrated in harmony with God and nature. In an old tree outside of Vienna he composed the Ninth Symphony. It was first played in Vienna May 7, 1824.

The deaf musician himself held the baton and, unable to hear, conducted the orchestra, but because his soul sang the wonderful harmonies, he swayed the multitude first into rapturous silence and then into tumultuous applause. We can understand something of how this could be when we read his definition: "Music is the manifestation of the inner essential nature of all that is." Thus the modern discoveries in the field of music add confirmation to the historical conclusion that music has a fundamental part in worship. Unaided by human voice or written or spoken language, music can touch the heart and bring the spirit into contact with spirit, the composer, the interpreter, the hearer, and God.

The most common use of music in the worship of to-day is in congregational singing. But for another reason also it is the most important, namely, because of its *expressive* value. The church service is divided naturally into two parts, as the various exercises contribute either to making an impression or aiding in expression. The Scripture reading and sermon are chiefly for purposes of impression. True, the reading of the psalms is often an opportunity for the entire congregation to voice their prayer in the words of the ancient singer, and the preacher often speaks for his entire audience in the expression of lofty sentiments. But the movement, intelligently directed, is toward a goal, and that goal a definite expression to be created. On the other hand, prayer and song are for purposes of expression. There are preachers who have the reputation of being able to preach a sermon in a prayer. That is never appropriate. There is a higher function for the public prayer. It should be addressed to God, and not to the congregation. It should be the outpouring of the full heart, not an elocutionary delivery before a company of people. True prayer results when the pray-er so identifies himself with the congregation that he thinks their thoughts, bears their burdens, faces their difficulties, struggles with their temptations, and so voices them that the worshiper feels, "There, that is what I wanted to say." So, also, the chief value of the hymn is as a means of expression. This balance should be kept. The organ, choir, and soloist are mostly on the side of the sermon, and add to the impressions made. As a church we have gone far enough in our emphasis on the value of

the sermon. The "foolishness of preaching" is still the chief means of winning men to Christ, but every congregation needs opportunity to express itself, and this opportunity is found preëminently in the congregational hymn. It remains to be said that there is value in the impression of true expression. As the singer interprets faithfully the message of the song, as the player lets the soul of the composer speak through his music, as the preacher gives effective expression to his message, the impression is successfully made, and who is there who has not felt the thrill that comes from joining with the great congregation in singing the great hymns set to the great tunes of the church, when throat and lips, as well as mind and heart and soul, vibrate in unison with the multitude!

How to secure good congregational singing is one of the most practical questions that concern the conduct of public worship. Much depends upon the selection of the hymns, which will be determined by the above principles. The first two hymns are for pure worship, chiefly, an expression of the reach of the soul for God, though they may also be wisely introductory to the prayer and sermon in sentiment. The third hymn is the great opportunity. Whatever else it does, it should clinch the message of the sermon. It should express the consequent resolve that naturally follows the conclusion of the message. After a sermon on "Personal Evangelism," "Rescue the Perishing" is better than it could possibly be at the beginning of the service. The sermon was on sin and forgiveness, and the closing hymn, "Rock of Ages," meant more to both congregation and preacher than it ever had before, and the people meant what they sang. Of course, only words that are worth while will be admitted. Perhaps doggerel has its place, but it is not in the church hymnal. Of still greater importance in securing results is the selection of singable tunes. Many good hymns have been doomed to oblivion by a union not made in heaven. A singable tune is one with a good melody, or "air." A tune with an easy, natural, flowing melody will be sung successfully by any congregation. The great and popular hymns are all sung to such tunes. Much depends upon the leading of the singing. There is no doubt that a good precentor, backed by a sympa-

thetic organist, will secure better results than anything else. A good choir is of great assistance, and in that case it is best if the leader also acts as precentor. An organist who knows how can lead a congregation as he will, within certain limits. We have seen an audience melted to tears just by the playing of a hymn introductory to its singing, and then sing it as we have never heard it sung. But there are very few organists who can *lead* a congregation in singing. As a rule the congregation by its dragging leads the organist. The attitude of the preacher may go far toward making for success. If he announces a hymn with enthusiasm and reads it with intelligence, it will be enthusiastically and intelligently sung. An occasional exhortation, especially in learning a new hymn, is timely in a Methodist church, though few to-day would so break the dignified movement of the service as to follow Wesley's rule for guarding against formality in worship, especially in singing, "By often stopping short and asking, 'Now, do you know what you said last? Did you speak no more than you felt?'" But this is a good question for individuals to put to themselves. Only cheerful hymns should be used. Doleful words and doleful tunes have no place in a Christian service, last of all at a funeral. Nor have they rightful place in a Christian song book. Cultivate expression. Not every hymn is to be sung on the gallop or with full blare of trumpets. Some are to be sung in whispers, some in dignified and stately time. In almost every hymn there is one verse that is to be sung more softly than all the rest. Use the softest stops, and breathe the song-prayer quietly. Sometimes sing a stanza without accompaniment. Learn the great hymns of the church, some of which are neglected, like "Creation," "Hark, Hark, my Soul," "Jerusalem the Golden," etc. Sometimes tell the story of a hymn. Luther's great battle hymn is not easy to sing. It is never sung in the majority of churches. But tell its story, connect it with the Reformation and the trying days when it brought strength to the reformers, and everyone will make a try as the notes thunder out, "A mighty fortress is our God." Wesley's brief rules for congregational singing might well be commended to every congregation to-day. "1. Sing *all*. 2. Sing *lustily* and with good courage. 3. Sing *modestly*. Do not bawl so as to be

heard above or distinct from the congregation. 4. Sing in time.
5. Above all, sing *spiritually*."

Is a choir a good thing? It depends on the choir. There are three things that will justify a choir. First, a choir is vindicated if it helps secure good congregational singing. If a choir does not do this, better not have it. Second, a choir is justified if it aids directly in the worship. The anthem must be more than a mere performance; it must lift the thoughts above the millinery to the skies, and turn them away from the dress to the hearer's own inner life. Third, last, and *least*, a choir is vindicated if it make the service attractive. Especially amid the temptations of the city, where for selfish reasons the world caters to the love of the beautiful and ennobling, the church cannot be behind in making the service attractive. But this purpose standing alone is not a safe guide for the embellishment of the service. We sometimes forget that we possess a power of attraction that the world has not. The church cannot hope to cope with the grand opera in the production of music in itself, nor should it make the attempt. The function of the church is to produce truly worshipful music. This test of attractiveness should be secondary to the other two tests, which should never be sacrificed to anyone's notion of attractiveness. After all, true worship draws the best, and music which contributes to worship will be the most permanently attractive. What is necessary in order to have such a choir? First of all, a devout and capable leader, a good musician, but more, a consecrated man. One such has been a leader of the choir in a city church for more than twenty-five years. He has been with the society from the time it was a struggling child until it now ranks as one of the largest in the denomination. He is a member of the church and interested in all her work. In the preaching service, in prayer and revival meetings he is a power with the music. It is the testimony of those who know his work that his contribution to the effectiveness of that church is greater than that of any one pastor they have had. May his like increase! A second essential is Christian singers. The choir box and the organ stool should be dedicated to the occupancy of none others. Experience is back of the contention that the poorest way to make a Christian of an unconverted man is to give

him a position in the church, either in the board of trustees or the choir box. A third essential is a wise selection of music. No rule can supply the place of common sense, and if the Lord has not given the leader what the lamented Dr. Upham called "the fourth blessing," the case is hopeless.¹ There is a simple test by which all vocal selections may be judged. That is a good selection which leaves the message of the words in your mind and warms your heart to respond to that message. The words form the jewel. The music is the setting. The jewel must be worth while, and the setting must reveal and utilize all the latent beauties and potencies. Most choir music is bad. We endure a great deal in patience because of the good selections we sometimes hear. Often the words seem to be the mere excuse for jumbling together strange musical combinations, and in rendition there is too much noise and not enough of that sweet melody and rich harmony, sung with true expression, which requires no special cultivation, but only a musical soul, to enjoy.

The same underlying principles should govern the use of solo music in the church service. There is something more essential than mere musical excellence. Given a reasonably good voice, the next most important thing is the spirit of the singer. The earnest, simple, devoted Sankey is more acceptable and serviceable than the trained opera singer who airs her immoralities in the divorce court. Music, real music, is spiritual. By it one soul speaks to another. Sacred music has as its theme the deepest, the loftiest, the holiest thoughts and emotions of life. To the candidate for a position in the choir loft may well be addressed the words of Horace to the poets, "If you wish to touch my heart, you must begin by showing me that you have touched your own." The next most important thing is a grasp of the message, an intelligent understanding of the poet and the composer. The third essential is a clear enunciation. It would be just as edifying to sing before an American congre-

¹ We will agree that John Wesley was a little extreme on this point, and yet we have often been compelled to sympathize with his criticism of the fugue in his remarks upon the oratorio *Judith* which he heard performed at Lock in 1764: "Some parts of it were exceeding fine; but there are two things in modern music which I cou'd never reconcile to common sense. One is, singing the same words ten times over; the other, singing different words by different persons, at one and the same time. And this in the most solemn addresses to God, whether by way of prayer or thanksgiving. This can never be defended by all the musicians in Europe, till reason is quite out of date."

gation in Hongkong Chinese as to so butcher the words of a song that the hearers cannot understand. The singer must be allowed some liberties with pronunciation in order to accommodate the words to proper vocalization, but the permissible limit is passed when the least trained auditor fails to understand. To preach, read, or sing anything in Christian worship that cannot be understood is an abomination and sin. Last of all comes the vocal art, applied specifically to vocalization. Do not misunderstand. No training is too fine for the worship of God. But given a good voice, intelligence, and good enunciation, then simple naturalness is more pleasing than the finest art, so called, without these characteristics. The truth is, however, that the former is the higher art, and that the true art of singing is exemplified in this total analysis.

A good organist is one of God's best gifts to a modern church. A poor organist can spoil everything and dispel all symptoms of true worship. If the organist is at once a real musician and a lover of God, and has a reasonable gift of common sense, he will need no rules to make him invaluable to the proper conduct of worship. This organist, in his unselfishness, does not consider church worship an opportunity to display his talent. He never drowns the congregation with the volume of sound from his instrument. He skillfully leads the congregational singing and helps interpret the spirit of the song. He is eager to grasp the soloist's interpretation and support the voice and make his part an accompaniment and not another solo. There is always a devotional and worshipful character to his prelude and offertory, and on communion Sunday his music is touched with the sweet sorrow of the Last Supper and Gethsemane and Calvary. Seldom does anyone think to thank him, so unobtrusive is his work, but he tones up the entire service.

Perhaps we can make clearer some abuses by a brief enumeration. It is an abuse of music in worship to use unfit or unpoetical words, equally so to employ poor tunes, and just as bad to join words and music not adapted to each other. It is also an abuse, little short of criminal, to divorce words and music of some hymns which have become a part of the life of the church, and to force either into another marriage. There is only one tune for "Abide with me," "Lead, Kindly Light," "Nearer, my God, to Thee," "Just as I am,"

or "Jesus, Lover of my Soul." O, makers of hymn books, leave some things alone! It is an abuse to surrender to the rag-time type. The great hymns are needed nowhere more than in our Sunday schools, where it should be impossible for a scholar to spend a year without becoming acquainted with the fifty greatest hymns. But it is an equal abuse to attempt to limit the Sunday school to the staid and stately hymns. Songs for young people must have some "go" in them, and a little more "go" would not injure the church hymnal. Adaptability to age and use must play a larger part in our choices. We need a better hymnology for child life, which the kindergarten is now partially supplying. The gospel song has vindicated itself by results. We must recognize its place, though seeking to prevent its abuse by improving its quality and eliminating that which offends. It is an abuse to sing for the purpose of changing the air or taking a collection. It is just as sensible for the preacher to announce his text while the coins are rattling, as for the soloist or choir, or even the congregation, to sing. It is an abuse to introduce organ music that is not devotional. Two abuses, which seem small, are common to many organists. We refer to the custom of striking the note with which the melody begins at the opening of each verse, just before the people begin to sing. This is very disagreeable, entirely unnecessary, undesirable and inexcusable. Equally bad is the practice of holding the bass note of the last chord long after all other sounds have ceased. It is much better to stop short with the end of the measure, or to hold the last chord softly for a moment after the singing has ceased.

To all who have part in the music of worship we commend the rule of the sweet-spirited Sankey: "I never touch a song that does not speak to me in every word and phrase. Before I sing I must feel, and the hymn must be of such a kind that I know I can send home what I feel."

Staley F. Davis

EDITORIAL DEPARTMENTS

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

RICHARD WATSON GILDER ON IDEALS OF LIFE¹

THE SUBJECT DEFINED

THE idea of preaching ideals to idealists like these girls! I hear some of you—think. Why, they are running over with ideals; they are idealists all; even more, they are to one another, and to many others, themselves embodied ideals, and this hour is the very crest and culmination of all their exquisite idealism. It is like laying a duty upon birds and poets to sing, brooks to babble, dreamers to dream.

True enough—gloriously true! But my hope is to say a clinging word that may be of service in that possible future, when these bright ideals may, some of them, get to be dim, ineffective, and dispensable—a bit house-worn, perhaps; and furthermore, to insist upon certain specific ideals of special necessity among our people and in our time.

The dictionaries do not always furnish us with just what we want when we go to them for definition, but I have been fortunate in finding the desired shades of meaning for my title word, namely, *Ideal*, "an imaginary object or individual in which an idea is conceived to be completely realized, hence a standard or model of perfection, as the ideal of beauty, virtue, etc."; again, "a standard of desire, an ultimate object or aim, a mental conception of what is most desirable." I am not to speak of ideals of art or beauty—not of æsthetic ideals or educational ideals, but of ideals of life.

Ideals of life may be separated into several kinds—one implying conscious or unconscious emulation of some one individual or career, or of a group of individuals, historical or contemporaneous. This may even descend to imitation of appearance—dress, cut of hair, tricks of manner. Approaching this sort of ideal is the image of one's self projected imaginatively before the mind's eye and imaginatively existing in certain desired conditions or with certain traits and powers. In the first case one flatters another by imitation; in the second case one tries to live up to a conception of a more interesting, more successful, more useful, more admirable, in fact, a better self. Again,

¹ A Commencement Address delivered at Wellesley College by R. W. Gilder, whose intention was to send it, after delivery, as a free gift to the *METHODIST REVIEW*. Circumstances having prevented the carrying out of his desire at the time, we now fulfill his wish by putting it upon our pages as a grateful memorial of his friendship for this *REVIEW*.

we cherish ideals of moral qualities, ideals of duty, industry, good manners, good behavior, pluck, and what not, gathered from various sources.

Life's ideals, you see, may be real or imaginary persons, or groups of persons, that is, composites; or they may be attributes, detached virtues or accomplishments. These various ideals interblend, but always they serve as standards, low or high, according to our intellectual and moral culture or native virtue.

NO ESCAPE FROM IDEALS

Those are, of course, mistaken who take it that the ideal has only to do with the purely impracticable, to be something entirely outside of life. The misconception comes from adhering to a definition of the word which is legitimate enough, and refers to something which exists only in idea, something, perhaps, which is fanciful, unattainable. They give a moral significance to the term, and they take a dubious and cynical attitude. But we are using the term more broadly, and, in the broad sense, it is clearly demonstrable that the everyday life of every man, woman, and child is dominated by his or her ideals. It must be a less than human stupidity in the person, or an absolute deadening by routine, that utterly eliminates the influence of standards of ideals from any life. Take the dullest individuals known to you, leading the most monotonous possible existences, and see whether their treadmill days are utterly lacking in influences from fixed ideals. One way in which you may test this is to run counter to the convention of the locality, or the social or religious group, and then find out what a figure you cut in the eyes of the narrowest and heaviest spirits in the whole community. You are likely to discover that these have very definite aims and ideals; their ideals may be small, even sensual, base; they may be what you call superstitious, yet some of these ideals may be, also, in their way admirable.

The Russian peasants seem a stolid lot; think of the tragedy of the late coronation, where in a panic-stricken crowd they perished like poor, stupid sheep. But some, at least, of their ideals are of a kind that poets praise. I thought so when I saw, at Jerusalem, the Russian pilgrims awaiting for days and days the fraudulent miracle of the holy fire at the so-called Tomb of Christ. It was a pitiful sight when one remembered the long, hard journey—and the strenuous desire to lay hold of a less burdensome life in another state of existence; but it was a spectacle not without color of ideality, in the uplifting sense.

The prophet, the sensualist, the miser, the benefactor, the reformer, and the poor fellow with a brain incapable of carrying a great thought without an errant gait, whom we call crank or fanatic—all these have their ideals, and are striving, indolently or forthrightly, to attain them. It is the ideal of many youths to be prize fighters, pickpockets, or all 'round crooks. Not long ago, at Hampton, I heard a colored man tell with pleasing frankness of the change that had come in his own ideals of life. His essay was named "A Changed Ideal." His young ambition had been to attain to be an "extra good middle-weight prize fighter," that his name might "go whirling around the world in the newspapers." His second, and present, ambition was to be a well-trained farmer. His life and his ideals changed together, as do yours and mine. The thief has his ideal of honor—even if this is modified by his profession, still he strives to live up to his ideal, and judges his fellows accordingly. The statesman who partitions or steals whole countries has, too, his ideals of modified honor, as shown by Talleyrand's self-reported reproof of Napoleon for cheating in the game, in reference to the scandalous manner of his dealing with unfortunate Spain. If, then, we all have ideals, and these are forever influencing us, it is a gravely practical matter, this question we are discussing to-day.

WHAT IDEALS SHOULD BE

One very desirable thing about ideals is that they should be precise. He is fortunate who early in life attains a definite ideal as to his future. It is a powerful element of success. If you read the confessions of successful men and women, you will, not always but very often, find that their efforts were inspired by a definite image of what they wished to become. This one aim they struggled toward all their years, in due course of time accomplishing the great result. He or she was determined to be like this or that artist, writer, statesman, soldier, philanthropist—and approached, equaled, or surpassed the inspiring original.

But definiteness of this kind is not the most important thing in relation to the ideals that are to influence our careers, be these careers public or private. The most determined nature is often deflected from its aims, but if it is governed by ideals of industry, of honor, of courage, of high attainment in whatever is undertaken, the man will find his place at whatever altitude circumstances make possible; and the world will be better for his having stepped into it for a while and done his part bravely.

"WHEN HALF-GODS GO, THE GODS ARRIVE"

Many a man and woman smiles in after years at the small proportions and narrow bounds of first ideals as to things to be accomplished in a career, but he or she is none the less glad that these ambitions were enthusiastically cherished.

When half-gods go,
The gods arrive.

Sometimes, on the other hand, is the faithful ideal not only exalted, but so enormous, so magnificent, so tainted with sentimentality and unreality, that it is absolutely unattainable. Nevertheless, it has lifted hours that might have been sordid and depressed into the glow of imagination and hope; it has been the inspiration of monotonous labor; it has led, in due course, to the creation and realization of ambitions right and attainable.

IDEALS THAT ARE THRUST UPON US

There are certain ideals which come to us as an effect of that mysterious element which we call public opinion, and there are others that are ours through accident or training. The tone that we take from our surroundings is very subtle in its formation and very hard for any of us to escape. Most people "go with the crowd." It is a tremendously important part of all culture, then, and all education to put up a dam against the inundation of contiguous opinion. Nothing is harder to avoid than such overflow, and very few do avoid it. In other words, one great object of education is to bring to the intelligence a variety of information and of opinion from various worth-while quarters and points of view, so that there will be in the mind of the educated person a supply of materials that will serve in constructing the necessary barriers against a rush of popular emotion, or against some craze of the circumjacent crowd.

FORMING ONE'S OWN IDEALS

Students in schools and colleges are taught to think for themselves; to form their own ideals. More than this, there is an attempt in every institution of learning, from the kindergarten up, to send students into the world with a stock of ideals so admirable and compelling that they will keep them on the straight path as long as they live. There is nothing more valuable to the life of the community than the reaction upon popular sentiment of minds that, through education, have attained a certain amount of independence and power of resistance, and which are thus capable of influencing, and even at

times of forming, that public opinion upon which all government and all society are based.

To sum up what has gone before: It is not so important that the ideals of our lives should be minutely exact, as that they should be of a kind that may apply to all circumstances. It is more to the point that we should measure ourselves morally with some fine character which we enthusiastically admire, than that we should say, "I will be a teacher like this one or that, a preacher, a poet, a publicist, orator," or what not. It is a good thing to have definite ideals; it is a better thing that one's ideals should be of a nature that makes them serviceable in all the developments and emergencies of life, and it is the most vitally important thing of all that our ideals should be altogether noble.

WESLEY AND EMERSON

It would be interesting to speak of the two very notable idealists who were born, one of them just two centuries, the other one century, ago this summer. Wesley's was a life for pure strenuousness, matching, if not surpassing, any modern instance whatever, no matter how distinguished or picturesque, whether of Europe or America; a beautiful and ever-memorable life, whose enormous altruistic energy was inspired and guided by an ideal no less high than the image of the one Supreme Altruist himself; of him who, doing good, went up and down the ways of Palestine, as did his devoted disciple the roads and benighted byways of Great Britain. As for Emerson, it is something for you and me to know that this unique genius added new glory to the tongue we speak; that this great citizen loved and believed in our America; that this superb character, this world-prophet, made sacred the very time, the very country, in which we live; that we to greatness are not altogether alien, for close to our ears has sounded a voice from the eternal.

I have been thinking much lately of two women who not long since passed beyond the veil. One died in the fullness of years, the other in midcareer. One was a life almost entirely private; the other was one largely public. The lives of both were inspired and glorified from beginning to end by the noblest of ideals. I wish I could bring these two lives vividly before you, make you realize their golden ideality, and then say: "This is what I mean! Here is what I wish for each of you! Go out into life furnished like them—not necessarily with definite ambitions, though that is well, but with something in your souls that will be the splendid and unforgotten standard of every

action and desire! Take hold of daily life in the same unrelinquished spirit of purity, of service, of serene faith in divinest things!"

SARAH BLAKE SHAW

Herself unpublic and unobtrusive, one of these women was, in her family relations, the center of a group of remarkable men and women. Not even her husband, while known as a philanthropist, was of the class of men prominently "public." With all his reserve he was a man of such sterling character, and one having so deeply at heart all matters of good citizenship, that he was classed with those of our merchants who could always be counted upon in the cause of civic righteousness; his means and his counsel ever, in war and peace, at the disposal of those who were in the thick of public endeavor; more than this, his personal taste and cultivation were actively exercised in furthering worthy movements in the pioneer days of reform in the last century. Well matched, indeed, this fortunate couple, in moral and intellectual attributes and enthusiasms.

The names of those near to them by birth or marriage are a roll-call of honor—Lowell, the patriot-poet; Curtis, the civic knight without fear or reproach; Barlow and young Lowell, the intrepid soldiers; Minturn, the good citizen; that daughter, whose lifetime of devotion to the poor has enshrined her in the hearts of the people of a mighty city; that son, whose great monument on Beacon Hill was not needed to keep in remembrance one of the truest heroes that ever went solemnly to a sacrificial death. Others, too, I could name in the immediate circle who, even to the third generation, were and are among our men and women of force, of good-will and wise philanthropy.

With her the virtues of citizenship were not an acquiescence, but a passion. Graciously helpful to individual distress; giving out affection and hope tenderly and freely from her own generous stores, her sympathies covered countries and races. There was no endeavor of patriotism that she did not befriend. She inspired the inspirers. In the sacred privacy of her hearth and home men and women breathed the very air of heroism. To her the republic was like a mother beloved, whose pure fame must not be breathed upon—whose error, if error there was, could only be a passing aberration; who *must* be generous, righteous, noble. Let it not be forgotten of her that she loved music—and helped to bring its rest and benediction to the masses of the people; for she could enjoy selfishly no good thing in life. To her life was indeed ideal.

ALICE FREEMAN PALMER

Of the other woman scarcely do I dare speak in these halls, where her memory and tradition are like a living presence. Here was a life in industry and energy marvelous and undaunted, dedicated to large and ever larger uses, and inspired from first to last by the loftiest ideality. Deeply she felt the impulse and clearly she saw the object of her labor—in her self, surrender and service; for others, the lifting of the mind and soul through the truest methods of education to the highest possible levels. Few can hope to match her exceptional accomplishment; but her spirit—her spirit is here to-day, an ennobling and beckoning ideal in the hearts of teachers and students and all who cherish the beautiful memory of Alice Freeman Palmer. Judgment, tact, opportunity were hers, knowledge and experience, sympathy and affection, but above all was the inspiration of the unseen. Always she seemed to hear in the air above her, and ever follow, with bright and perfect confidence, the rustling wings of the angel of the ideal.

IDEAL OF THE HOME

To leave on one side the attractive contemplation of ideality as illustrated in personality, let us now consider certain of the ideals which need to be upheld very especially in our own day and among our own people. Naturally, speaking to women, the thought uppermost is that of "home"—yes, the "institution" of marriage, the "institution" of home. It used to be that nothing more hopelessly, forlornly trite could be put forward on an occasion like this. The singular thing about it is that there has of late come into practical effect a notion on this subject which makes the very theme such an immediate and burning question that, I give you my word, in the town where I live no one dare mention it, radically, if there is a single person present the details of whose social antecedents are not known! And, in fact, I am somewhat sensitive about bringing it here and now to your attention, for one never knows when—against the social amenities—blood may be drawn by a stroke in the dark. In a play by Brander Matthews, one of the characters says that divorce will never be as popular among women as marriage until it includes music and flowers. (There, I did not mean to mention the hateful word!) But I remember that the play is already an old one. Helen Hunt used to say that she considered some things settled—and that marriage and the home were among these things; but that poet and idealist went from among us these many sad years ago. I cannot bring myself to

multiplying words on a theme like this, in a presence such as this, but can anyone say that there is not a practical side to ideality, when the lack of a high ideal has broken up so many homes, has made so many orphans, has dragged down in so many minds and in so many lives that state which should be the noblest in the existence of humanity; that should have allied to it such a sense and standard of mutual forbearance, of mutual service, of self-control, of dignity, of consecration?

IDEAL OF THE STATE

Another theme that has long seemed irreclaimably trite is that of the virtuous commonwealth—the ideal of philosophers in all ages. We, in America, once well-nigh assumed that the centuries had reserved for us and for our children this immemorial aim and desire of the good and wise. To-day we scarcely dare to open the morning paper for dread of the revelations that may stare us in the face of new and even more hideous civic corruption. In one city government after another, and in State after State, even up to the administration of the general government, scandal follows scandal, till one is in danger of growing morbid and disheartened at the blackmail, bribery, and partnership with crime—so often do our city governments exhibit, not honest men united in public service, but dishonest men united in public plunder; so often do political candidates emerge into the senatorial chamber of the world's chief republic, bearing not the laurels of honorable victory, but the odor of notorious crime; crime of the very kind that demoralizes citizenship, and, if unchecked, would destroy the nation itself! We must not forget that these very revelations are signs and incidents of the fight against corruption; and one must never despair of the republic. Neither must one evade the truth, lest the evil increase. The evil is not merely political and governmental; it goes deeper—often into methods of business and finance, sometimes into the relations between capital and labor, frequently into the relations between men of affairs and the professional political manipulators. There is a pitiful, an unpatriotic lack of scruple on the part of men who, while protecting property from the attacks of demagogues and adventurers in office, might be thought able themselves to resist the temptation of corrupt practices.

PERSONAL APPLICATION

As few, if any, of you expect to have the opportunity of voting at elections, you may think that much of this is rather remote from your probable activities. You will find that it is not. When you go out from this college into the community you will discover that women

who neither vote nor wish to vote are directly assisting very effectively in political reforms of a local or national character throughout the country. Especially are they promoting to-day the pressing cause of civil service reform, and I do truly hope you may each be able to lend a helping hand. Yet it is not necessary to urge you into any path other than that which you anticipate. You will be doing a good work for the state and for society if you follow your professional, or your private, household lives—in the spirit that has been a part of the direct and indirect teaching of this institution of learning, to each of you so dear. You will be helping the honest citizenship of America if, even without specific work for public political reform, you simply maintain and exalt, and are never, never ashamed of your youthful ideals of honor, of honesty, and of moral courage.

Soon enough the question of political or financial scruple will be brought home to each of you—most likely through the best that is in you, through your friendly interest and natural affections. It may even be revealed to you that your own tacit demands are working havoc in the conscience of some one near to you, making it hard for him to refuse a usual acquiescence in some sort of rascality, in order that your comfort or your luxury may not be endangered.

You will not only be an influence for good or evil in the contacts of family and society but you, with your culture, will have peculiar power in the formation of that public opinion which regulates government and life. What shall be your part in giving tone to your own home and to your own community? Will this not depend upon whether or not your own better ideals are kept bright and evident?

WHAT MEAN THE RUG AND THE PICTURE?

The envy of wealth and worldly success—what is more degrading? But who can keep, in entering a well-to-do household, from the unuttered query, What has been the price of this abundance? Has anything other than intense industry and application, unusual ability and opportunity, been paid for these possessions? Has honor been surrendered? Has tacit compliance with business or political crookedness been the price? Is the possession of these goods guaranteed by a life which, in days of heroic moral conflict, basely abstains from all effort toward better things? Is this gorgeous rug a sign that the head of the house has got rich by bribing legislators? Is that costly painting not merely a proof of æsthetic taste, but of moral callousness, in keeping silent while a partner or associate trustee made a

corrupt deal? In a word, is this fortune built upon hard work, ingenuity, and high principle, or upon unscrupulous greed? Is its possessor assuaging his conscience by philanthropical subscriptions, while knowing himself to be a coward and deserter—a miserable “quitter”—in the battle that men and women of honor and patriotism and moral bravery are waging all over this country in the cause of decency and good government?

Imagine yourself the woman of that house. How will you meet your responsibility? What will be your moral attitude? I wish I could make you feel how grave the situation is in our land to-day. Truly there is an emergency; there must be a revival of civic righteousness—a definite movement—and, directly or indirectly, every one of you can be of very real assistance.

There will be ideals in that house of yours. Will the nobler ideals be wrapped up and laid away, with a little pang of regret, or smile of superiority, and the dim remembrance of a prosy graduation address how many years ago? Or will they be living, present and radiant, and full of the good old-fashioned “power of salvation”?

A TEXT FROM ST. GAUDENS

I spoke of the monument to Colonel Shaw in Boston. I was staying across the lake yonder at the time of its unveiling, and went up from here to see the ceremony. It was a significant, a touching occasion. Particularly interesting it all was to me, for I had seen the work grow year by year under the hand of the patient master—our great sculptor, St. Gaudens—striving in his conscientious way to realize his own high ideal. What a thrilling monument it is! When sculpture such as this, and the glorious Sherman just unveiled in New York, are erected in public places, our cities are beginning to possess something of the artistic interest of the old Italian towns. You know the “Shaw” well. In these my closing words, let me recall its features to your memories, and let me be so bold as to ask you to associate this monument with the thought I have tried to impress upon you to-day. Remember the swing of the sable soldiery, with the cheerful faces of their race kindled into new determination; remember the slanting, decorative lines of the guns; remember the sensitive, exquisite, resolute, devoted countenance of the young hero riding to his doom; remember the action, the tremendous urge; and over all, hovering in the air, the woman’s form—the Ideal, eternally leading, eternally uplifting, eternally inspiring.

THE ARENA

BISHOPS IN THE GENERAL CONFERENCE

A CAREFULLY studied and interesting article was that by Dr. R. T. Miller in the January-February number of the REVIEW. Almost was I convinced that the bishops are members of the General Conference. But the article was a little loose in its discrimination at two points and one of these affected its main contention. If I rightly apprehended Dr. Miller's argument, it was to this effect: The bishops were originally members of the General Conference by virtue of their ministerial standing. This with all its rights they retained and carried over into the episcopal office. These rights were not taken away by the legislation which made the General Conference a representative body; the bishops still held all their rights as ministers. Further, all their rights and powers as bishops were retained to them by the restrictive rule which inhibits the General Conference from any act which would "do away episcopacy or destroy the plan of our itinerant general superintendency." Therefore the bishops are still possessed of all the powers originally held by them and are still members of the General Conference.

The flaw in this argument is that it fails to discriminate between the special rights of the bishops by virtue of their office as bishops, and the rights which they possessed in common with other ministers by virtue of their membership in the body of the ministry. Prior to 1812 they were members of the General Conference, not because they were bishops, but because they were duly qualified ministers. Since this right did not come to them as bishops, but was theirs before their elevation to the episcopacy, and would have remained theirs had they resigned the episcopal office, it formed no part of episcopacy, as such, or of the plan of the itinerant general superintendency and was not within the scope of the third restrictive rule.

If the bishops still retain their right to membership in the General Conference, they hold that right as ministers and not as bishops. They hold it in common with their brethren in the ministry and under the same conditions and limitations. These limitations are those which have been imposed and accepted by the whole ministerial body, of which body the bishops are members, and by whose acts they are bound. These limitations include primarily all those imposed by the General Conference of 1808, and equally all that have since been adopted in the manner legally prescribed. Under these limitations no minister may be a member of the General Conference until he has been legally elected thereto, and is legally eligible to a seat. As the law now stands bishops are not eligible to seats in the General Conference, because they are not members of Annual Conferences. The Constitution provides in Article II., Section 2 that ministerial delegates "shall be elders, at least twenty-five years of age, and shall have been members of an Annual Conference four successive years,

and at the time of their election and at the time of the session of the General Conference shall be members of the Annual Conference which elected them."

The article also seems to imply that the "full power to make rules and regulations" granted the General Conference is a limitation of the powers of that body in addition to the limitations contained in the Restrictive Rules. Whether or not this is so must be ascertained by an investigation of the law as it is. It would seem to be a self-evident proposition that the church has within itself, in its own Constitution and laws, full and complete power for its own government. All the powers and processes by which the church as now constituted may govern itself are contained in the Discipline. No extra-disciplinary process can be allowed to have any force or authority whatsoever. The Discipline knows only two processes of legislation—one by majority vote of the General Conference; the other, the so-called constitutional process, requiring a concurrent vote of two thirds of the General Conference, two thirds of the Annual Conferences present and voting, and two thirds of the Lay Electoral Conferences present and voting. In such a distribution of powers it is evident that one class must be specific and precise, including only those powers which are definitely and expressly stated, and the other must be general, including all powers not distinctly and specifically reserved. It would scarcely be possible to assign all powers in express and definite terms. Such a process would be a little like charting the universe. We never could be quite sure that some matters had not been omitted. These two methods, then—the majority vote of the General Conference and the constitutional process—include all the legislative power and authority of the church. The constitutional process by the specific terms of the Constitution itself applies only to the matters expressly reserved originally to the church as represented in the ministry and now to the church as represented in the Annual and Electoral Conferences. The general grant of power must of necessity include all matters not expressly reserved. This is the real scope of "full power to make rules and regulations." What kind of legislation that must be which neither rules nor regulates anything is exceedingly obscure.

JOS. W. VAN CLEVE.

Champaign, Ill.

ANSWERS TO PRAYER FOR TEMPORAL THINGS

We met late in life, my friend and I, and she knew that her own personal experiences had much interest for me. Her father had died lingeringly, just as she left school. Her mother dragged out a living death from paralysis, while she worked to keep up the home, give her mother all that she needed of care, and educate a young brother and sister. Their home was in a large eastern city. Her energy and business capacity had placed her as owner of a restaurant, with over forty waiters, and a large business to superintend. After a long engagement the man of her choice urged her to sell out and marry. She was determined to begin married life with a long honeymoon for change and rest, so as to restore

his health. The business must be sold, and she must have cash payment in order to accomplish this. She made it a subject of earnest prayer. Her ad. appeared in the principal paper, and she asked God that he would send the right person. The landlord, whose lease she had held, must approve of the purchaser. Three answers came to the ad. She took the first (the most promising to her eyes) to the owner. He knew the writer, and that his waiters were not the quiet, orderly set that hers were. So he refused him. She brought the next best, as she thought. The landlord recognized him as a man who would bring guests of uncertain character around him. He turned him down. Her faith never wavered that it would be all right in the end. The third man answering was accepted at once. He paid her the cash down, which enabled them to start on their travels west. Her husband's health was reestablished, and he went into business in one of the beautiful "mushroom cities" of the Pacific slope. However, business reasons obliged them to move to another of these new cities. The pleasant home they had built had to be sold. She had prayed the "prayer of faith" that a path might be opened to them, and now she asked, as before, that a purchaser who would pay them in cash should be provided them, so as to meet without debt the inevitable expenses before them. The real estate men said that it was an impossibility, that she could never get it. She still believed that she could and would with the help of God. So she wrote out an ad. asking the heavenly Father to prompt the writing of it, that nothing be omitted that was wanted to attract a purchaser. She took infinite pains with the composition. A lady owning a large wheat farm in the neighborhood allowed no grass to grow under her feet before coming in to see the "pleasant home," the description of which had so attracted her. Everything satisfied her. The cash payment was made, which enabled my friends to make the change in comfort, leaving no debts behind them. "Surely an answer to the prayer of faith," said my friend. I added, "As surely as that the steps of a good man (or woman) are ordered, that is, arranged for, by the Lord!"

LOUISA A'HUMUTY NASH.

Nashville, Oregon.

THE ITINERANTS' CLUB**SERMONIC LITERATURE**

THE sermon is not generally considered as a part of our literature, and yet there is no adequate reason why it should be excluded. Within a recent period, however, the Bible, as literature, has received a new impetus, and the writings of the Old Testament and the New have taken their place among the literary productions of the world. There is the further fact that the sermon based on the Holy Scriptures has its literary side as well. It is not intended to appeal so much to the æsthetic faculty as to the religious and moral faculty, and yet it has its relation to all the powers of man.

Sermonic literature has hitherto in our own country not attained the prominence which it has secured in some European countries. Anyone who reads the writings of such distinguished scholars as Dr. Vaughan, at one time Master of the Temple in London, Dr. Lightfoot, Dr. Westcott, Dr. Liddon, will find that much of the work by which they became known was their sermons. The writer of this has noticed on the tables of the book-stores in Germany sermons which have been recently preached and which have been placed there for general circulation. Of course special occasions of a religious character will always more or less call for sermonic literature. This was manifest in the recent Calvin celebration in Geneva. Throughout Germany and the Reformed Churches of France and Switzerland, sermons were delivered which have become a part of the religious literature of these countries. The preachers of former times left a sermonic literature of great value: Butler's sermons are almost as well known as his *Analogy*; Southey's sermons have been for many years a mine in which ministers were accustomed to delve; Barrow's sermons, with their endless subdivisions, have been preserved in literature. In recent times Beecher's sermons have had a wide circulation and are still vigorous. Spurgeon's sermons had an enormous sale during his life, and we are told that they have still a large reading. The sermons of Horace Bushnell have been as widely read as his other writings, which is saying a great deal. To all appearances, there seems to be a revival of sermonic literature in our own country, for which we should be grateful.

There are several reasons why the spread of sermonic literature is important. The sermon is, or should be, the finest product of the intellect and heart. There is no kind of discourse which involves more qualities of the highest kind than the sermon. A specialist on some particular line may write a book in his own department containing the latest results of investigation. He deals in facts of a scientific character open to observation and physical experiment. The subject of the sermon is the highest subject that can engage the attention of man; it has to do with God and man, with duty and destiny; it must have visions of the future, and apply the teachings of the gospel to the details of human life. It involves the-

ology, metaphysics, psychology, the everyday life of man. It touches time and eternity. The subjects of which it treats are as broad as humanity. The highest thought and richest experience and the profoundest scholarship have their fitting place in the sermon. The sermon should be circulated, for it ought to represent the best that there is in the world. It is no argument against this view that apparently so many do not have this high estimate, and sometimes ministers preach in a perfunctory way without the full devotion of all their powers. There are sermons, however, which for the time sway communities and have been remembered for generations. President Edwards's sermon on the text, "Their foot shall slide in due time," is historic; the topic was "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God"; and Chalmers's great sermon on "The Expulsive Power of a New Affection" stirred the nation. Many sermons in these days are well worthy to be recognized in the literary life of the world.

Sermonic literature should be widely spread because sermons are for all people and rarely represent sectarian aspects of truth. As a rule, in these modern days sermons are not controversial. It is common for preachers of the various denominations to exchange pulpits. It would be manifestly a breach of courtesy for a pastor to go into another pulpit and preach doctrines out of harmony with the position which he is called to fill. Very few ministers need to change a single thing in their sermons in order to preach acceptably to any evangelical congregation. The great fundamental truths of all branches of the Christian Church are common to all. The familiarity of the people with the sermons of the ministers of other churches will reveal how much they have in common.

Sermonic literature should be diffused also because the sermon is prepared for a practical purpose. Every sermon has, or should have, a purpose. This purpose is direct and immediate; it is either to instruct the mind, to stir the heart or to move the people to action, hence its application is wider than the particular audience to which it is addressed. The wide circulation of sermonic literature renders an important service to the unity of Christendom. The tastes of the people vary at different periods in history; sometimes we have a poetical period, when Tennyson and Browning, Wordsworth and Longfellow, and other masters of poetic form, attract the attention. Again we have the æsthetic period, when literary production gathers around the fine arts. But the sermon also has its period, and we think that period is now; both in England and America the output of sermonic literature is very great. Even the public press, recognizing the relation of religion to life, and noting the subjects on which people are thinking, gives a large space to the literature of the church, especially its sermonic literature.

ENGLISH VERSIONS OF THE LORD'S PRAYER

Matthew 6. 9-12. Our Lord now proceeds to give a form of prayer which may be called Christ's Universal Prayer. It has been repeated in every language where the knowledge of him has come; it has been on the lips of the wise man in his wisdom, of the suffering in his anguish, of the joyful in his hopes, of the poor in his poverty. It is a prayer so perfect

and complete that nothing has ever been added to it, and no one has been able to take anything from it without marring its perfection. There is no body of Christians where it is not known, and no service of the Church of Christ where it is not found welcome. It is introduced in the ninth verse of the sixth chapter of Matthew in the language, "After this manner therefore pray ye." It is not to be supposed that by "this manner" our Saviour means that his disciples are always to employ this precise language, and yet it was a form of prayer which they might use, and which has been used, all through the Christian centuries. Comparing it with the context, it would seem as if it might have been intended to be the expression in which our Lord chose to unite the church at the throne of the heavenly grace.

It is a remarkable fact that English versions of this prayer are so uniform. It may not be uninteresting to place before the readers the several great versions as they have come down to us:

WICLIF—1380.

Our father that art in heaven, hallowed be thy name; thy kingdom come to; be thy will as done in heaven and in earth; give to us this day our bread or other substance, and forgive to us our debts, as we forgive to our debtors; and lead us not in to temptation, but deliver us from evil. Amen.

TYNDALE—1534.

O our father which art in heaven, hallowed be thy name. Let thy kingdom come. Thy will be fulfilled, as well in earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread. And forgive us our trespasses, even as we forgive our trespassers. And lead us not into temptation: but deliver us from evil. For thine is the kingdom and the power, and the glory for ever. Amen.

CRANMER—1539.

Our father which art in heaven, hallowed be thy name. Let thy kingdom come. Thy will be fulfilled, as well in earth, as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread. And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors. And lead us not into temptation: but deliver us from evil. For thine is the kingdom and the power, and the glory for ever. Amen.

GENEVA—1557

Our father which art in heaven, hallowed be thy name. Let thy kingdom come. Thy will be done even in earth, as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread. And forgive us our debts, even as we forgive our debtors. And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil. For thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory for ever. Amen.

RHEIMS—1582

Our Father which art in heaven, sanctified be thy name. Let thy Kingdom come. Thy will be done, as in heaven, in earth also. Give us to day our supersubstantial bread. And forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors. And lead us not into temptation. But deliver us from evil. Amen.

AUTHORIZED—1611

Our father which art in heaven, hallowed be thy Name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done, in earth, as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread. And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors. And lead

us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil: For thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for ever. Amen.

REVISED VERSION—1881

Our Father which art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth. Give us this day our daily bread. And forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors. And bring us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil one.

REVISED VERSION—1901

Our Father who art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth. Give us this day our daily bread. And forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors. And bring us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil one.

Any analysis of this prayer, beyond that in the prayer itself, is not proposed here. It involves, however, fundamental doctrines which lie at the root of these supplications: (1) "Our Father which art in heaven." The prayer begins with the precious name by which God is ever known to his people. It is an assertion of the Fatherhood of God—God the universal Father of all lands, all climes, all races. There is no one excluded from his fatherly care and there are none to whom he will not listen when men approach him in confidence and faith. (2) The second paragraph involves the holiness of God—"Hallowed be thy name." Of all the attributes of God the greatest and noblest is holiness. It is the supreme thought of the Old Testament and of the New concerning him. "Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of Hosts, heaven and earth are full of thy glory." The holiness of God is essential to all true conceptions of Christian thought and all life; it is the central idea around which all thoughts of God must turn. (3) It affirms the reign of God—"Thy kingdom come." It is a prayer that his rule may fill the whole earth. The psalmist says: "The Lord reigneth; let the earth rejoice"; and again he says: "The Lord reigneth; let the people tremble." (4) It affirms that the will of God is the law of the universe—"Thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven." When that will is done the triumph of the gospel will be complete. The will of God is the law of life, and the only law by which his human creatures are properly governed. (5) This beautiful prayer expresses the brotherhood of human need—"Give us this day our daily bread." It is the universal call of people for temporal support, although it may imply spiritual needs as well. Men are bound together in a common need for the supply of daily natural and spiritual food. This petition assumes God as the giver of both. It expresses (6), further, the gracious forgiveness of human sin and the condition without which it cannot be granted—"Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors." The Father heart will forgive us our sins, but it is accompanied with the law that we also must forgive the sins of others. (7) The thought of the next petition is the divine care of the Father for his children in the time of trial. It is a prayer not to abandon them to temptation; to preserve them from conditions of life which may lead them into temptation. (8) It is, further, a prayer for deliverance from evil. The Revised Versions render, "deliver

us from the evil one," with margin, "evil." The grand conclusion of the prayer as found in the majority of the earlier versions, "For thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory forever. Amen," is omitted from the recent versions. It seems to the writer that it is still an open question whether the authority in its favor is not strong enough to warrant its retention. The marginal note of the Revised Version is worthy of consideration: "Many authorities, some ancient, but with variations, add, 'For thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory forever. Amen.'"

It may be well to note some of the differences as well as some of the harmonies of these versions. The first sentence of the prayer is the same in all the versions with the exception of Tyndale's, which begins with "O our Father" instead of "Our Father," and the Rheims version, which substitutes "sanctified" for "hallowed." The next petition is in Wyclif, "Thy kingdom come to"; the subsequent versions down to the Authorized Version in 1611 have "let thy kingdom come." The version of Cranmer, in 1539, the Geneva version, and the Authorized Version are strikingly similar. The Rheims version of 1582 instead of "Give us this day our daily bread," which runs through nearly all versions, has "give us to-day our supersubstantial bread," after the Vulgate. It is further to be noted that the Wyclif version, the Rheims version, and the versions of 1881 and 1901 omit the last clause of the prayer, "For thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory forever. Amen."

We note also a forcible change in the two more recent versions in the last clause of the petition, "And forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors." These versions render the last part, "As we also have forgiven our debtors." The ordinary rendering is "As we forgive our debtors," following the Greek of *Textus Receptus*. The rendering of the recent versions evidently intends to follow the more recent text and translate, "As we have forgiven our debtors." If the force of the aorist is strictly adhered to, instead of "have forgiven," as these versions put it, we should have "forgave," although the rendering of the aorist by the perfect is found often in all the revisions of the New Testament. One cannot in the examination of the translations of the Lord's Prayer fail to be impressed with the accuracy of those who from the beginning have rendered the Greek text into English. Comparing the Wyclif text of 1380 with the text of to-day, we are surprised at the accuracy with which this prayer was rendered then; and the text of Tyndale in 1534 with slight variations anticipates the text of the Authorized Version in 1611, and, except in the last clause, that of 1881 and 1901. No one can note these things without recognizing the providential guidance of the noble men who ventured their lives to place in the hands of the people the priceless treasure of the Word of God. The prayer has been so frequently expounded in commentary and homily and sermon that a detailed exposition is not called for; its general import is all that may be noted at this time.

ARCHAEOLOGY AND BIBLICAL RESEARCH

THE PONTIFICAL BIBLICAL INSTITUTE

STUDENTS of the Bible, regardless of denomination or country, will be pleased to learn that the Church of Rome has just opened a Biblical Institute, which promises great things in the realm of biblical research and advanced study of Holy Writ. This is the more interesting, since during the past few years American Protestants, especially, have been gradually discounting a thorough study of the Bible in the original languages. Much twaddle has recently appeared in our religious press from men not entitled to speak on the subject about the advisability of making Hebrew, if not Greek also, elective in our theological seminaries. If we are correctly informed, this has been done in some places, such is the competition for students! It is, therefore, refreshing to see Rome, while her Protestant sisters seem to retrograde, taking an advanced step by the establishment in A. D. 1909 of an Institute endowed with every facility for a thorough study of the Holy Scriptures. Let us not be misunderstood; we do not intimate that Rome is in advance or even on a par with the Protestant world in opportunities for work of this kind. We simply call attention to the present condition of things in the two branches of the Christian Church.

This step of Rome is significant. It points very clearly to the fact that the Catholic Church in the future will meet the destructive critics on their own grounds and will not allow the best biblical learning to be in the hands of the rationalists. It is also hoped that our Protestant young ministers will become more and more and not less proficient in all that pertains to a thorough study of the Old as well as the New Testament. Information regarding this new Institute is given in the *Acta Pontifici Instituti Biblici*, which, like all official documents of the Roman Church, is published in Latin. The *Acta* corresponds to the bulletin or announcements of our colleges and seminaries. It is to be issued periodically as occasion may require.

We reproduce in full this first official bulletin of the Institute¹, which is as follows:

ACTA OF THE PONTIFICAL BIBLICAL INSTITUTE

GENERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

1. *Location of the Institute.* The headquarters of the Institute have been established temporarily at the Pontifical Leonine College, near Saint Joachim's Church, where rooms for lectures and conferences (recitations), as well as for the library, will be ready at the beginning of next November (1909).

2. *Conditions of Admission.* Those desiring to pursue the studies of the Institute must send their names in writing to the president, stating (1) the diocese, the religious order or congregation to which they belong; (2) their place of birth and present residence; (3) the sacred order to which they have

¹ Anyone desiring the Latin original will find it in the December (1909) issue of the *American Ecclesiastical Review*, Philadelphia, a very ably edited Catholic monthly.

been ordained, with place and date of ordination; (4) their academical degrees, if any, with place and date of their graduation.

According to the rules governing the Institute *alumni* must be Doctors in Sacred Theology and must have completed the course in scholastic philosophy. These only are, properly speaking, students of the Institute; those who have finished the regular course in philosophy and theology may be enrolled as *auditores* (hearers); the *hospites* (guests) may be admitted to the lectures simply as guests without any conditions.

Every applicant for admission must inform the president whether he wishes to enroll in the list of *alumni*, *auditores*, or *hospites*, and upon reaching Rome must present to the president the original certificate of having finished his theological and philosophical studies, as well as the certificate of the theological degree which he may have won. Moreover, he must bring authentic documents by which the ecclesiastical authorities may ascertain that he comes with the consent and permission of the ordinary (bishop) or the superior of his community, and that the faculties for performing sacred functions have been legitimately granted to him.

Students intending to prepare themselves for the examinations before the Pontifical Biblical Institute for the degree of Licentiate (*prolytatus*) are admitted on condition that they attend all lectures and exercises, regularly, unless specially or legitimately dispensed. The studies marked * in the subjoined program are obligatory. None except *alumni* are admitted to the conferences or practical exercises marked † unless it be those who are qualified to lend therein an active coöperation.

No fee will be charged for enrolling, class work, or use of the library.

All students of the Institute, whether *alumni*, *auditores*, or *hospites*, may suit their own convenience as to board and lodgings in the various colleges or religious houses of the city, as the Institute is not concerned in such things.

3. *Distribution of Studies.* In conformity with the rules of the Institute the subject-matter (*materia*) of the studies is chiefly that required by the Pontifical Bible Commission for the conferring of academical degrees. To these will be added the pursuit of other subjects which may lead to a more extensive knowledge of biblical science in general.

As for those subjects required for the degree of Licentiate under the heading, "rules for the examination" (*ratione periclitandæ doctrinæ*) they are distributed in a two-years' course, in such a way that about one half may be taken every year. As to the preparation for the degree of Doctor, which requires much study and greater individual and private application, all candidates may profit greatly during the biennial course (or when that is completed during the third year), by the methodological and bibliographical work and the conferences given for the benefit of those aspiring for the Doctor's degree.

Aside from the required lectures and exercises, students may also, with the advice and consent of the president, elect other lectures and exercises which they may deem profitable. As a rule, the same course of study is not suitable for all, and for that reason the same lectures and exercises will not be attended by all students; but lest any may be led in the wrong direction, it will be well for all to consult invariably their superiors in selecting courses.

4. *Beginning of the Lectures.* Lectures and exercises, by the goodness of God, will begin November 5, 1900.

5. *Examinations for the degree of Licentiate in Sacred Scripture before the Pontifical Bible Commission.* There will be two examinations for the above degree during the coming year; the first on November 15, 16, and 18, in the other toward the end of June.

LECTURES AND PRACTICAL EXERCISES OF THE INSTITUTE

The sign * marks the required lectures for the Licentiate; the sign † denotes the practical exercises. The subjects in the left-hand column are studies of the first year, and those on the right side belong to the second, while those covering the entire page apply to both years.

1. *The Method of Study of Sacred Scripture*

†The scientific method in general; the scientific study of the Sacred Scripture in particular; the several parts of biblical study; the auxiliary disciplines pertaining to this study; biblical literature; the most recent biblical books and commentaries.

†The practical study of Sacred Scripture for the priestly ministry.

†The difficulties which meet us in the study of Sacred Scripture.

2. *General Introduction to Sacred Scripture*

*The inspiration and inerrancy of the Sacred Scripture; the laws of biblical hermeneutics; the literal and the typical sense of Sacred Scripture.

The origin and authority of the Masoretic text and its history; the Greek and Oriental versions of sacred Scripture; the history of the canon of the Old Testament.

†The principles of textual criticism and their application to the sacred text of the Old Testament.

The Greek text of the New Testament and its history; history and authenticity of the Vulgate; other Occidental versions of the Sacred Scriptures; history of the canon of the New Testament.

†Practical exercises on the criticism of the text of the New Testament.

3. *Special Introduction to the Different Sacred Books*

*Special introduction to the books of the Old Testament.

*Special introduction to the historical books of the New Testament and to the Epistles and Apocalypse of Saint John.

*Special introduction to the didactic and prophetic books of the Old Testament.

*Special introduction to the Pauline and to the other Catholic Epistles.

4. *Interpretation of the Sacred Text*

*†Exegesis of the Hebrew text First and Second Kings.

*†Exegesis of the Greek text of the four Gospels up to the Passion of Christ.

Selected texts from the historical books of the Old Testament.

Selected texts from the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles.

*†Exegesis of the Hebrew text of Third and Fourth Kings [First and Second Chronicles].

*†Exegesis of the Greek text of the remaining parts of the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles.

Selected texts from the didactic and prophetic books of the Old Testament.

Selected texts from the Epistles and the Apocalypse.

5. *Biblical Theology*

Selected questions from the biblical theology of the Old and of the New Testaments.

6. *Biblical History*

*†History of the Hebrews from Samuel to the death of Solomon.

*†Gospel History.

Selected questions from the other parts of the historical books of the Old Testament; general view of Babylonian and Assyrian history.

*The different sects among the Jews at the time of Christ.

*†History of the Hebrews from the division of the kingdom to the Babylonian captivity.

*†Apostolic history to the first imprisonment of Saint Paul at Rome.

Selected passages from other parts of the biblical history of the New Testament; general view of Egyptian history.

The history of the Jews from A. D. 30-130.

7. *Biblical Geography*

*The inhabitants of Palestine.
 *Geography of Palestine at the time of the Kings.
 Biblical geography of Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia.

*Division of Palestine and topography of Jerusalem at the time of Christ.

*Journeys of Saint Paul.
 Biblical geography of Egypt, Asia Minor, Greece, and Italy.

8. *Biblical Archaeology*

*The calendar and principal sacred rites of the Hebrews.

*The ancient Hebrew synagogues.
 The Tabernacle of the Covenant and the Temple at Jerusalem.

†Greek and Latin paleography:
 Greek papyri and ostraci.

*The most ancient Palestinian inscriptions.

*Weights, measures and coins mentioned in the Sacred Scriptures.

†Semitic paleography: Aramaic papyri.

9. *Biblical Philology*

Higher courses in Hebrew; the Greek of the New Testament.

A course in some one of the other Oriental languages to continue for two years will be offered in alternate years. Hebrew, Syriac, and Coptic will be given next year.

10. *Historical Exegesis*

Judaic exegesis; the exegesis of the Greek and Latin fathers to the eighth century.

Conspectus of historical exegesis from the eighth century to the present time.

PUBLIC CONFERENCES

To attain the end sought by the Apostolic See in founding the Biblical Institute, besides the lectures and exercises, public conferences on biblical subjects will be held, so as to meet the desires and needs of the many desiring biblical instruction.

During the first year public conference will be held to discuss, among other subjects: Palestinian conditions throwing light upon the life of Christ, as related in the Scriptures; the vain efforts of a false science against the truth of the Gospels.

Whenever the nature or character of the subject will permit, the lectures in these conferences will be illustrated by means of electric projections (*projectionibus electricis*).

Further details will be announced in due time and place.

THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTE

The publications issued by the Institute in conformity with the Apostolic letter, *Vinea Electa*, and as the third means to attain the end in view will be of three kinds:

1. *Acta Pontifici Instituti Biblici*. These will contain information regarding the work and affairs of the Institute, and will be issued whenever opportune or necessary.

2. Besides the *Acta* and as soon as possible, there shall appear *Commentationes* of the Institute. This biblical quarterly will pay special attention to everything of prime importance in biblical studies, and will vigorously endeavor to encourage by erudite elucidations the study of the Bible in all its branches, and all subjects related to it.

3. *Scripta Pontifici Instituti Biblici*. These will be works and pamphlets in harmony with the injunctions of the *Vinea Electa*, and of three kinds (1) a scientific-theoretical series for erudite biblical investigations; (2) a scientific,

practical series for the exposition and defense of Catholic truth regarding the sacred books; (3) a scientific-popular series, having in view the dissemination and popularization of sound teaching regarding the Bible.

Of the above publications the *Acta* will contain nothing except that announced officially by the Institute. The *Commentationes* and *Scripta* are open for all, and contributions will be accepted from every quarter, provided, of course, that such contributions meet the requirements naturally expected in such works. Moreover, the Institute earnestly requests all those who have at heart the true progress of biblical knowledge, and are qualified to assist the Institute by sending erudite dissertations and disquisitions on biblical topics, and also books and pamphlets to appear in the triple series of the *Scripta*. Contributions need not be in Latin or Italian, but may be written in English, French, German, or Spanish.

It is also requested that authors and editors of books or brochures on biblical studies send their publications to the Institute, and, for this double purpose: (1) that all such works may be noticed in the *Commentationes*, and (2) that an abundance of additional and subsidiary biblical literature may be always at the disposition of the students in the Institute library.

And to attain the above twofold end, it would be highly desirable and opportune if colleges, institutes, societies, editors, and publishers should exchange publications in any way touching upon biblical science with those of the Institute.

Information regarding subscriptions to publications of the Institute or any phase of its work will be published from time to time in the *Acta*, on sale at Bretschneider's, Via del Tritone 60.

NOTES FROM ROME

The excavations of the Roman Forum have reached the point where stands the present church of Sant' Adriano. This has been constructed out of the remains of the ancient Curia Iulia, the Senate House of Rome. In the near future this most important ruin is to be divested of the accretions of the centuries and be restored as a monument of the ancient city.

All lovers of the poet Horace will be glad to learn that the Italian Minister of Public Instruction has ordered excavations made to uncover the Sabine villa, which has been for some time quite definitely located at the foot of Mount Campanile, the Lucretills of song. The fountain of Bandusia, rendered immortal by the poet's beautiful words, exists to-day almost exactly as it may have been two thousand years ago, lacking only the oak overhanging the cool waters.

FOREIGN OUTLOOK

NEWEST ASPECTS OF THE STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMA

IN the years 1886-90 Adolf Harnack (as professor at Giessen, then at Marburg, and finally at Berlin) published the first edition of his famous and epoch-making *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (third edition, 1894-97; English translation, *History of Dogmas*, in 7 vols.). It will scarcely be questioned that this is the most significant and influential work of the last half of the nineteenth century in the field of church history; and there is but one work of that period in the whole wide range of the history of religion that has exceeded it in influence, namely, Wellhausen's *History of Israel*. It is, therefore, no wonder that the announcement (in 1908) of a forthcoming new edition of the great work was received with the liveliest interest. Of this edition two volumes have already been issued, and the third and last may be expected soon. Both in matter and form the work—already so admirable—is much improved. That an investigator of Harnack's powers, in spite of his other great labors, must, in the interval of a dozen years or more, have penetrated much more deeply into his subject, and must have brought to light new treasures, was confidently to be expected. In respect of form, however, the alteration has been less than many had expected and desired. Harnack himself had expressed his dissatisfaction with the multitude of footnotes, though he justified them as necessary and inevitable. "Let the in many respects clumsy form of this book remain so long as it represents the difficulties with which the study is still oppressed." And so the hoped-for radical transformation of the book was not undertaken. The time for this seems not yet ripe. Nevertheless, the work in its new form is distinctly better balanced and rounded than in the former editions. Harnack's style is too luminous and plastic to be rendered ineffective by any number of footnotes.

In 1889 Harnack's distinguished pupil, Loofs, published the first edition of his *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*, which, though designed primarily as a basis for his lectures, showed even in its earliest form a considerable amount of independent research. The third edition of the *Leitfaden* appeared in 1893, comprising 500 pages and numbering 4,000 copies. The fourth edition of 1906 comprises more than 1,000 pages, and is in every way a magnificent work. Great as is his debt to Harnack—a debt, by the way, always amply and gladly acknowledged—Loofs has shown himself, not only in this book but also in important special studies in the same field, to be an independent investigator of the very first rank. It is probable that his studies have done more in the last fifteen years to extend the range of knowledge of the history of dogma than those of any other man. Especially noteworthy is his work entitled *Nestoriana* (1905),

but also his remarkable articles in Hauck's *Realencyclopädie* (such as those on Christology, the Lord's Supper, Augustine, Pelagius, etc.). In 1895-98 Reinhold Seeberg (then in Erlangen, now in Berlin) published the first edition of a History of Dogma in two volumes (English translation by Hay). In 1908 and 1910 have appeared the first two volumes of an enlarged and greatly improved second edition of this work. While in matters of historical research less penetrating and fruitful than Harnack and Loofs, Seeberg has great merits as historian of dogma. His style is warm and vivid, his grasp of the factors in the development of dogma is strong and firm, his statement of problems is clear. Besides this it is of value to have so serious and able a presentation of a view of the origin and development of dogma so widely divergent from Harnack's. Especially in his view of the beginnings of dogma, Seeberg has weighty considerations to direct against the position of Harnack. The immense praise unanimously accorded Harnack for his learning, originality, power of combination and freshness of presentation, and especially for his wonderfully clear conception of the organic unity and the tenacity of Catholic dogma, in spite of all variety and change, has not been given without a widespread dissent from his view of the scope of the term "dogma." Harnack uses the word "dogma" in the narrowest sense as a doctrinal statement definitely formulated and expressly sanctioned by the church as the full, adequate, and indispensably necessary expression of the faith. In this restricted sense dogma can properly exist only on the ground of Catholicism. And, indeed, Harnack consistently adheres to this definition, and accordingly follows the Greek development until the dogmatic "petrefaction" in 787, and the Roman Catholic development up to the present; but he touches Protestantism only so far as to set forth "the original position of the reformers, subject, as it was, to contradictions, in relation to church doctrine." Evangelical "statements of the faith" may, he admits, be called dogmas in the wider sense; but his book "pertains not to the universal genus dogma, but to the species, namely, to the specific dogma, as it took shape on the soil of the ancient world and, even if with modifications, is still a power." This very restricted use of the word "dogma" Loofs and Seeberg have not accepted. For Loofs "dogmas are those statements of the faith the acknowledgment of which an ecclesiastical communion expressly requires of its members, or at least of its teachers." Dogma is, accordingly, "churchly-authoritative doctrine." Loofs, however, explains that "the 'dogma' does not need in every instance to be fixed by synods or by means of symbols (creeds); its authority can be otherwise conditioned." Evidently, this definition is broad enough to be applicable to the expressly sanctioned doctrines of the Protestant churches. The Protestant conception of the nature of faith necessarily excludes all thought of identifying dogma with faith; yet, of course, there are doctrinal statements which are expressly sanctioned by the Protestant churches, and so have normative authority in the same. In this view of dogma Seeberg is in full agreement with Loofs. "Not all theological statements are dogmas, but only such as have become church statements." But in 1895 Krüger, and in 1898 Stange, attacked even this less restricted use of the term as being still too re-

stricted. Stange insisted that the express sanction of a church is not necessary to the constitution of a dogma. There are communions which deprecate the formation of any and all dogmas and yet are clearly under the sway of the most specific doctrinal conceptions. For Stange the essential thing in dogma is its *actual normative force* in a religious communion. And the term "communion" may here be taken so broadly as to include not only all definitely organized churches, but also all those special forms of fellowship—it may be within the bounds of an organized church—which, perhaps with little or no technical organization, are united by common religious principles and purposes. In 1899 August Dorner (son of I. A. Dorner) published an Outline of the History of Dogma, in which he conceived his task as the "history of Christian ideas" (*des christlichen Erkennens*)—an extremely idealistic view, with more than a touch of Hegelianism.

Loofs's and Seeberg's definition of dogma clearly extends its scope so as to include the field of Protestantism. But inasmuch as they conceive of dogma as established only by a church's express sanction, they seem forced to close their account of the dogmatic development of the Reformed churches with the Formula Consensus Helvetica (1675), and of that of the Lutheran church with the Formula of Concord (1580), while, of course, the dogmatic development of Roman Catholicism must be followed down to the close of the Vatican Council in 1870. What inferences are to be drawn from such a view of dogmatic history? Shall we conclude that since 1580 or 1675 the Protestant churches have experienced no dogmatic development—have in this respect been at a standstill? Or are we to conclude that the unquestionably actual doctrinal development in these centuries has been quite "undogmatic" in its nature? The protest suggested by these inquiries has recently found very vigorous and effective expression from an unexpected quarter. In essential agreement with the definition of dogma as given by Krüger and Stange, Otto Ritschl, professor of systematic theology at Bonn, son and pupil of Albrecht Ritschl, and pupil of Harnack, has published (1908) the first volume of an ample *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*. In it we find exhibited not only a thorough independence of mind (as shown in his breaking away from the standpoint to which his training might have bound him—the book, nevertheless, being dedicated to Harnack: *in alter Dankbarkeit gewidmet*), but also a wealth of interest in the matter presented. For Ritschl brings many things to light that had been forgotten or disregarded, and sets aright many things that had been generally misunderstood. The present (first) volume, after the weighty and interesting "Prolegomena" of 51 pages, deals with "Biblicism and Traditionalism in the Old-Protestant Theology." Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the book is the unexpected cordial appreciation of the fathers of Lutheran orthodoxy. This from a decidedly "modern" theologian is indeed noteworthy. But it is not designed here to review the book, but only to indicate its general character and its probable significance for the further development of historical and theological science. The work is the fruit of long and patient research and thought, and is sure to provoke earnest discussion and study.

A PROFESSORSHIP AND A COMMISSION FOR APOLOGETICS

ABOUT a year ago a new extraordinary professorship for apologetics was created at Leipzig, and A. W. Hunzinger (born 1871) was appointed to fill the chair. This is the first time in the history of German Protestant theological faculties that this subdivision of systematic theology has had a chair devoted specially to it. Hunzinger has lately been attracting no little attention to his program. At the twelfth General Evangelical Lutheran Conference, in Hanover (September 14-17, 1908), he delivered an address on "Our Apologetic Task," which was received with the greatest enthusiasm. The speaker expressed the belief that a new apologetic age was about to dawn. The faith does not need to be rescued, but there is danger that people will lose their foothold. The church can be a true church of the people only as she is the strongest of all powers to produce or confirm a right view of the universe. The chief task will be to bring this power that is in Christianity so fully to expression in the intellectual life of the present, that German Christian idealism shall awake and shake off naturalism that now lies like an Alp on the people. The way to this end he then sketched, ending with the thought that the church must provide men and organs specially fitted for and devoted to the task of apologetics. From the beginning to the end Hunzinger carried the great conference with him.

In accordance with the proposal of the speaker the Conference determined to establish an Apologetic Commission. Five men—two university professors, two pastors, one gymnasium professor—compose the commission, which will have its seat in Leipzig. The object in view is to organize a bureau of information, especially to serve the needs of teachers, and a system of lectures in the principal cities and towns throughout the country. It is the intention also to establish an apologetic library. The whole movement, of course, will be carried on in general agreement with the standpoint of the Conference, that is, Lutheran orthodoxy.

GLIMPSES OF REVIEWS AND MAGAZINES

THE Hibbert Journal for January might almost be called a Tyrrell number, so much space is given to Father George Tyrrell, the Jesuit priest, a leader of the "liberals" in the Roman Church, protesting against Papal tyranny, and insisting on freedom of thought and of scholarship, especially in biblical criticism and comparative religion, the apostle of modernism in the Papal Church. In the first January article Baron F. von Hugel presents some memorials of the last twelve years of Father Tyrrell's life; and in the second article, the Rev. C. E. Osborne gives his personal impressions as an intimate friend. In addition to these articles, the first review in the department of Book Notices is of Father Tyrrell's last book, now so much discussed, entitled *Christianity at the Cross-Roads*, the deepest and most characteristic of all his writings. The picture given us of Father Tyrrell by his two friends is of an impressive and engaging character: An Irishman, with the Celtic wit and tenderness of heart and subtle grace of imagination, the fire and glow and surge of soul, the sentiment and gayety of the Gaelic blood; a man also of quiet and lonely courage, reared in an atmosphere of plain living and high thinking, disciplined by a frugal and strenuous mode of existence to simplicity, self-control and careful stewardship of time and of all other resources; a man of deep religiousness and delicate spirituality, incurably spiritual, heroic, and amazingly farsighted. To Protestants Father George Tyrrell has seemed recently the most uplifted, gallant and prophetic figure in the Roman Church, making in the name of freedom his passionate protest against the absoluteness of the Papal power, which he considered the greatest obstacle to the progress of Romanism among the civilized nations of the world. He demanded that this autocratic exercise of unlimited authority should be checked and limited. He complained that this arbitrary power transgresses the rights of the individual mind and conscience, transgresses the rights of science and learning and the rights of the State. He provoked the bitter displeasure of the Vatican by speaking out fearlessly and vehemently against the ever-increasing centralization and absolutism of the Papal authority. This Irish Romanist felt, with Lord Acton, that "the very principle of Ultramontanism is profoundly unchristian and immoral." R. F. Horton tells us that Huxley went one day to dine with William George Ward, the typical English Romanist of the modern Romanist reaction. He stepped to the window and peered out of it. Ward asked him what he was doing. "I was looking," said Huxley, "in your garden for the stake, Dr. Ward, which I suppose you have got ready for us after dinner." It was not a joke. Ward's relentless Romish logic was prepared for persecution, if it should again become possible or expedient. Huxley was more religious than Ward. From his bracing air of exact inquiry and fearless acceptance of truth the soul can easily pass into true religion. But from Ward's stifling atmosphere of Romish authority and coercion the soul can only

sink enervated into modern Mariolatry and worship of the Pope. Tyrrell loved the word "Catholic"—he said it was as music to his ears; it brought the whole *orbis terrarum* before his eyes—the world which was embraced in Christ's outstretched arms upon the cross. So do we love the word "catholic"; and in the Apostles' Creed we declare our belief in the holy catholic church. But the Roman Church is not the catholic church. It has no moral right to arrogate to itself that name. Its proper title is "the Roman Church," or a yet more accurately descriptive title would be "the Papal Church." To give it that name is both fair and fit. The declarations of this great Jesuit, who made himself the champion of freedom under a hierarchical despotism, and who fearlessly characterized the Papal power as it deserves, warrant and sustain our contention that the Roman Church is *not* "catholic," and has no moral right to appropriate that name. The claim implied in calling itself "the Catholic Church" is foundationless and false, "Catholic" means "universal," and the Roman Church is not the church universal; it is at best only a part—and by no means the best part—of the Universal Church of Jesus Christ, which is made up of all true Christians under whatever name. The impudence of a part which calls itself the whole is glaring and intolerable. By all outside of its communion it should be called the Papal Church. This is accurate, for it is the one church that has a Pope; that is its distinctive peculiarity. And because it is the Papal Church, ruled by the Pope of Rome, a foreign potentate, it is in America a foreign body with headquarters on the Tiber; standing among us as the one un-American church in our land. And its leaders in this country are boasting that they "have Romanized America"! Their so-called Catholicism is Romanized Christianity. Is it really true that American Christendom has been made, or is to be made, a dependency of the Vatican? What have the great and mighty Protestant bodies to say to such daring claims and avowed purposes? We are glad to have Father Tyrrell's testimony. Tyrrell had no sympathy with the Romanizing wing of the Anglican Church. He called them the "Anglican Ultramontanes" and said that they merely succeeded in reproducing Rome's mistakes without her logic. In the same number of the Hibbert Dr. P. T. Forsyth says: "The Papacy is a heresy. It is quite impossible that it should live in the same house with evangelical faith. To make the Pope the vicar of Christ is heretical." We will add that it is a blasphemous pretense and fraud. On an erroneous exegesis of an ambiguous text in Matthew xvi, Rome has reared the stupendous depotism of the Papacy. Father Tyrrell, the leader of the Modernists, held that Christianity must be before all things evangelical. He had no patience with the merely ethical conception according to which Jesus of Nazareth is but the drawer aside of a curtain, the removal of which leaves face to face "God and my soul, my soul and God." For him the divine Personality of Jesus Christ, and not his ethic merely, was the supreme and central feature of the Christian religion.—Two of the articles in the January Hibbert contrast self-assertion in Nietzsche with self-surrender in Boehme. From the former we quote the following: "Nietzsche's attack upon religion and morality is well worthy of serious consideration. We

must endeavor to appreciate his point of view. He looked out upon the world, and did not, like Saint Paul and the fathers of the church, find human beings rioting in an exuberance of wantonness, but found them for the most part tame, mediocre, undeveloped, without passion, without initiative, incapable even of strenuous wickedness. The modern European is, he says, a tame house animal. It is from this point of view that he attacks those who preach self-sacrifice, repression, ascetic ideals; who constantly harp upon sin and its consequences, and who encourage feelings of remorse, guilty conscience, self-laceration. Our moralists impose additional chains upon those who are already slaves. As opposed to these nihilists, these preachers of destruction, of the negation of life, he teaches that men while in this world should live as fully and abundantly as possible, feel every thrill and ecstasy, discharge their strength; that life is power and the will to power; everything is good that makes for power; everything that makes for weakness is bad. As the crowd seek comfort and a safe and vegetable existence, the strong man or noble man, who aims at fullness and intensity of life and whose goal is beyond man, must scorn the virtues of the crowd and strike out his own plan of life. The crowd will look upon him as a wicked person, a disturber of social order, and will endeavor to suppress him. He will, therefore, be a warrior reveling in danger and opposition, welcoming hardships, rebuffs, misfortunes, as they give him the mastery over himself and over circumstances; fond of adventures, temptations, thrilling experiences, because life is short and he must live to the utmost; viewing life as an æsthetic spectacle; fond of good company and equally fond of bad company, but more a lover of solitude, concealing beneath a gay wantonness an intense seriousness; in the sphere of action a leader of men; in the realm of thought, not a scholar, an interpreter of other men's ideas, but a courageous critic, a free lance, a writer at first hand, a creator. The picture so far is a fascinating one; but it must at the same time be pointed out that Nietzsche's strong man is an egoist, with a lofty contempt for the crowd, without pity for the weak, who treats women not as companions but as dangerous toys, and who is lacking in a sufficient sense of reverence, of duty, and of discipline. In other words, there is in his strong man a good deal of blatant weakness. His strong man will be able neither to command nor to obey; he will become a criminal or a lunatic unless his supermorality comprehends, while it rises beyond, the morality of the crowd. Fullness and intensity of life are good, but there must be barriers and limitations, the life must flow in well-regulated channels. The more intense each passion and desire, and the more intense the 'will-to-power,' the more intense must be the feelings of duty and discipline. Love of danger and adventure is excellent if balanced by a corresponding prudence. An enlightened egoism must include some degree of self-sacrifice and submission to the will of the community. Nietzsche's own overweening egoism was probably one of the contributory causes of his madness. One cannot with impunity attack what men have hitherto held sacred; rules and conventions that have been evolved through centuries of experience must be revered, though they must be modified with changing circumstances."——From the article

on Boehme we take the following: "Philosophy does not exist for its own sake, but for the sake of producing right conditions, and setting men on the right road. We should seek the true only to attain the good. Boehme's philosophy—apparently the most abstract of all—is of all the most practical. From it I learn to avoid mistakes into which ignorance and inexperience naturally fall; and not only to know that they are mistakes but also to see exactly why they are such. Righteousness and sin remain as much as ever the eternal choice for man; but no longer because of the arbitrary command of a Being who can punish me if I do not obey. I am shown the inward reason from a point as near to the divine as is possible to a creature of imperfect faculty. I see the grand, divine Order, that things should *be* rather than *seem*; and understand the natural temptation to a limited creature to prefer above all things to seem, to get credit for his little gifts and graces among those—his fellows—who for the present see only the surface, whereby we feel inclined to have whatever we pride ourselves on, upon the surface and think it of small value if it is not seen of all men. I see that the nature thus qualified must be a surface nature, two-dimensional instead of three; and that it gives rise to a world where surface considerations weigh alone, and men prefer to be reputed to have without having, rather than to have without being reputed to have. Thus I understand the false glory of this world and its cure. This is not so much to give up the desire to be great, as to give up the desire for an inferior sort of greatness which stands in pretense rather than in actuality. I see that sin is only the will of a being hostile to God because it is the will of a being who preferred the false to the true, the apparent to the real, the being thought great to actually being great in the sight of those who can see all that is there. I see that this pretentious greatness is a thin surface over a hollow void, a bubble that must sooner or later burst, and—having no solidity—vanish. It is this love of estimation rather than reality that I must straightway put into the hiddenness; and that the way to do this is to bring out of the hiddenness in myself its contrary, the feeling that virtue is its own reward, that to be really great from center to circumference is far greater than to be applauded by all the blind of this world for what I only seem to be on the circumference. And his is a most helpful perfection. For often I am perplexed how to operate to my self-amendment. Now I know that I have the right thing in me, only it is yet hidden. I have no need to go far and wide—up to heaven, or over the sea—to find what I ought to have, for it is nigh, *in* my heart, and only needs to be discovered and brought to the surface. What benefit to the beggar to dream that he is a king and surrounded by applauding crowds? It only makes him 'cry to dream again,' which means that he does not believe that he can be equally happy in real life. Yet this is a delusion: real life must have greater possibilities than any delusive dream; only the good things of the real cannot be gained by lying down and going to sleep, but only by effort and earnestness as real as the things desired. Many could give us the conclusions here reached. The value of Boehme is not in the conclusions he sets forth, but in the fact that he sees and indicates the premises on which the conclusions rest."

BOOK NOTICES

RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND BIBLICAL LITERATURE

What is Christianity? A Series of Lectures Delivered in the Central Hall, Manchester, England. Two volumes, 12mo, pp. 356, 319. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. New York: Eaton & Mains. Price, cloth, \$2.50.

THE general theme of Vol. I is Christian Doctrine, and of Vol. II Christian Life. The lectures are practical, dealing plainly with religious subjects and questions in a way suited to the miscellaneous audiences to whom they were spoken. A sample is this on Conversion: "The experience of conversion varies in different people. The types are as varied as human temperament. With some it is sudden, convulsive, and exciting; with others it is gradual, gentle, and almost imperceptible. In the Acts of the Apostles the most startling contrasts are placed side by side that we may be preserved from the tyranny of any one type. Saul of Tarsus, with the supernatural accompaniments of light, visions, and healing, is balanced by the Ethiopian eunuch, who was converted as he rode home reading his Bible. The conversion of Lydia, whose heart the Lord opened, is placed alongside that of the Philippian jailer, with its earthquake terror and tragedy. There are twelve gates into the city, and they all lead to the one throne. It is the throne that matters. They come from all points of the compass and in every variety of way, but the one thing common to them all is that they come to God and surrender to his will. That is the essential thing, that every man turn away from iniquity and from his own way to serve the living God. Whether we turn with tears or with dry eyes does not matter, if we turn. Convulsion is no necessary part of conversion, but consent to the will of God is as its very soul. There is in one of the American cities an honored citizen who was for many years a notorious gambler. One Sunday morning he stepped out of the hotel, leaving his companions stripped of everything that could be staked upon the play. His pockets were full of money and I O U's. As he walked down the street in the calm and sunshine of a Sabbath morning, he suddenly loathed himself and the life he lived. He said half-aloud, 'I'll quit.' No one had cared for his soul except a young girl in her teens, and he went to the girl's home to tell her he would be at church that evening. Her father rebuked him, and charged him with having been playing poker all night. 'I have,' he said. 'I am on my way home now, and this is my night's winnings, but I've quit. All this money I will return, and come to service this evening.' He went to service, and sat by the child who had prayed for his soul. At the close of the sermon he rose and said, 'I wish to say that, in God's name, I've quit.' From that day he has been a God-fearing man. Never mind your feelings, Quit!" In the style and matter of the lectures there is wide variety, since they are by a great variety of men, all trying to put the truth home to the plain wayfaring man. One of the aptest and most telling is by

Rev. S. F. Collier, who knows his Central Hall audience and knows what he is about. The subject of it is "The Miracle of Changed Lives." He confronts Blatchford, the editor of the *Clarion*, with his own words written once in reply to the statement that nothing has come of Christianity. To that preposterous falsehood, even Blatchford had to answer: "Has nothing come of it? But almost every noble action and sweet personality in all those nineteen centuries has come of it. A very great deal of our progress has come of it. All the mercy and patience we have in the present, and all the hope we have in the future, has come of it. Moreover, let us remember that the very fact that the gospel of love has lived for so many centuries against long odds and bitter opposition is a proof of its vitality and truth." Mr. Collier says this: "Jesus Christ came to save the lost. I remember a well-known and earnest social reformer saying to me, 'It is no use attempting to deal with certain portions of the community. They are irredeemable. It is waste time, strength, and money.' Then, after a pause, he said, 'I know, Collier, you don't believe that—you think there is a chance for every man.' I replied, 'Of course I do. That is the glory of the gospel I preach. Your gospel of humanity is a gospel full of limitations and ever must be; the gospel of Christ is as wide and effective as the "Whosoever" of its invitation.' We claim that Christianity holds the field against all systems of philanthropy and religion. Other lecturers have dealt in masterly and effective manner with the 'Evidences' for the truth of Christianity. To-day we bring forward what must ever be the decisive argument. There is no lack of testimony. In all classes, in all ranks, in all countries, men and women have borne and still bear their testimony to their faith that Christ, and Christ alone, is their Saviour. It would be easy to call as witnesses a vast array of men and women of the keenest intellects and widest experience—leading scientists, foremost statesmen, eminent philosophers, great scholars, most successful business men, labor leaders, all bearing the same testimony to the truth and power of Christianity. But we need not go beyond our own city; we need not step out of this hall. Here men and women who have been the despair of their friends have been restored to nobility of character; men and women who have been most hopeless about themselves have found abundant hope in Christ." Rev. J. Lewis Paton, in a lecture on "Christ and Our Pleasures," says: "Not even in the darkest hour does joy desert the Christian, if he has first given himself to God. God gives him all things richly to enjoy, because he has first given him a gift the worldling refuses to accept—himself. What gladder psalm of triumph was ever written than Paul wrote when held in Nero's grip in the Roman prison?—It is his first and his last word to the Philippians, 'Rejoice, and again I say rejoice.' To bear pain for the sake of Christ, to suffer rather than surrender truth, or in order to save another; to take a blow that was meant for another in order to shield that other; to drudge, to serve, to give up that we may be fellow-workers with God himself in the saving of our fellows; to do all this is joy because it is Love; and love, the death of self, is the real life of man, because it is the life of God himself. It is a great truth, and it

must be learned in the fire." And then he quotes Robert Louis Stevenson's verse:

Come well or ill, the cross, the crown,
The rainbow or the thunder,
I fling my soul and body down
For God to plow them under.

Further on Mr. Paton says: "Just as there is a *happiness of duty*, so, I repeat, there is a *duty of happiness*. If Christians are to make the world happier, the first thing for them is to be happy themselves. Happiness is caught by contagion, and, strange to say, the man who has brought this lesson home to his day and generation better than any other teacher is one whose whole life was one constant struggle against pain and weakness, an exile from the land he loved so well. Listen to Louis Stevenson's evening prayer:

If I have faltered more or less
In my great task of happiness;
If I have moved among my race
And shown no glorious morning face;
If beams from happy human eyes
Have moved me not; if morning skies,
Books, and my food, and summer rain,
Knocked on my sullen heart in vain,—
Lord, Thy most pointed pleasure take,
And stab my spirit broad awake."

Comparative Religion. By W. ST. CLAIR TISDALL, D.D. 16mo, pp. 132. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. Price, cloth 40 cents, net.

THIS is one of the series of Anglican Church Handbooks edited by W. H. Griffith Thomas, D.D. We have already commended some of the volumes. The chapters of this book are summed up in conclusions which, because of their compactness, we quote as a sample of the whole. The question is, What difference do we find between Christianity and other religions which justifies us in holding it to be the absolute religion, and distinct not only in degree but in kind from every ethnic faith? To this the author makes reply as follows: "It is not difficult to answer this question. Christianity is no mere system of ethics, as some hold; it is no confused mass of dogmas, no senseless collection of jejune rites and ceremonies, no tangled jungle of traditions and myths, which have gradually gathered from many different quarters and have hardly yet been systematized. Above all, we must not mistake for Christianity, as do many of our modern opponents, that fallen church which in the Apocalypse is described in language almost too strong and too truthful for the false liberalism of our day to tolerate. Christianity is not a mere religion as other religions: Christianity is Christ. Herein the 'faith once for all delivered unto the saints' differs from all others. One who is not generally accounted by any means an orthodox Christian, and whose evidence is on that account all the more worthy of consideration by those who are not as yet convinced of the truth of Christianity, writes thus of Christ's

mighty influence upon mankind, contrasting it, not with that of the ethnic faiths in their corruption, but with that exercised by the greatest philosophers of ancient times upon their disciples. 'The Platonist,' says Mr. Lecky, 'exhorted men to imitate God, the Stoic to follow reason, the Christian to the love of Christ. The later Stoics had often united their notions of excellence in an ideal sage, and Epictetus had even urged his disciples to set before them some man of surpassing excellence, and to imagine him continually near them: but the utmost the Stoic ideal could become was a model for imitation, and the admiration it inspired could never deepen into affection. It was reserved for Christianity to present to the world an ideal character, which, through all the changes of eighteen centuries, has inspired the hearts of men with an impassioned love, has shown itself capable of acting on all ages, nations, temperaments, and conditions, has been not only the highest pattern of virtue, but the strongest incentive to its practice, and has exercised so deep an influence that it may be truly said that the simple record of three short years of active life has done more to regenerate and soften mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers and all the exhortations of moralists. This has, indeed, been the wellspring of whatever is best and purest in the Christian life. Among all the sins and failings, amid all the priestcraft and persecution and fanaticism that have defaced the church, it has preserved, in the character and example of its Founder, an enduring principle of regeneration.' Again, Christianity differs from all other faiths by containing all the good to be found in the whole of them collectively, but none of their errors and abominations. Ethnic religions have been compared to a stream into which flow two rivulets, one pure and the other foul. In the bed of the river these mingle their waters, though sometimes there may still be detected a part of the current which has partially escaped pollution. Lactantius and other Christian writers of antiquity appeal to the fact that on certain occasions even polytheists confess the unity of God and show some knowledge of him. 'When they swear, and when they express a hope, and when they render thanks, they name—not Jove, nor many deities, but—"God"; to such an extent does truth of itself naturally find expression even from unwilling hearts.' Lactantius points out that in prosperity this occurs much less frequently than in adversity. Amid the threatening horrors of war, when in danger from pestilence, drought, famine, and even a sudden storm, men turn to God, seek aid from him, beg him to come to their assistance. But 'they never remember God except when they are in trouble. After fear has left them and dangers have receded, then indeed do they joyfully run together to the temples of the deities: to them they pour out libations, to them they offer sacrifice, them do they crown with garlands. But to God, whom they had called upon in the stress of necessity, not even in word do they offer thanks.' Underlying polytheism, and even such philosophical pantheism as is to be found in modern India, there still exists in each human heart, even if no longer in book-religions and in systems of philosophy, an innate belief in the one true and living God, who is not a 'Stream of Tendency,' not 'The Unknowable,' nor 'a Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness,' but

the heavenly Father whose name is preserved even in the traditions of the modern savage. In the ethnic religions, on the other hand, we meet with a whole host of lesser divinities, many of them confessedly evil, who have almost entirely led their worshipers away from God. In recalling men to the worship of the Father in heaven, Christianity is a 'republication of natural religion.' Moreover, it thus again proclaims the great truth to which 'the human soul naturally Christian' bears mute witness. It not only avoids introducing other gods but leaves no room for them in the heart of a Christian worthy of the name. In this respect, as well as in many others, we have in Christianity the gold without the alloy, the silver without the dross. As we have already seen, there is good reason to believe that the true knowledge of God shone upon the cradle of our race. The noble vision became veiled, and idolatry with all its attendant abominations shows itself in history as the result of a fall which calls for a restoration, rather than as the starting point of a continuous advance. The noble vision became veiled. Who raised the veil? It was not the priests of the idols. In the history of paganism reformation movements, or at least those of religious transformation, are met with. Buddhism is a noteworthy instance. But it was not a return to the pure traditions of India or of Egypt which made us know that God whom we adore. Was the veil raised by thought, that is to say, by the efforts of philosophers? Philosophy has rendered brilliant services to the world, . . . yet it was not philosophy that restored to humanity the conception of God. Mixed with darkness its rays of light remained scattered, destitute of a focus sufficiently potent to enable them to enlighten the universe. To seek for God, and, consequently, in some degree to know him already, but to stand constantly in front of the altar of a God of whom chosen sages had merely caught a glimpse, and who to the multitude remained an Unknown God—such was the wisdom of the ancients. It prepared the soil, but it did not plant the seed from which should spring up, living and strong, the conception of the Creator, to shade with its boughs all the peoples of the earth. And when this conception did appear in all its splendor and began the conquest of the world, ancient philosophy, which had parted company with pagan worship and had covered it with contempt, formed an alliance with its old enemy. It accepted the most rash explanations of common superstitions in order to be able to league itself with the mob in the contest with the new Power which had just made its appearance in the world. This is the epitome of the history of philosophy in the first period of our era. Modern monotheism is not the offspring of paganism, speaking historically. It was prepared for by ancient philosophy without being produced thereby. Whence, then, does it come? About this there exists no serious difference of opinion. Our knowledge of God is the result of a conception traditionally transmitted from generation to generation in a definite historical course. . . . All the superstitions of which history retains the recollection still prevail to-day either in Asia or in Africa or in the islands of the sea. The most absurd and the most cruel rites are still shone upon by the rays of the same sun that at its setting gilds the spires and domes of our churches. Even to-day there are on earth peoples who

prostrate themselves before animals, or who worship sacred trees. Even to-day, says the lecturer whom we are here quoting, perchance at the very moment when I am addressing you, human victims are being bound by idol priests; before you leave this hall their blood will have stained the altars of false gods. Even to-day many nations, which have lacked neither time to develop themselves, nor all the resources of civilization, nor able poets, nor thoughtful philosophers, belong to the religion of the Brahmans or are taught the legends which clothe the gloomy teachings of Buddha. Where is there to be found the clear conception of the Creator? In an unique tradition which comes from the Jews, which the Christians have spread abroad, and which Mohammed corrupted. It is under the influence of this tradition, and nowhere else, that God is known with that clear and general knowledge which forms the foundation of a doctrine and of a religion. This is a simple fact of modern history, and hardly any fact of history is more thoroughly established. Not only does belief in the one living and true God come to us through Christ, the Messiah promised to the chosen people so long before his advent, but, apart from Christ and his teaching, we moderns have made absolutely no advance in the knowledge of God beyond that of the philosophers of Greece and Rome. Without the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ we should, at best, still be erecting altars to an Unknown God. Christ alone among the great teachers of the world presents to us from the moral side an embodiment of our highest possible conceptions of the Divine. These are not only loftier and nobler than those which the Jews had of old, but—as held by all true Christians—are higher than the conceptions of our greatest modern non-Christian thinkers, such as Spencer and Mill. When a man rejects Christ he soon finds how little he knows about God. He is a lost babe in the wood, he knows not the path home, he can teach nothing that will help his fellows. His creed consists of empty negations. For a time he may still cling to the belief that virtue, honor, purity are not mere vain words; inherited Christian habits may enable him to live an upright though hopeless life. But the flower soon withers when severed from the parent stem. Life lacks an object, exertion a mainspring, existence a goal, when Jesus Christ fades from our view, and with him the Father in heaven whom he has revealed to men. In religious philosophy, too, the debt which we owe to the gospel is great. Egypt may perhaps, as Professor Petrie seems to think, have first in a sense enunciated a theory which may have ultimately developed into some belief in a Divine Logos. The term is also employed in Plato and Philo, whence it doubtless entered into the philosophic language of the first century of our era. But how vast the difference between the vague and impersonal Logos theory of Philo and the 'Word made flesh' of Saint John! To speak of this or any other Christian doctrine as borrowed from any ethnic religion or philosophy is to confound words with things, the shadow with the substance, imagination with fact. But were Christianity as a whole produced from other faiths by some mysterious process of evolution which had actually—in whatever way—brought into existence the historical Christ of the Gospels, that fact, instead of disproving the truth of Christianity, would most

clearly show that, on any system of theism, Christianity was the goal to which God had gradually during past ages been guiding the human race. We may doubtless learn many lessons from the comparative study of religions, but from it at least two facts stand out most distinctly, being proved alike by the aspirations and by the failures of ethnic religions and philosophies. One of these is, the world's deep need of Christ; the other, his uniqueness. This twentieth century of ours, therefore, may well join its voice with that of his disciples of the first in the cry, 'Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life': and well may it exclaim with Augustine, once an unbeliever and a sinner, afterward a faithful soldier of Christ: 'O God, Thou madest us for thyself, and restless is our heart until it rest in thee.'"

PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND GENERAL LITERATURE

Great Issues. By ROBERT F. HORTON. Crown 8vo, pp. 379. New York: The Macmillan Company. Price, cloth, \$1.50, net.

THAT the "issues" discussed in these twelve chapters are "great" all men will agree; with the views presented in the discussion not all men will fully agree; but that the book is stimulating will be conceded even by those who differ with parts of it. A certain reviewer thinks Dr. Horton's Christianity somewhat mystical and undefined and continues further as follows: "The Rev. Robert F. Horton, the author of *Great Issues*, represents the modern recrudescence of muscular Christianity. His will to believe is so strong and large as to admit lodging space for a reasonable amount of alien science and even skepticism. He is a lover of the cerebral watertight compartment. Keep your science and your faith apart and neither will trouble the other. Obviously, this is sound mediævalism; in fact, the merely ancillary position of science is hinted at if not affirmed. Myths, Religion, Morality, Politics, Socialism, Philosophy, Science, Theology, Literature, Art, Life, Death—such are the truly great issues that are here cheerfully elucidated. Mr. Horton's manner has dignity and force, but he strides all obstacles with the seven-leagued boots of the devout pragmatist. The churches seem to be dying, but Christianity is living, is a characteristic paradox. As to the story of Christ, he believes it to be essentially true; but if it were indeed a myth, it would have equal moral claims upon us. For "Christian Science" he entertains a tenderness, since the doctrine seems to provide cash values in personal serenity. Our essayist is widely read, and his illustrations are frequently better than the substance of his discourse. He was at Oxford 'in the days of the æsthetes,' but to judge by the essay on art it did him rather little good. In general he exemplifies a sort of temperamental optimism that easily invents the few intellectual warranties it needs. All his suppositions come out well. For instance, he writes: 'If Protestantism is a failure, as Dr. Newman Smyth implies, and as it would seem from the decay of the Protestant churches on the Continent, the alternative is not a return to Catholicism, but a return to Christianity.'

Our two quotations suggest the mystical and undefined sense that Christianity has in this book. In fact, the landscape of *Great Issues* has no metes and bounds. For that reason genial, long-winded folk of roving mood will like it immensely. Cautious folk who prefer to keep their intellectual bearings may as well be warned off once for all. One must share Mr. Horton's robust religious impressionism to profit by his counsels." Agreeing with this reviewer in the opinion that Dr. Horton's illustrations are often better than the substance of his discourse, we turn to some of the illustrations. Egerton Young went as missionary to a tribe of red men who had never heard the gospel. He dwelt on the Fatherhood of God with great earnestness. Presently a chief, in his feathers and deerskin, rose and said, "White man, do you say that God is the Father of the white man?" "Yes." "And is he the Father of the red men?" "Yes." "Then the red men and the white are brothers?" "Yes." "Why did not our white brothers, if they knew it, come and tell us this before?" In illustration of the well-known fact that actions which once passed unquestioned by conscience become questionable in a fuller moral light, and are finally condemned and put away, the following story is given: "George Grenfell found among the Bengola of the Congo the most revolting cannibalism. Not only were slaughtered enemies eaten, but human butchers kidnapped, bought, or otherwise obtained human flesh, which they fattened for the human market. A morbid passion for this food was common; a chief would kill and eat his wives, and ask the relatives of each slaughtered woman to the banquet; many would dig up corpses in an advanced stage of decomposition for food—the origin, it is thought, of the early Arab stories of ghouls! These customs existed unquestioned and uncondemned. But Grenfell found, on closer acquaintance with the tribe, that all were perfectly conscious of the evil. They knew the taste was depraved, as the drunkard condemns drunkenness. At the touch of the gospel the Bengola become the most devoted and loyal of Christians. They break with their old life; it passes as a horrible dream." Here is an attempt to illustrate the nature of hell: "Facing eternity, that eternity which it does not seem within our power to evade, it is evidently necessary to have a consciousness which, at home with eternal things, has learned to live a life tolerant of an eternal continuance and growth. A life which has become entirely dependent on the things that are passing away might be hardly less desolate and forlorn in an eternal world than one which has heedlessly misused the things of the senses. A Dives in hell might suffer as much as a debauchee or a criminal. For to the thoroughly vicious character the indulgence has ceased to be pleasing, and hell only continues the habit of his life; but for Dives hell means the loss of the comforts and luxuries which were his only pleasures. A man living the luxurious and self-indulgent life of the clubs had one night a dream which altogether changed his course of life. He was in hell, and he knew it. But the strange thing was that he was in the smoking-room of his club, and everything appeared just as usual. He rang the bell, which brought in the waiter, alert and respectful. He asked for the evening papers. 'Yes, sir,' was the reply, and they were

immediately brought. He glanced through them, but could find no interest in them. He rang again. The same deferential waiter was at the door. He ordered a brandy and soda 'Yes, sir,' and it was brought at once. 'Waiter,' he asked, 'where am I?' 'In hell, sir,' was the reply. 'Is this hell?' he cried; 'is it just like this? Will it continue so?' 'Yes, it is just this, and will continue so!' 'Forever?' 'Yes, forever!' Then the horror of it broke upon him. Life had consisted in killing time with the aimless indulgences of the club. He had always congratulated himself on getting through another day, or week, or winter. Though he had always dreaded death, each lapse of the years of life had been a relief. But now here was no time to kill. He might kill years, centuries, millennia, but he would be just where he was—the selfish meals, the cigars, the drinks, the sporting papers. He realized that he was in hell. The supreme problem, then, is to obtain an interpretation, a plan, a mode of life which, having in itself intrinsic value, continued into eternity, would retain and increase its value. Not life is what we want, but life that is life indeed. '*Omnia fui, et nihil expedit*,' said the Emperor Severus—I have been everything and nothing is of any use.' The same burden is in Ecclesiastes, though with a conclusion that offers a clue. It is a commonplace of thought—and it is this which makes Ecclesiastes the most delicately charming book in the Bible to a mind like Renan's—that all the experiences of honor, indulgence, wealth, and power, which are possible for a human being, may leave the soul as hungry and dissatisfied as ever. Though mistaken mortals start out on the old quest, defiant of the world's experience, it remains true that everything which the world offers is in the long run vanity and vexation of spirit." Here is a passage from Dr. Horton about the mission of the artist, which, in a measure, suggests the mission of the minister: "The soul of a man, and the soul of a society, withers and perishes, unless some gifted minds, 'of imagination all compact,' can body forth its ideal, and present it with the images toward which it is to grow. The intrinsic beauty is not always visible to the eye, nor is the harmony of the spheres always audible to the ear. The world looks drab and casual, a rapid succession of vanishing scenes rather than a paradise or a city of God. The sounds which assail the ear are often discordant or unintelligible. The beauty we thought was there is gone, the music we thought we heard is silent. Discouraged and disillusioned, humanity relaxes effort and stops its march. Now is the artist needed. He does not take the place of the prophet or the seer; he is the prophet and the seer. He does not usurp the work of evangelist and apostle, but he is needed to bathe the evangel in the iridescent colors of the heavens, and to carry the apostle forward to the sound of music. He begins the high chant of the things that always were and of the things that are to be. And the mighty process of evolution becomes an ordered march, a march to the melody of which the feet of men can move. 'Mother,' said a child, as the military band marched along the street, 'how is it that the music makes me feel happier than I am?' The answer is one of the great secrets and the justification of all great art. The artist paints his picture or fetches his statue out of the marble, and immediately the world is seen to be a

great landscape or seascape, blossoming, wind-swept, glinting with light; and human forms are seen to be beautiful, even divine. The artist tunes his orchestra and sounds his prelude. Then the great piece proceeds. We are at a high music. All the thoughts of men seem to be transcended; all the experiences of men, the passion, the rapture, the sorrow, the pain, are blended and harmonized. The world seems noble and full of meaning; the heavens bend over it with conscious and palpitating stars." Read that extract over again, and note in how much of it you can substitute "minister" for "artist." To touch life with glory, to make existence seem nobly worth while, to impart the inspiring motives which shall make the hard march easy, to put exhilaration in the place of ennui and good cheer in the place of despondency—all this is the expected and possible work of the preacher of the gospel of Jesus Christ; and he can, if he will, and if he knows his gospel aright, do all this with the solid verities of the "faith of our fathers" more successfully and permanently than the Eddytites can with their metaphysical mist and moonshine of delusion and make-believe, ignoring and denying as they do the concrete facts of science, experience, and life.

Shelley. By FRANCIS THOMPSON. 16mo, pp. 91. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. Price, cloth, \$1.

AN exquisite bit of literature is this essay; and so seldom does anything appear that is real literature and really exquisite, that, when it does, it is a treasure to be prized, and all who love such products should be notified. Back in the eighties of the nineteenth century Bishop Vaughan met the poet Francis Thompson in London and suggested that he contribute an article to the *Dublin Review*. Thus prompted, Thompson in 1889 offered this essay on Shelley. The editor declined the article, and the discouraged author threw it aside, and it was found among his papers after his death. His literary executor offered it again to the venerable quarterly which had declined it nineteen years before, and it was published in the *Dublin Review* in July, 1908, with the result that for the first time in its seventy-two years the *Dublin* had to issue a second edition to supply the demand which clamored for copies of this masterpiece of English prose, this nest of buried jewels, posthumously brought to view and glittering in the sunlight of publicity. One capable critic notified the public with words like these: "Brilliant, joyous, poignant are these pages of interpretation, as sensitive and magical as the mind of one poet ever lent to the genius of another." It set London ringing, as would some splendid music never played till found in the portfolio of some dead composer. Thus the rejected article, which was the brilliant expression of the inward glory of Francis Thompson's youth, becomes his own rich eulogy and epitaph. The pity of the matter is that public appreciation arrives too late to comfort him. Unsuccess, poverty, and hardship made his life bitter and sorrowful, a hapless lot, full of sheer misery; and the medal of honor pinned now on his dead breast accents and intensifies the pathos of his fate. In the introduction prefixed to this essay, Mr. George Wyndham calls it "the most important contribution to pure

Letters written in English during the last twenty years. . . . Matthew Arnold's Essays in Criticism did not reach such heights. They do not, as a rule, handle subjects so pertinent to poetry; and when they do they are outclassed by this essay. . . . The only recent essay on poetry which challenges comparison with Francis Thompson's Shelley is Myers's Virgil. Thompson's style is incomparable in rhythm and profuse illustration. He is rich and melodic, where Myers is sweet and ornate. Thompson's article, though in the form of prose, is pure poetry, and is also in reality, though unconsciously, a human document of intense suffering. This is why it pierces like an arrow to the universal heart of man, and sticks and quivers there." One of Francis Thompson's affirmations is that Shelley was essentially an eternal child, the enchanted child. Listen to this: "In Shelley's poetry we see the winsome face of the child. Perhaps none of his poems is more purely and typically Shelleian than 'The Cloud,' and it is interesting to note how essentially it springs from the faculty of make-believe. The same thing is conspicuous throughout all his singing; it is the child's faculty of make-believe raised to the *n*th power. He is ever at play. The universe is his box of toys. He dabbles his fingers in the day-fall. He is gold-dusty with tumbling amidst the stars. He makes bright mischief with the moon. The meteors nuzzle their noses in his hand. He teases into growling the kenneled thunder, and laughs at the shaking of its fiery chain. He dances in and out of the gates of heaven; its floor is littered with his broken fancies. He runs wild over the fields of ether. He chases the rolling world. He gets between the feet of the horses of the sun. He stands in the lap of patient Nature, and twines her loosened tresses after a hundred willful fashions, to see how she will look nicest in his song." What a picture of an eternal child romping with the universe! Farther on the essay returns to this point as follows: "The poems on which the lover of Shelley leans most lovingly, and which best represent Shelley to him, are some of the shorter poems and detached lyrics, in which Shelley forgets that he is anything but a poet, forgets sometimes that he is anything but a child, lies back in his skiff, and looks at the clouds. He plays truant from earth, slips through the wicket of fancy into heaven's meadow, and goes gathering stars. Here we have that absolute virgin-gold of song which is the scarcest among human products, and for which we can go to but three poets—Coleridge in 'Christabel' and 'Kubla-Khan'; Shelley in 'The Skylark,' 'The Cloud,' and 'The Sensitive Plant'; and Keats in 'The Eve of Saint Agnes' and 'The Nightingale.' These are made of quintessential loveliness, the very attar of poetry." And again, near its end, the essay reverts to the same view of Shelley: "Enchanted child, born into a world unchildlike; spoiled darling of Nature, playmate of her elemental daughters; 'pard-like spirit, beautiful and swift,' laired amidst the burning fastnesses of his own fervid mind; bold foot along the verges of precipitous dreams; light leaper from crag to crag of inaccessible fancies; towering Genius, whose soul rose like a ladder between earth and heaven with the angels of song ascending and descending upon it!" That Shelley never ceased to be a magnified child is reiterated. To the last he retained the idiosyncrasy

of childhood expanded and matured without differentiation. In his life, as in his poetry, he shows the genuine child's power of investing little things with imaginative interest. And even the errors of his life are palliated by Francis Thompson as being due to the irrationalities and unrestrained impulses of a foolish child. And it was no enmity of circumstances, but his own unreasonable and ungoverned nature that was responsible for Shelley's mistakes and unhappiness. Thompson calls "Prometheus Unbound" the greatest and most prodigal exhibition of Shelley's powers—an "amazing lyric world where immortal clarities sigh past in the perfumes of the blossoms, populate the breathings of the breeze, throng and twinkle in the leaves that twirl upon the bough; where the very grass is all a-rustle with lovely spirit-things, and a weeping mist of music fills the air. The final scenes especially are such a Bacchic reel and rout and revelry of beauty as leaves one staggered and giddy; poetry is split like wine and music runs to waste. The choruses sweep down the wind, tirelessly, flight after flight, till the breathless soul almost cries for respite from the unrolling splendors." It is interesting to find Francis Thompson saying that the one thing which prevents Shelley's "Adonais" from being perfect is its lack of Christian hope. Thompson can take no comfort in the prospect of a mere pantheistic immortality, "whose wan countenance," he says, "is as the countenance of a despair." A poor immortality, indeed, it is that thrusts you into the maw of Nature and circulates your dissolved elements through her veins. Thompson's essay does not ignore the evil side of Shelley's life, but thinks that through it all there was a blind and stumbling effort toward higher things. He is not considered genuinely corrupt of heart as was Byron, "through the cracks and fissures of whose heaving versification steam up perpetually the sulphurous vapors from his central iniquity." It is not believed that any Christian ever had his faith shaken through reading Shelley, unless his faith were shaken before he read Shelley. Thompson argues that no one really corrupt and carnal could write poetry so consistently ethereal as Shelley's. He says "we should believe in nothing if we believed that, for it would be the consecration of a lie. The devil can do many things. But the devil cannot write poetry. He may mar a poet but he cannot make a poet. Among all the temptations wherewith he tempted Saint Anthony, though we have often seen it stated that he howled, we have never seen it stated that he sang." Shelley's heresies were borrowed, it is claimed, from the French Revolution in a wild and frenzied period; and it is said that the religion around him was a spectral Christianity, unable to permeate and regulate human society. The radical defect which mildews our contemporary poetry in general, according to Francis Thompson, is the predominance of art over inspiration, of body over soul. Writers, even those of high aim, are overdeliberate in expression. This results in choosing the most ornate word, the word farthest from ordinary speech. In prose, Henry James is an example of this. It affects even writers who aim at simplicity, for "nothing is so artificial as our simplicity. We are self-conscious to the finger-tips; and this entails loss of spontaneity and insures that whatever poets may be born, the spirit of Shelley is not

likely to find a reincarnation among us. An age that is ceasing to produce childlike children cannot produce a Shelley." Touching on the familiar, but sometimes overlooked, fact that emotion cannot be stable, that feeling inevitably fluctuates, the essay before us says: "Even love seems to have its tidal moments, lapses, and flows. Love is an affection, its display is an emotion; love is the air, its display is the wind. An affection may be constant; an emotion can no more be constant than the wind can constantly blow." Referring to Robert Browning's wooing of Elizabeth Barrett, Francis Thompson mints this image: "Browning stooped and picked up a fair-coined soul that lay rusting in a pool of tears." In closing our notice of this brilliant essay, a literary masterpiece barely redeemed from oblivion, we must say that we are less convinced by Francis Thompson's insistence that Shelley belongs to the Metaphysical School than by his characterizing of Shelley as a child. The latter view we can accept as largely true; but an essential child is not metaphysical.

The Wrong and Peril of Woman Suffrage. By JAMES M. BUCKLEY, LL.D. 12mo, pp. 128. New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. Price, cloth, 75 cents net.

THIS is the latest output of Dr. Buckley's prolific authorship. Antecedent probability and an examination of the book unite to convince us that this is as strong and as complete an argument against woman suffrage as can be made. It is "dedicated to men and women who look before they leap"; and is a serious, solemn, and deeply earnest plea, in the interest of both sexes, for the very foundations of human well-being. So the author intends, and so the majority of readers, both men and women, will doubtless feel. Lifelong study of the subject has settled Dr. Buckley in the conviction that "to impose upon woman the burdens of government in the state would be a 'Reform against Nature' and an irreparable calamity." Four chapters review the history of woman suffrage in France, England, and the United States. Five chapters refute the arguments advanced in favor of woman suffrage. Seven chapters set in impressive array the vital objections to woman suffrage. One chapter cites and quotes from a few of the notable instances in which eminent and influential men, who for a time favored woman suffrage, were led by deeper and more serious consideration of the nature of womanhood and its relation to society to reverse their opinions. Among these are Horace Bushnell, John Bright, Herbert Spencer, Mr. Gladstone, and Bishop John H. Vincent, the founder of Chautauqua, who has distributed diplomas to thousands of women in recognition of their completing the extended course of reading and study prescribed by the Chautauqua Literary and Scientific Circle. We quote Bishop Vincent's statement of his matured judgment: "When about thirty years of age I accepted for a time the doctrine of woman suffrage, and publicly defended it. Years of wide and careful observation have convinced me that the demand for woman suffrage in America is without foundation in equity, and, if successful, must prove harmful to American society. I find some worthy women defending it, but the majority of our best women, especially our most intelligent, domestic, and godly mothers, neither ask for nor desire it. The instinct of motherhood is against it. The basal con-

viction of our best manhood is against it. The movement is at root a protest against the representative relations and functions by virtue of which each sex depends upon and is exalted by the other. This theory and policy, tending to the subversion of the natural and divine order, must make man less a man and woman less a woman. A distinguished woman advocate of this suffrage movement says, 'We need the ballot to protect us against men.' When one sex is compelled thus to protect itself against the other, the foundations of society are already crumbling. Woman now makes man what he is. She controls him as babe, boy, manly son, brother, lover, husband, father. Her influence is enormous. If she use it wisely, she needs no additional power. If she abuse her opportunity, she deserves no additional responsibility. Her womanly weight, now without measure, will be limited to the value of a single ballot, and her control over from two to five additional votes forfeited. The curse of America to-day is in the dominated partisan vote—the vote of ignorance and superstition. Shall we help matters by doubling this dangerous mass? Free from the direct complications and passions of the political arena, the best women may exert a conservative and moral influence over men as voters. Force her into the same bad atmosphere, and both man and woman must inevitably suffer incalculable loss. We know what woman can be in the 'commune,' in 'riots,' and on the 'rostrum.' Woman can, through the votes of men, have every right to which she is entitled. All she has man has gladly given her. It is his glory to represent her. To rob him of this right is to weaken both. He and she are just now in danger through his mistaken courtesy." The argument presented by Dr. Buckley in this book is more complete and cogent than that which he made in the Century Magazine some years ago, which Senator George F. Hoar called "the strongest ever made against suffrage for women." Dr. Buckley closes his powerful book, and we our quotations therefrom, with what he calls his creed: "As the suffrage is but one of several subjects related to woman's rights and privileges, it is due to the writer, as well as to the reader, to state his creed concerning woman. I believe that for many ages woman has been grievously oppressed, and that in various parts of the world she is still oppressed. I believe that woman's intellectual powers are equal to those of man; that the same faculties and tendencies exist in both sexes, and that some of them are the same in strength, while others differ in strength and rapidity of action; that nature gave to woman as one of her most important functions that of refining man; and that as woman is the chief guardian and teacher of children from their birth, she is naturally endowed with greater quickness of the senses, of thought, speech, and watchfulness. I believe in coeducation for some young men and women and in separate education for others, the selection depending on the special characteristics of each, and in the higher education of woman and rejoice to promote it—provided that the normal dissimilarity in the constitution of the sexes—a difference but not a scale of inferiority or superiority—is not ignored or underestimated. If that be not recognized, the proper characterization of such culture is the lower education. I believe in woman's right to enter and practice the

professions; and see no incongruity in her speaking in any assembly which gives her the right so to do—provided she preserves her womanly delicacy. *I believe* in woman's being athletic, and that it is wise for her to use all healthful exercises in preparation for her numberless burdens. But should she become as strong as the legendary Amazons, I would not have her join the army or the navy. On similar principles I would have her cultivate and enrich her mind to the highest degree compatible with her situation and responsibilities; but for the reasons given in this book, *I believe* that neither the state, the family nor woman herself would be benefited, but, on the contrary, would be injured, if she were invested with the suffrage. *I believe* that there are two objects in nature alike obnoxious—a mannish woman and a womanish man; also in the wisdom as well as the wit of the toast offered at a banquet, a day after woman suffrage went into effect in one of the states of the Union: 'The Ladies: *Our superiors yesterday, our equals to-day.*'" Whoever reads Dr. Buckley's book will not need to read any other book on that side of the subject.

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, AND TOPOGRAPHY

Recollections. By WASHINGTON GLADDEN. Crown 8vo, pp. 434. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Price, cloth, \$2.

IN May, 1909, at the age of seventy-three, Dr. Gladden writes: "The record of the family Bible, and the reflection of gray hairs in the looking-glass, would make out that with me it is late October; but the tingle in my blood and the scenery of the garden and the heart insist that it is 'the high tide of the year.'" Nevertheless, this youthful veteran has reached the time when life is mostly retrospect, and when reminiscences bloom like purple asters along the country roadside in November. He says his story is that of an average American who, living through momentous decades, has been a sympathetic observer of men and things and who in this volume records some of his observations. Such records and comments, made by a capable reporter of and participator in events, are usually of interest both to those who, with him, have lived through the same period, and to the younger generation coming after. Recalling his school days, the author pays this tribute to one of his teachers: "His power of arousing and inspiring students, of appealing to all that was best in them, of making fine ideals of conduct attractive to them, was quite exceptional. He found me a listless and lazy pupil; he left me with a zest for study and a firm purpose of self-improvement. It was a clear case of conversion, and when anyone tells me that character cannot be changed through the operation of spiritual forces I know better." One of the author's college mates at Williams was Henry M. Alden, afterward editor of *Harper's Monthly*, of whom it is here written: "Alden's forte was metaphysics; he was supposed to be occupied mainly with interests purely transcendental, absorbed in investigating the 'Thingness of the Here'"—which recalls a verse of Louis Stevenson's "Spae Wife":

O, I wad like to ken—to the beggar-wife says I—
The reason o' the cause an' the wherefore o' the why,
Wi' mony anither riddle brings the tear into my e'e.
—*It's gey an' easy spierin'*, says the beggar-wife to me.

Yes, it's easy to ask questions; but to answer—there's the rub. Yet the mind that doesn't question searchingly never gets anywhere. Dr. Gladden says that "If the Harpers had come to Williamstown in the late fifties inquiring for a young man who would be a skillful purveyor of short stories and poems and sketches for a popular magazine, the last student to whom they would have been sent was Henry Mills Alden. . . . Just how Alden ever got down from cloudland to an editorial chair in Franklin Square I have never been able to find out, but it is well for the world that he came, and perhaps the world has been the gainer by his early residence in cloudland. We get our best training for work in this world by living above it." In 1860 Gladden became pastor of the First Congregational Methodist Church in Brooklyn, New York, a little company of seceders from the Methodist fold because of a quarrel about a minister—a foolhardy and foredoomed enterprise, which recalls Dr. Whedon's sarcastic phrase, "An infant reprobate, damned before it was born." With the usual fatuity of such foolish folk, this handful of malcontents called an untrained boy named Washington Gladden to take charge of them. The boy, looking back with the wisdom of riper years, writes: "I am entirely sure now that this was a place where angels would have feared to tread; that was why I rushed in." How slavery was defended as late as 1860 even by some Northern men appears in the following incident: "One sermon which was preached in one of the most conspicuous pulpits of the city, during that summer, raised some excitement. The preacher was the Reverend Henry J. van Dyke, one of the most honored and influential of the Presbyterian pastors, father of Dr. Henry van Dyke of Princeton University, and the sermon was a closely reasoned and forcible argument to prove that abolitionism and infidelity were synonymous terms; that no man could be an abolitionist without being an infidel. The argument, of course, was scriptural; it was easy to show that slavery was a biblical institution; that the holders of slaves had in many cases been inspired men; and that laws under the imprimatur of Jehovah himself had enjoined slavery. This was a demonstration that God had made himself responsible for the institution, and that opposition to it was rebellion against him. The logic was relentless; the conclusion was one of many monstrous results, which, upon the assumption of the inerrant authority of the whole Scripture, are inescapable. It was tragical to see a man of the acumen of Dr. van Dyke writhing in the coils of such a conception." Of Emerson's manner in lecturing, Gladden says: "His manner was so quiet and deliberate, there was so little of what is called 'oratory,' that most of the audience voted it tame. His manuscript was a pile of loose leaves, which he fumbled over and turned back quite frequently, sometimes losing his place. On an occasion in Boston the audience waited a minute or two while he shuffled his leaves. At last he found the sentence he was hunting for—the

last sentence of his lecture. One auditor remarked to another, "We had to wait a long time for that last sentence, but it was worth waiting for." The writer of this book notice once had to introduce Emerson and chaperone him through a lecture. Now and then the lecturer in pushing his leaves about would shove some of them off the desk. Sailing off through the air, they lit here and there on the platform. Part of the chaperon's function was to pick them up and replace them on the desk. Of Robert Bonner, proprietor of the New York Ledger, Dr. Gladden tells us that, though the literary quality of that paper may not have been of the highest, it was the owner's purpose to keep it pure. Bonner said: "I tell all my editors that nothing must ever appear in our paper that would trouble my Scotch Presbyterian mother if she should read it after prayer meeting." In 1871 Gladden came to New York as one of the editors of *The Independent*. Speaking of notable frequenters of the editorial sanctum, our narrator says: "A fresh and piquant personality who often enkindled our spirits by his presence was the Reverend Gilbert Haven, afterward bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, a man with whom it was delightful to disagree, and who had the happy faculty of stating with perspicuity the things which you knew you did not wish to believe. To few men do I owe a larger debt than to some who have put clearly before my mind the things which I knew to be untrue. It would be unfair to 'Gil' Haven, as we then familiarly named him, to leave the matter here. I suppose that I agreed with him in ten matters where I disagreed in one; but there were various theological questions on which our differences were sharp, and his delightfully incisive and perfectly good-natured way of defining those differences was extremely serviceable." Of the Brooklyn pulpit in the seventies Dr. Gladden writes: "The popularity of Mr. Beecher was still undimmed; it was difficult to gain admission to his church at any preaching service. Dr. R. S. Storrs had taken a new lease of preaching power, and his audiences, though less thronged, were enthralled by his majestic eloquence. Talmage was at the top of his fame; his great tabernacle was always crowded, and his unparalleled acrobatics, physical and rhetorical, were an astonishment to many." In 1878, Dr. Gladden, then a pastor in Springfield, Massachusetts, added to his work as pastor the editorship of a monthly published there, named *Sunday Afternoon*, a Magazine for the Household, the principal purpose of which was to discuss such practical problems as were indicated in the editor's prospectus thus: "How to mix Christianity with human affairs; how to bring salvation to the people who need it most; how to make peace between the employer and the workman; how to help the poor without pauperizing them; how to remove the curse of drunkenness; how to get the church into closer relations with the people to whom Christ preached the gospel; how to keep our religion from degenerating into art, or evaporating into ecstasy, or stiffening into dogmatism, and to make it a regenerating force in human society—these are some of the questions to be asked and answered." A pretty urgent list of questions, now as then. When Gladden moved from the hill country of New England to Columbus, Ohio, he was for a time depressed by the change of scenery. Hear him: "The hills to which I had

been wont to lift up my eyes, and from which had often come my help, were nowhere in sight; the flatness and monotony of the landscape were a perpetual weariness. I put all this out of my thought as much as I could, but, at first, it was hard to bear. The time came when this craving ceased to give me pain, and I have learned to take great pleasure in the quieter beauty of these fertile plains and river-bottoms, and can now fully understand why the *Hollanders find a keen delight in their own flat country, and why the artistic impulse has flourished there far more splendidly than in Switzerland*; but nothing of this was credible to me in those first months in Columbus." In 1893 Dr. Gladden was the Yale lecturer on the Lyman Beecher Foundation, the lectures being published under the title, "Tools and the Man: Property and Industry under the Christian Law." He also gave a course of lectures at our Drew Theological Seminary on "Christianity and Socialism." Discussing the Negro problem as it stands to-day, Dr. Gladden says: "If the main thing to be done for the Negro is to keep him in ignorance and subjection, that is a task which requires no great amount of art—nothing but hard hearts and brutal wills. There is physical force enough in the nation to hold him down for a while; how long that dominion would last I will not try to tell. The civilization built on that basis will fall, and great will be the fall of it. We have had our admonition already—a war that cost six hundred thousand lives and twelve billions of dollars—and the bills are not paid yet. That is a slice of the retribution due for trying to build a civilization on prostrate manhood. If we are not satisfied with that, if we insist on trying the same experiment over again in a slightly different form, another day of judgment will come, and will not tarry. We shall get it hammered into our heads one of these days that this is a moral universe; not that it is going to be, by and by, but that it is moral now, moral all through, in tissue and fiber, in gristle and bone, in muscle and brain, in sensation and thought; and that no injustice fails to get its due recompense, now and here. The moral law admonishes us not to make our fellow man our tool, our tributary. 'Thou shalt treat humanity'—it is Kant's great saying—'ever as an end, never as a means to thine own selfish end.' Disobey that law, and the consequence falls. Evade it no man ever does for so long as the wink of an eyelid. Its penalty smites him with lightning stroke; he is instantly degraded, beclouded, weakened by his disobedience. Virtue has gone out of him; the slow decay is at work by which his manhood is despoiled. The same law holds in all realms. It is as sure and stern in its dealing with races as with persons. The stronger race that tries to treat the weaker not as an end, but as a means to its own selfish ends, plucks swift judgment from the skies upon its own head. On such a race there will surely fall the mildew of moral decay, the pestilence of social corruption, the blight of its civilization. This is not Northern fanaticism. It is a truth which has been uttered more than once, with the emphasis of conviction, by strong men in the South. It is not the view which prevails there to-day, but it is a view which is held there by a strong minority of the ablest men, and it must prevail. There are men at the South to-day who know and say that the task which the Negro presents to the South

and the nation is not the task of keeping him in subjection, but the task of lifting him to manhood and giving him the rights and responsibilities that belong to a man. 'The best Southern people,' says President Alderman, of the University of Virginia, 'are too wise not to know that posterity will judge them according to the wisdom they use in this great concern. They are too just not to know that there is but one thing to do with a human being, and that is to give him a chance.'" Dr. Gladden quotes also the wise and noble words of President Kilgo, of Trinity College, North Carolina, on behalf of the Negro: "He lifts his dusky face to the face of his superior, and asks why he may not be given the right to grow as well as dogs and horses and cows. For a superior race to hold down an inferior one that the superior race may have the services of the inferior was the social doctrine of mediævalism. Americans cannot explain why they shudder at the horrors of the tenth and eleventh centuries, and are themselves content to keep the weak in their weakness in order that the strong may rule better." Dr. Gladden has no sympathy with the demand for a big navy. He believes that the day of disarmament among the nations is nigh, and that our nation is called of God to take the initiative in it. He also is not blind to Theodore Roosevelt's limitations. Yet he calls him "the most forceful figure yet seen in our national history," and he says no other man has done so much to promote peace on earth, citing in evidence "that glorious deed by which he put an end to the war between Russia and Japan; the return of the indemnity money to China; the convention with Japan, negotiated by Elihu Root, but giving expression to Roosevelt's good will." Dr. Gladden wonders whether any man with such tremendous energies as Roosevelt's, always in full play, ever made fewer mistakes; and he is sure that "no other man since Lincoln has poured into the life of this nation such a stream of vitalizing influence." Speaking of the conditions which Mr. Roosevelt faced, at the beginning of his administration, the author says: "Vast combinations of wealth, created by the law and endowed with superhuman powers, were using these powers for purposes of spoliation—plundering the many for the enrichment of the few. To disentangle this piratical business from honest business, to protect legitimate enterprise and prevent and punish predatory schemes—this was the task set before him. Clearly, this must somehow be done; unless it could be, democratic government was a failure. And Mr. Roosevelt addressed himself to this Herculean task with a courage, a determination, and an enthusiasm which have won for him the admiration of the world. The men who have been making enormous fortunes by piratical methods, and those who have wished to do so, have been greatly enraged by Mr. Roosevelt's activity; they hate him with a perfect hatred, and with honest cause; they have done what they could to discredit and destroy him. But the people know that he has made no war on honest industry; that he has only sought to put an end to plunder and to give every man a fair chance. The Roosevelt policies are fairly well understood by the people, and any attempt to recede from them will provoke a reaction which will not be profitable to the opposing interests. The Roosevelt policies mean simply honesty, justice, fair play; and any business which

is too big to learn these lessons is too big to live in this country. . . . We had laws enough to prevent all these robberies; they were practically a dead letter; it was the will of Theodore Roosevelt that gave them life and power." We end our quotations from Dr. Gladden's interesting book with this bit: "We hear people, in these days, denying the supernatural. It is a little as if the planets should proclaim that there is no such thing as space, or as if the rivers should declare that there is no such thing as water. We cannot lay our hand on life anywhere without feeling the thrill of that SOMETHING MORE which underlies all law and eludes all physical analysis." A stirring and gladdening collection of recollections is this volume.

A Memoir of the Right Honorable William Edward Hartpole Lecky. By his Wife. Crown 8vo. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. Price, cloth, with portrait. \$2.50, net.

THE finest of recent biographies in America is that of Alice Freeman Palmer by her husband. One of the finest of recent biographies in England is this memoir of W. E. H. Lecky by his wife. Both books are models of good taste, sincerity, discretion, and moderation; though the former is a more intimate revealing, and has the greater charm and the more vivid warmth, which is partly due, no doubt, to the fact that it is a woman's life. Lecky's life was an extraordinary example of carefully economized forces. A fair, quiet, gentle, studious boy, with intellectual tastes, there was nothing of the riotous young barbarian in him. He was so sensitive that the rough contacts of school life sometimes drove him to distraction, and harsh city noises were a distress to him all his life. A lifelong student, he often took his books and hid away somewhere, far from everybody he knew; and especially, he says, "in long solitary mountain walks I calmed my mind and systematized my thoughts." A very significant phrase is that—"systematizing my thoughts"—no discipline of the mind is more important. It gave to Lecky's writing and speaking the qualities of clarity, consecutiveness, and a sense of proportion. The power to systematize one's thoughts distinguishes the master from the tyro. Only he who has, by self-training, acquired such mastery and orderliness of mind can properly be called a thinker. The best way of acquiring this power is to write or to prepare for public speaking. Then a man is compelled to arrange his thoughts by some rule or principle of rational coördination. The men who have to speak in public or to write are under necessity of systematizing their thoughts and have the best possible opportunity for becoming thinkers. Lecky was fond of oratory, and liked to take the opposite side in an argument. One of his devices for stimulating the brain was to write *kneeling* on a sofa, in order to shut off circulation from the lower limbs and so force more blood to his head. At twenty-two he had written his *History of Rationalism*, and at thirty his *History of European Morals*, and had a permanent place among great historians. His *History of England in the Eighteenth Century* came later. His last book was made up of moral meditations and reflections, and entitled *The Map of Life*. That this great scholar did not believe in being all head and no heart, appears in this criticism:

"Some people are mere aspiring intellects, like the pictures of cherubims by the old masters—heads and wings and nothing more." In early life his head was very full of theology and he inclined toward a clerical career, but for this his too delicate physique unfitted him. The faith that was in the young scholar speaks in a letter from the top of the Rigi: "The evidences of Christianity are irresistible. . . . I believe that it is a man's duty to prove his creed, to seek for truth reverently, humbly, and sincerely, praying for the guidance of the enlightening Spirit, and, by good works, seeking for himself the fulfillment of the promise, 'He that doeth the will of my Father shall know the doctrine, whether it be of God.'" When friends suggested to young Lecky the law as a profession he responded: "I have no interest in it. I should hate doing people's quarrels for them; and the very highest position for a lawyer—Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench—would, I should think, be intolerable." Like other sensitive and conscientious workmen, Lecky had his fits of dissatisfaction with his work, and moments of discouragement. Once he wrote, "As a writer I have failed so egregiously, utterly, and hopelessly that I have lost almost every particle of confidence and courage I ever possessed." But he struggled out of that Slough of Despond, and not very long after, with chastened self-confidence, steadier purpose, and more patient persistence, he began the laborious though congenial task of writing his *History of Rationalism*. Shortly after this he wrote to a friend: "Those who *try to do their duty* find in the effort its own reward; it dispels every fear, it dispenses with restless ambition. Not all can be great teachers, preachers, or philanthropists, but all, if they labor honestly and self-sacrificingly, can do something in two great fields of duty—the alleviation of sorrow and the correction of error." Once he told a friend, "So far, I have never succeeded in being even approximately happy, except when working hard." In Rome Lecky heard Dupanloup of Orleans preach to enormous crowds, and wrote, "He preaches like a charge of cavalry, very fiery, but sometimes very touchingly, and sometimes in an odd, familiar, discursive style." On the progress toward materialism in France, Lecky once wrote, "The French are at present discussing with terrific energy the question whether they are mind or matter, and (under the guidance of Renan, Littré, and Taine) are coming very rapidly to the conclusion that they are only matter." Even when his *History of Rationalism* had been completed and was making him famous, Lecky wrote, in a fit of disgust due to reaction from prolonged effort, "I am so sick of writing. It is dreary, frigid occupation. I feel like throwing pen, ink, and paper into the fire." Lecky's pen had a sharp point. When some criticism of his views appeared in *The Anthropological Review*, he referred to it as "a review set up, I believe, by some scientific gentlemen who say they are monkeys." He tells us Carlyle's characterization of August Comte as "the ghastliest algebraic factor that ever was taken for a man." Lecky tells us that Herbert Spencer was very confident when he was writing his *Sociology* that it would be a complete explanation of life; but while explaining life Spencer quite forgot the existence of domestic relations, and had to put them in as an after-

thought, and then try to explain that apparently unimportant part of human life, which, of course, he did as completely as he explained the rest. Believing as he did in the inferiority of woman, the place of the home in human society naturally did not, for a long time, occur to Spencer; still, a gentleman who proposes to make a complete explanation of life would do well to take the women and the home into his account. The world has been overburdened with explanations that did not explain; and ambitious philosophers like Spencer have furnished a large proportion of the same. Huxley was another very positive and downright old dogmatist who held strongly that men are greatly superior to women, not only intellectually, but also morally, and in point of personal beauty; which, Lecky thinks, "must be very consolatory to us men." What ungallant old curmudgeons some of these "scientific gents" are! Lecky was by nature and by conviction an intuitive philosopher, and the belief in an original and innate moral faculty was the keynote of his life. When some of his constituents of Trinity College, Dublin, inquired concerning his religious creed, he replied, "I am a Christian," and declined to go into particulars. Lecky spent much time in Italy. Writing to a friend from Naples in 1870, he gives this story about Pope Pius IX: "People at Rome were a good deal amused and rather scandalized at an odd proceeding of the Pope's about six weeks ago. A hideous little African bishop, all speckled with smallpox, was presented to him, and the Pope asked what language he spoke, and was told that the bishop neither spoke nor understood any but his own. Whereupon the Pope said in Italian, in a solemn tone as if he was giving a benediction, 'Then since you do not understand me, I may say this is the ugliest son of Christ I have ever seen.'" About the decree of papal infallibility, after its proclamation by the Council, Lecky wrote: "By committing itself to the infallibility of the long line of Popes, the Roman Church cut itself off from the historical spirit and from the learning of our age, and exposed itself to crushing and unanswerable refutations." And again he said: "Catholicism is rapidly becoming incredible to all intelligent minds. The prospects of Protestantism are better than they have ever been since the end of the sixteenth century. All political changes tend to make Protestant nations more and more the magnets and the rulers of the world; and the infallibility decree is sending large numbers of Romanists in the same direction." After the close of the Franco-Prussian war, which the Vatican helped to precipitate, Lecky wrote: "I think that the calm, patriotic, unboastful enthusiasm which the Germans have shown, their manifest love of peace, and their simple piety in the hour of victory, have been very noble. . . . France was utterly wrong in the war, and she began it with an amount of boasting and of lying that was revolting to the last degree." Of the Irish, this historian said, "The most affectionate, imaginative, and quick-witted race I have ever known." Lecky was troubled over "the secularization of Oxford—chapel no longer compulsory, the truth of Christianity, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul made subjects of unrestricted dispute. A strange seething is going on, and when one considers that the present of its universities is in great

measure the future of a nation one is perplexed to think what is coming." In illustration of the absurdities of Episcopalianism we are told of the Anglican bishop, Phillpotts, who maintained that in cemeteries it was essential that there should be a wall at least four feet high between the Episcopalian and the non-Episcopalian corpses. Lecky did not enjoy being in politics. He said, "I have neither the business faculty nor the callousness required for such a career." The seven years when he was sitting in the British Parliament as member from Trinity College, Dublin, were hardly happy ones. In the winter of 1895 he writes a friend: "The work is physically very tiring, and I often feel that a good deal of it might be done equally well, with a little training, by a fairly intelligent poodle dog." This great historian died quietly sitting in his library, October 22, 1903. At Nuremberg in 1875 he saw on a tomb this epitaph: "I will arise, O God, when thou callest me, but let me rest a while, for I am very weary." In his commonplace book on the last day of the year Lecky once wrote: "I am thinking of the prayer of the Breton sailors, 'My God, my God, help me: the sea is so great and my bark is so small!' The sea of thought, the sea of life, the sea of death—" But he hoped to see his Pilot face to face when he had crossed the bar.

The German Element in the United States By ALBERT BERNHARDT FAUST. Two volumes. Svo Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Price, \$7.50.

THERE are few subjects of more intense interest or historical value than the investigation of the various racial elements that enter into the makeup of the so-called American nation. Never in the world's history has such a strange conglomeration of various races been brought together in such a short space of time. What the final result of such a mingling of different national characteristics will be no one can prophesy. At any rate, it is a satisfaction to know that the vast majority of such elements belong to the various forms of the Teutonic race, English, Dutch, and German. The story of the English and Dutch contributions to our national life and history has been often told; that of the German element has not been discussed in the same thorough way until comparatively recent times. We already have had the valuable books from such men as Seldensticker, Löher, Kapp, and especially the various volumes of the Pennsylvania German Society. In this way we have had a pretty full discussion of one narrow element in the United States, that of the so-called Pennsylvania Dutch. These people, as everyone knows, are the descendants of the Germans and Swiss who immigrated to Pennsylvania before the American Revolution, and later overflowed into Virginia, North and South Carolina, Maryland, and the West. In the crucible of the Revolution they were completely Americanized, although many still retain their dialect and quaint religious and social customs. The later immigrations of Germans, those of the nineteenth century, have never up to the present been investigated with the same thoroughness as those of the Pennsylvania Dutch. Happily, this state of things no longer exists, and we have in the present volume what may be called a definitive discussion of the whole subject of the influence of the Germans on our national life, from

the earliest times down to the present. The book itself in its original form was submitted in competition for one of three prizes, offered in 1904 by Mrs. Catherine Seipp, of Chicago, for the best monographs on the German element in the United States. The first prize, of three thousand dollars, was awarded to the author, Professor A. B. Faust of Cornell University. Few men were better prepared to undertake this work than Professor Faust. Born in this country of German parents, using both English and German with equal facility, a graduate of Johns Hopkins University, for many years in charge of the German department at Wesleyan University, and at present in the same department at Cornell University, he has had unusual opportunities for pursuing his investigations. Add to this his indomitable industry, logical habits of mind, clear and interesting style, and the fact that for ten years he has been actively engaged in the work of investigating the influence of the Germans in this country, and we are not surprised that his book was awarded the first prize. This feeling is intensified as we look over these handsome volumes, with their numerous illustrations. The enormous mass of material has been carefully sifted and arranged under appropriate headings, volume one being devoted to the historical outline of the subject, while volume two covers the *cultur-historische* part. Taking up the first volume, we see pass before us the various streams of German immigration: those to the Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys in New York State; the vast movement that made Pennsylvania almost Teutonic in its characteristics; the secondary migrations from Pennsylvania to Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas; and the later streams, grouped together in Chapters XII to XV, under the general title of "The Winning of the West." In this same volume is likewise given the military record of the Germans in the Revolution and the wars of the nineteenth century. Volume two discusses the general influence on the various phases of American industrial, social, religious, and political life. On the material side we have discussions of the prominence of the Germans in agriculture, mining, manufacture of iron and steel, musical instruments, naval architecture, and a dozen other lines of work. Chapter IV discusses the political influence of the German element, while a similar discussion of the same influence on education forms the subject of Chapter V. Both these chapters tend to dispel many false impressions hitherto entertained in respect to the German-Americans. The religious life of the Germans and their influence on American denominations is not treated as fully as we should like, only twenty pages being devoted to that subject in volume two, in connection with the "joy of living," "philanthropy," "German American Women" and "German Traits," all grouped together in Chapter VIII under the general title of "Social and Moral Influence of the German Element." Taking the book as a whole, it can be most heartily recommended. It is scholarly, interesting, and contains the results not merely of work done by others but of a large amount of original investigation on the part of the author. It is the best general treatment of the subject thus far produced in this or any other country.